war," was omitted by common consent as superfluous, since the general provisions of international law include the titular heads of government in this category.

Some little vagueness and misunderstanding had to be cleared away in relation to definition No. 2, "Officers," largely because of the fact that in the German armed forces some of the warrant officers are assimilated in rank to our chief petty officers, and also the Germans do not have the grade of appointed officer such as we have in a limited number of cases. Definition No. 3, "Non-commissioned officers," was deemed to be necessary for the reason that in the German army corporals are not so regarded, while the reverse of the case holds true in our army. Definition No. 4, "State of Origin," was a great stumbling block. What the Germans held up their sleeve in regard to this definition is not even yet clear to me, but they objected to it outright at the beginning of our conference, and only our quiet insistence on this point enabled us to gain it in the closing days of our negotiations. The original definition was so worded in order to cover and protect, among others, such of the members of our armed forces, both naval and military, as might not have completely established their American citizenship; furthermore, in view of the existence and the operation of the German nationality law, commonly referred to as the Delbrueck Law, and the persistent rumors and reports that Germany intended to treat as traitors any of the members of our armed forces who might be captured while still owing allegiance to Germany by German interpretation, we considered it positively essential to have a specifically definite conception of the state of origin so that our Government might stand on very firm ground in demanding for such captives treatment appropriate to prisoners of war. In the course of our lengthy discussions of this particular definition, the attitude of both of the governments involved was pretty clearly stated and was, I think, well understood. I am sure that had the prospect of a further prolongation of the war with a probability of German triumph been apparent, the Germans would have held out against accepting this definition. As the conditions lay at that time, we held more German prisoners than they held Americans; and it was rather strongly intimated to them that in the absence of a conventional agreement cover

ing this question, any radical action on their part, that is, the German authorities, would necessitate suitable return action on the part of our military authorities in France.

Definition No. 5, "Valid and invalid prisoners of war," was also categorically rejected by the German delegation at the outset. One of their expressed objections was that the terms in which this definition was originally clothed were likely to cause panic and pessimism among prisoners of war who might be wounded or sick. Eventually the sense of this definition, couched in milder and less alarming language, was embodied in the annex.

For the purposes of this agreement only, a conventional definition of repatriation was adopted. The peculiar territorial situation of the armed forces of the two parties made it advisable to advance this definition in its terms as adopted, i. e., return to military jurisdiction of the state of origin would, for the purposes of this war and this agreement, constitute repatriation.

This brief account of the conception, constitution, assembly, and performance of the American-German Prisoner of War Conference would be indeed incomplete without the expression of some small tribute to the cordial, helpful, and courteous co-operation of the Swiss Government officials.

In some respects our long-continued sojourn in their midst, along with thousands of "war guests," must necessarily have been at the very least inconvenient. During many days we occupied valuable office space in the Palais Fédéral, or Parliament Building; heat, light, and service were at our disposal day and night, as was also a liberal amount of round table equipment and stationery, an item in itself not inexpensive. Always the hours of convening and the duration of the committee meetings were accorded precedence over the official and personal convenience of the President of the Conference and his Secretariat. I feel that I would be remiss in the performance of a pleasurable duty did I not here and now give appreciative testimony to the keen insight into our proposals and sympathetic comprehension of our motives and ideals; boundless patience with our lengthy discussions and disputations; unfailing tact and ability in smoothing out

the rough places in the road of contentious argument and in discovering exits from seeming impasses; everpresent cheerfulness and strict impartiality in conducting our meetings; all of these things as possessed and exercised by the neutral President of the Joint Conference, Monsieur PAUL DINICHERT, Minister Plenipotentiary in charge of the Swiss Division of Foreign Affairs. I for one am glad and proud to have been associated with so fine a gentleman.

Although naturally far removed from actual daily contact with our labors by reason of his official preoccupation and the strenuous exigencies of his office, nevertheless President CALONDER gave frequent evidence of sincere interest in the progress of the Conference and threw all of his weight and influence towards bringing about a successful conclusion to the joint discussions of the belligerent delegations face to face across the council table.

The latter days of the Conference were characterized by a considerable degree of haste in the effort to iron out the wrinkles of difference and to finally formulate an agreement. Turkey had given up. Austria had caved in. Château Thierry, Belleau Woods and St. Mihiel were historical. Our soldiers were driving in the Argonne. Laon, occupied by the Germans, was being bombarded by one of our U. S. Naval Railway 14-inch gun batteries at a range of 41,000 yards. Metz was within range of another similar battery. And Admiral Plunkett had twice as many more of these great guns en route to the front. The German office of military intelligence surely knew these things and what they portended. Disquieting (to Germans) reports were leaking through from Germany and being published in extra sheets of the local Swiss papers. Our friends the enemy delegates on the opposite side of the board doubtless visioned the mural inscription, "Mene, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin," an admonitory sentence as true and applicable today as it was at the feast of Belshazzar.

Communiqués announcing the Franco-American military successes were displayed at frequent intervals throughout each day at the Agence Radio, a French subsidized news agency extremely popular in Berne and a rendezvous for Entente internés and others aligned on the side of right and justice. Surreptitious visits to the Agence fur

nished to Teuton sympathizers accurate information coupled with cold comfort.

The impending break in Germany was reflected not only in the altered countenances of our German conferees, but also in their changed attitude towards many of the articles in our proposal. They knew or sensed what was coming.

In my notebook, under the date 12 October, I find the following entry :

Mr. Z. told me today-he is the one who gets for us news "made in Germany"-that the Germans are ready to accept President Wilson's terms no matter what they are, and are only hesitating to say so while they find some method to guarantee themselves that if they retire within their borders the Allies will not follow them and invade Germany."

This was prophetic to no small degree.

Two days before the signing of the armistice, the Conference had reached agreement on the articles to be adopted; but unfortunately a general strike throughout Switzerland prevented the printing of the accord, wherefore we were not able to hold the final session for consideration and signature.

The armistice became effective at 11.00 a. m. of Monday, the 11th day of the 11th month of 1918. At 9 p. m. of the same day the closing act of our Conference took place in the Parliament Building at Berne. Monsieur Calonder had intended to preside at the dissolution, as he did at the formation of the Conference; but affairs of state of great moment imperatively demanded his presence at the Conseil Fédéral, then in almost continuous session. A general strike was on, involving the railroads, posts, and telegraphs, all federalized; troops had been mobilized by auto and camion and were bivouacked in the squares and market places of Berne-indeed in all the cities of northern Switzerland; the Parliament Building was heavily guarded on all sides; the tramp of soldiers within and without and the clatter of horses' hoofs on the flagged pavement of the Bundesplatz, just under the windows of our assembly room, came to our ears even as we gathered together for the final dramatic meeting of the Conference; the Bolshevist peril, which had insidiously entrenched itself in Switzer

land, the model republic-democracy, during the years of turmoil and strife surrounding that fair land, had to be met and defeated.

Would that I possessed the gift of word and pen to describe that last meeting in its impressive setting. It did not last very long. Monsieur Dinichert presided. For and in the name of the absent President he raised the curtain for the last act.

More than ever was I thankful that I was not a German.

Five copies of the completed agreement, in parallel texts of English and German, were signed by the Commissioners of the two Governments. There were two copies for us, two for the Germans, and one for the Swiss archives, this last being the official copy for reference in case of future need. The signing began at 9.15, requiring about twenty minutes for completion. Then Monsieur Dinichert made a short address of adieu, to which Prince von Hohenlohe and Minister Garrett, in turn, responded briefly, but with feeling. At 9.57 p. m. the Conference was declared adjourned sine die.

Across the table we exchanged bows of formality with the German delegates. We did not shake hands with them. We felt towards them no spirit of fraternity, not because of their individual personalities, but because of the system and the government they were representing and the practices for which they had stood and would, if victorious, continue to stand.

And so the Conference ended, having extended over a period of almost seven weeks.

Our leave-taking of M. Dinichert was most cordial; and deep in our hearts we wished for himself prosperity and for his country "a happy issue out of all her afflictions.'

I am by no means sure that this agreement will soon or even ever be ratified by our Government;2 in the opinion of some, ratification would be in serious conflict with the terms of the existing armistice; but this I believe, that ratified or unratified, it will prove to be a document of great referential value in future negotiations concerning warfare.

Our daily subcommittee meetings were always formal, as the importance of their being and object demanded; they were always pre

2 Written December, 1918.