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on the relations of China with Great Britain, Russia, France, Germany, Japan and the United States; and it concludes with a chapter on “International Control” and another entitled “Conclusion.” The former is misleading, for while it deals with some of the attempts at international co-operation, it falls short of being an intimate or comprehensive study of the vital problem of international control. And the latter is a brief summary of some results of foreign pressure on China and of general statements concerning the need of international co-operation.
The author has an uninteresting and prosy style. He intersperses his text with long and wearisome quotations; and he presupposes on the part of his readers an intimate knowledge of recent Chinese diplomatic history. These drawbacks, in an otherwise attractive volume, are sufficient to prevent the work from appealing to the general reader. And it will be equally disappointing to the student and the expert, since it contains little new material and falls short of being a broad, masterly treatment of the subject in hand. In some chapters, such as those on “Great Britain,” “Russia,” and “Japan," the writer has given a fairly complete account of the topic under discussion; but those on “France,” “Germany,” “United States,” and “International Control” are inadequate, both in their conception and in their treatment of the problems involved. There is a bibliography, an index, and an outline of the contents of each chapter, all of which add to the usefulness of the book. But the great lack which the reader feels throughout the volume is a map of China, or better, a series of sketch maps, that would show the location and extent of the various railway and financial concessions described, or referred to, in each chapter.
The idea of the author in defining terms and phrases in his “Theoretical Introduction” is excellent; but it would have been more satisfactory if he had carried out his plan consistently. He fails, however, to make clear the “Open Door" policy; and, on the question of “concessions," he confines his discussion to railway concessions, avoiding any reference to economic and territorial concessions. While on the topic of “control,” he does not explain the different degrees and kinds of political control. This inconsistency is undoubtedly due to the vital error of supposing that one can write intelligently on one phase of a great Oriental question without keeping its connection with the rest of the problem constantly in mind and without making this connection perfectly clear to one's readers. The relationship of the problem of Foreign Financial Control in China to the whole situation-financial, economic and political—in that vast Republic today, should have been explained in some detail—at least in the Introduction.
One cannot but feel that the author has undertaken an unnecessary and thankless task in attempting to produce a volume dealing only with the financial and railway policy of foreign states in China, without making a study of the political policies of these states. There are excellent works already on the railroads of China; and there are other books that cover the financial history as well as he does, for, unfortunately, his narrative stops in 1913 and it does not give the intimate history of the Six Power Loan or of later loans.
Moreover, the writer is led inevitably into blunders, whenever he steps outside the narrow field of his chosen research. For instance, he speaks of the Ishii-Lansing Treaty in high terms as "removing all danger of friction between the United States and Japan” (p. 194), and as securing “the independence and territorial integrity of China and the 'Open Door,' for commerce and industry." But it is well known that this agreement was so skillfully yet loosely drawn, that it confirmed Japan in her holdings and rights in Manchuria and North China, while affording American interests no more protection than already existed and furnishing no guarantee against further aggression on the part of Japan. And no mention was made of the racial discrimination in our immigration laws—one of the sources of friction between the two countries; while the transfer of Shantung to Japan in the recent peace treaty shows that the high-sounding phrases of the Ishii agreement concerning the integrity of China meant nothing to the rulers of the Japanese Empire.
Again, without any explanation of the work and policy of Japan in the Far East, the author suddenly claims that: “All treaties, conventions, agreements, and alliances through which Japan is consolidating her position are concluded for the consolidation and maintenance of a permanent peace in eastern Asia. This is the key to the whole Far Eastern Question: A Permanent Peace but a Japanese Peace (p. 194).” This sounds well; but there is a selfish, sinister side to this program, which is apparent only to those who know the real meaning of the term, “Japanese Peace.” Unfortunately, while the present party controls the destiny of the Empire of the Rising
Sun, this will mean nothing more than a peaceful situation where. Japan gets everything she wants in the trade and development of the East, and the rest of the world the fragments that remain, and where China will enjoy her national life and development under Japanese leading-strings.
The publisher's advertisement of this volume conveys a wrong impression of its purpose and contents. This is inexcusable, and in the long run will not help the sale of their books. “It presents,” they claim, "an unbiassed analysis of the financial and political activities of the six leading Powers in China during the last twenty years." But the author begins his work with the statement that he is concerned only with the financial side of recent Chinese development. And he keeps strictly to his program, except that he lays more stress on railway development than on financial or economic progress, and that he says nothing about the developments of the last six years. Again, the publishers state that the book “emphasizes the need of international co-operation.” It does so in a few sentences; but one is not impressed with the case as presented. Nor does the author suggest any feasible plan by means of which this can be brought about or the Chinese Government set on its feet-financially, economically and politically. Further, the publishers state that the aim of this volume is a contribution toward international conciliation, by assisting the Powers “to readjust their specific national interests and viewpoints on the basis of mutual respect for the needs and aspirations of all, including those of China.” It is doubtful if the diplomats of any state will be greatly impressed by a book that tells only part of the story and fails to give an adequate picture of the terrible plighteconomic, financial and political-in which China stands today, and to prove the hopelessness of her outlook without some form of international intervention.
NORMAN Dwight HARRIS.
El Perú y la Gran Guerra. By Juan Bautista de Lavalle. Lima:
Imprenta Americana, 1919. pp. xv, 439.
Students of the Great War will not overlook or underestimate the assistance to the desired end which was rendered by so many of the Latin-American nations. In the volume before us we find an excellent account of the events leading up and subsequent to the breaking off of relations between Peru and Germany. The history, fully documented, of the destruction of the Lorton (a Peruvian vessel), is set forth, as well as the exchange of correspondence between the representatives of Peru and of Germany with relation thereto. The work deserves, therefore, as indicated, the careful attention of the student and historian.
From another point this volume can, to advantage, be studied by those who are interested in Latin-American forms of courtesy, and who wish to submit themselves to them. Such a one will note the exchange of compliments or courtesies passing between Peru and other South, as well as Central, American countries, as well as between their cities, upon the breaking of relations and afterward upon the signing of the armistice. The emphasis placed upon the exchange of courtesies on these occasions between the various members of the diplomatic corps and the public officials of Lima will not be unnoticed. All of these matters suggest an attitude of mind with which we are relatively unfamiliar, but which is to be penetrated and understood if we are to meet our friends of the South upon their own ground.
JACKSON H. RALSTON.
Mein Kriegs-Tagebuch. Vol. I. Das erste Kriegsjahr. By Alfred
H. Fried. Zurich: Max Rascher Verlag. 1918. pp. xxiv, 472.
The author informs us that in August, 1914, he was in the midst of the preparatory labors for the Twenty-First World Peace Congress, which was to have convened in his home city, Vienna, one month later. The outbreak of war was to him, as to so many others, a bolt out of a clear sky. Although long familiar with the conditions making a European conflagration imminent, he could not bring himself to a belief in the actuality. He thus found himself unfit for other work and sought solace in this diary of his daily impressions.
The present volume takes us only through the first year of the war. The author recalls the warnings published in prior years in his peace organ, the Friedens-Warte, and frankly admits that he overrated the elements making for peace. His first analysis of causes leads him to the question of Alsace-Lorraine, and he even ventures a possible solution. He had long maintained that a good understanding between France and Germany was the key to peace in Europe. Later, when the exchange of correspondence between the capitals of Europe begins to appear in the daily press, he alters his opinions on the causes of the war and reaches the conclusion that the Central Empires saw a favorable moment for establishing a technical superiority in arms and at the same time found the Russian military party only too willing to play the game. While these premises are reasonable enough, we fail to understand how they lead him to the conclusion that it is thus a "preventive war." · Even in the first month, he correctly foresees the intervention of the United States if the war is to continue for any great length of time. He never gives up the hope of a settlement through American mediation, and proposes to the late Edwin Mead, whom he sees in Leipsic, that the nations of North and South America should jointly offer mediation through the instrumentality of the Pan-American Union.
Although parts of the diary seem to have been published in Berlin shortly after they were written, he adopts from the beginning a distinctly critical tone in discussing the attempted justifications of the German and Austrian press. He does not hesitate to point out crucial omissions in the documentary evidence produced relating to Belgium. He condemns unqualifiedly the sinking of the Lusitania. On the other hand, he criticizes, upon legal and moral grounds, the assumption by Great Britain of the right to treat captured submarine crews other than as prisoners of war.
By the Spring of 1915, after removing to Switzerland, he has become convinced of the utter hypocrisy of the governments of the Central Powers. The results of his observations lead him to advocate the elimination of the traditions of feudalism in international relations, the democratization of government, “the internationalization of disputes," and such changes in the policies of all states as shall harmonize with the needs of international organization.
The material with which he deals is often journalistic, yet he maintains a philosophic point of view. No one will fail to respect the author's impartiality, nor his reverent yearning for the coming of a better day. He is truly a Jeremiah, lamenting the false ideals by which his people have been led to their doom.
ARTHUR K. KUHN.