sea."

All "territories inhabited by indubitably Polish populations" have been accorded to Poland. All territory inhabited by German majorities, save for a few isolated towns and for colonies established on land recently forcibly expropriated and situated in the midst of indubitably Polish territory, have been left to Germany. Wherever the will of the people is in doubt a plebiscite has been provided for. The town of Danzig has been constituted as a free city, so that the inhabitants are autonomous and do not come under Polish rule, and form no part of the Polish state. Poland has been given certain economic rights in Danzig, and the city itself has been severed from Germany because in no other way was it possible to provide for that "free and secure access to the sea" which Germany has promised to concede.

The German counter-proposals entirely conflict with the agreed basis of peace. They provide that great majorities of indisputably Polish population shall be kept under German rule. They deny secure access to the sea to a nation of over twenty million people, whose nationals are in the majority all the way to the coast, in order to maintain territorial connection between East and West Prussia, whose trade has always been mainly sea-borne. They cannot, therefore, be accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. At the same time, in certain cases the German note has established a case for rectification which will be made, and in view of the contention that Upper Silesia, though inhabited by a two to one majority of Poles (1,250,000 to 650,000, 1910 German census), wishes to remain a part of Germany, they are willing that the question of whether or not Upper Silesia should form part of Germany or of Poland, should be determined by the vote of the inhabitants themselves.

In regard to the Saar Basin, the régime proposed by the Allied and Associated Powers is to continue for fifteen years. This arrangement they considered necessary both to the general scheme for reparation, and in order that France may have immediate and certain compensation for the wanton destruction of her northern coal-mines. The district has been transferred not to French sovereignty, but to the control of the Society of the League of Nations. This method has the double advantage that it involves no annexation, while it gives possession of the coal-field to France and maintains the economic unity of the district, so important to the interests of the inhabitants. At the end of fifteen years the mixed population, which in the meanwhile will have had control of its own local affairs under the governing supervision of the League of Nations, will have complete freedom to decide whether it wishes union with Germany, union with France, or the continuance of the régime provided for in the treaty.

As to the territories which it is proposed to transfer from Germany to Denmark and Belgium, some of these were robbed by Prussia by force, and in every case the transfer will only take place as the result of a decision of the inhabitants themselves, taken under conditions which will insure complete freedom to vote.

Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that the native inhabitants of the German colonies are strongly opposed to being again brought under Germany's sway; and the record of German rule, the traditions of the German Government, and the use to which these colonies were put as bases from which to prey upon the commerce of the world, make it impossible for

the Allied and Associated Powers to return them to Germany, or to entrust to her the responsibility for the training and education of their inhabitants.

For these reasons the Allied and Associated Powers are satisfied that their territorial proposals are both in accord with the agreed basis of peace and are necessary to the future peace of Europe. They are, therefore, not prepared to modify them except in the respects laid down.

Arising out of the territorial settlement are the proposals in regard to international control of rivers. It is clearly in accord with the agreed basis of the peace that inland states should have secure access to the sea along rivers which are navigable to their territory. They believe that the arrangements they propose are vital to the free life of the inland states. They do not think that they are any derogation of the rights of the other riparian states. If viewed according to the discredited doctrine that every state is engaged in a desperate struggle for ascendancy over its neighbors, no doubt such arrangements may be an impediment to the artificial strangling of a rival. But if it be the ideal that nations are to coöperate in the ways of commerce and peace, they are natural and right. The provision for the presence of representatives of important non-riparian states on the commissions is security that the commissions will consider the interests of all. A number of modifications, however, have been made in the original proposals.

Under the heading of economic and financial clauses the German delegation appear to have seriously misinterpreted the proposals of the Allied and Associated Powers. There is no intention on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers to strangle Germany or to prevent her from taking her proper place in international trade and commerce. Provided that she abides by the Treaty of Peace, and provided also that she abandons those aggressive and exclusive traditions which have been apparent in her business no less than her political methods, the Allied and Associated Powers intend that Germany shall have fair treatment in the purchase of raw materials and the sale of goods, subject to those temporary provisions already mentioned in the interests of the nations ravaged and artificially weakened by German action. It is their desire that the passions engendered by the war should die as soon as possible, and that all nations should share in the prosperity which comes from the honest supply of mutual needs. They wish that Germany shall enjoy this prosperity like the rest, though much of the fruit of it must necessarily go for many years to come in making reparation to her neighbors for the damage she has done. In order to make their intention clear, a number of modifications have been made in the financial and economic clauses of the treaty. But the principles upon which the treaty is drawn must stand.

The German delegation have greatly misinterpreted the reparation proposals of the treaty. These proposals confine the amounts payable by Germany to what is clearly justifiable under the terms of armistice in respect of damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies by the aggression of Germany. They do not provide for that interference in the internal life of Germany by the Reparation Commission which is alleged. They are designed to make the payment of that reparation which Germany must make as easy and convenient

to both parties as possible, and they will be interpreted in that sense. Allied and Associated Powers, therefore, are not prepared to modify them.

The

But they recognize, with the German delegation, the advantage of arriving as soon as possible at the fixed and definite sum which shall be payable by Germany and accepted by the Allies. It is not possible to fix this sum today, for the extent of damage and the cost of repair have not yet been ascertained. They are, therefore, willing to accord to Germany all necessary and reasonable facilities to enable her to survey the devastated and damaged regions, and to make proposals thereafter within four months of the signing of the treaty for a settlement of the claims under each of the categories of damage for which she is liable. If within the following two months an agreement can be reached, the exact liability of Germany will have been ascertained. If agreement has not been reached by then, the arrangement as provided in the treaty will be executed. The Allied and Associated Powers have given careful consideration to the request of the German delegation that Germany should be admitted to the League of Nations as one of the conditions of peace. They are unable to accede to this request. The German revolution was postponed to the last moments of the war, and there is as yet no guarantee that it represents a permanent change. In the present temper of international feeling, it is impossible to expect the free nations of the world to sit down immediately in equal association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged. To attempt this too soon would delay and not hasten that process of appeasement which all desire. But the Allied and Associated Powers believe that if the German people prove by their acts that they intend to fulfil the conditions of the peace, and that they have abandoned forever those aggressive and estranging policies which caused the war, and have now become a people with whom it is possible to live in neighborly good fellowship, the memories of the past years will speedily fade, and it will be possible at an early date to complete the League of Nations by the admission of Germany thereto. It is their earnest hope that this may be the case. They believe that the prospects of the world depend upon the close and friendly coöperation of all nations in adjusting international questions and promoting the welfare and progress of mankind. But the early entry of Germany into the League must depend principally upon the action of the German people themselves.

In the course of its discussion of their economic terms and elsewhere, the German delegation has repeated its denunciation of the blockade instituted by the Allied and Associated Powers. Blockade is and always has been a legal and recognized method of war, and its operation has always been adopted to changes in international communications. If the Allied and Associated Powers have imposed upon Germany a blockade of exceptional severity, which throughout they have consistently sought to conform to the principles of international law, it is because of the criminal character of the war initiated by Germany and of the barbarous methods adopted by her in prosecuting it.

The Allied and Associated Powers have not attempted to make a specific answer to all the observations made in the German note. The fact of that omission does not indicate, however, that they are even either admitted or open to discussion.

In conclusion, the Allied and Associated Powers must make it clear that this letter and the memorandum attached constitute their last word. They have examined the German observations and counter-proposals with earnest attention and care. They have, in consequence, made practical concessions in the Draft Treaty. But in its principles they stand by it. They believe that it is not only a just settlement of the great war, but that it provides the basis upon which the peoples of Europe can live together in friendship and equality. At the same time it creates the machinery for the peaceful adjustment of all international problems by discussion and consent, and whereby the settlement of 1919 itself can be modified from time to time to suit new facts and new conditions as they arise. It is frankly not based upon a general condonation of the events of 1914-1918. It would not be a peace of justice if it were. But it represents a sincere and deliberate attempt to establish "that reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind," which was the agreed basis of the peace.

As such, the treaty in its present form must be accepted or rejected. The Allied and Associated Powers therefore require a declaration from the German delegation within five days that they are prepared to sign the treaty as now amended. If they declare within the period that they are prepared to sign the treaty as it stands, arrangements will be made for the immediate signature of the peace at Versailles. In default of such a declaration this communication constitutes the notification provided for in Article II of the Convention of February 16, 1919, prolonging the Armistice signed on November 11, 1918, and again prolonged by the Agreement of December 13, 1918, and January 16, 1919, the said Armistice will then terminate and the Allied and Associated Powers will take such steps as they think needful to enforce their terms.

The more important modifications in the draft treaty which the Allies agreed to make were as follows:

A plebiscite for Upper Silesia, with guarantees of coal from that region.

Frontier rectifications in West Prussia.

The omission of the third zone from the Schleswig plebiscite.

A temporary increase of the permitted strength of the German army from 100,000 to 200,000.

A declaration of intention to submit within a month of the treaty's signature a list of those accused of violation of the laws and customs of war.

An offer to coöperate with a German Commission on Reparations and to receive suggestions for discharging the obligation.

Certain detailed modifications in the financial, economic, and ports and waterways clauses, including the abolition of the proposed Kiel Canal Commission.

Assurance to Germany of membership in the League of Nations in the early future if she fulfils her obligations."

According to the last paragraph of the Allied reply of June 16th, the treaty as modified was required to be accepted or rejected within five days. This period was later extended by two days, making the ultimatum expire on June 23d. Should the treaty not be accepted within that period, the armistice was to terminate and the Allied and Associated Powers would "take such steps as they think needful to enforce their terms."

The delivery of the ultimatum of the Allies produced a Cabinet crisis in Germany and a change in the Government. The original German Peace delegation left Versailles with the final terms of the Allies. In a note dated June 21, the day before the expiration of the time limit, and delivered on June 22d by a subordinate peace delegate, the German Government offered to sign the treaty with reservations. These reservations declined responsibility for any resistance by the inhabitants of districts separated from Germany by the treaty, or for the failure to carry out the economic and financial conditions, which Germany regarded as incapable of fulfilment. Germany declined to accept Articles 227-230 of the treaty under which she was required to admit responsibility for the war, to give up for trial German subjects accused of breaches of international law and acts contrary to the customs of war, and a protest was lodged against taking away the German colonial possessions. The note proposed a declaration, to be made an integral part of the treaty, whereby within two years it was to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, before which German delegates would have the same rights and privileges as the representatives of the other contracting parties, for decision as to whether the conditions of the treaty impair the right of self-determination of the German people and also whether they impair the free economic development of Germany on the basis of equality.

A reply was delivered immediately by the Allies peremptorily stating that the time for discussion had passed, that they could accept or acknowledge no qualification or reservation, and must require of the German representatives an unequivocal decision as to their purpose to sign and accept as a whole, or not to sign and accept, the treaty as finally formulated. M. Clemenceau also stated that "after the signature the Allies and Associated Powers must hold Germany 7 The New York Times, June 17, 1919.