we ought not to lose sight of the fact that such consideration and the action resulting from it are essentially diplomatic in nature. It is, in brief, the transference of a dispute in a particular case from the capitals of the disputants to the place where the delegates of the nations assemble to deliberate together on matters which affect their common interests. It does not-and this we should understandremove the question from the processes of diplomacy or prevent the influences which enter into diplomacy from affecting its consideration. Nor does it to an appreciable extent change the actual inequality which exists among nations in the matter of power and influence.

On the other hand, justice applied through the agency of an impartial tribunal clothed with an international jurisdiction eliminates the diplomatic methods of compromise and concessions and recognizes that before the law all nations are equal and equally entitled to the exercise of their rights as sovereign and independent states. In a word, international democracy exists in the sphere of legal justice and, up to the present time, in no other relation between nations.

Let us then with as little delay as possible establish an international tribunal or tribunals of justice with The Hague Court as a foundation; let us provide an easier, a cheaper, and a better procedure than now exists; and let us draft a simple and concise body of legal principles to be applied to the questions to be adjudicated. When that has been accomplished, and it ought not to be a difficult task, if the delegates of the governments charged with it are chosen for their experience and learning in the field of jurisprudence, we will, in my judgment, have done more to prevent international wars through removing their causes than can be done by any other means that has been devised or suggested.

I have but just returned from six months spent in the settling of controversies between nations through the medium of a great international conference, which followed the customs and practices of diplomacy as they will unquestionably be followed by all deliberative bodies representing the nations. I believe that I know and understand the currents and countercurrents which impelled action and

influenced decisions in that conference. It is not my purpose to review the conduct of those negotiations or to imply more than that they were diplomatic in character. But with this experience vividly in mind I cannot too strongly assert that international justice interpreted and applied by an impartial court can do more to prevent future wars than any agency, single or collective, operating in the sphere of diplomacy.

The mind of the world was never more receptive to the idea of applied justice. Mankind has endured such terrible woes from injustice and lawlessness that they seek above all things the restoration of the rule of law and justice. The governments cannot ignore this universal demand. They should not. They cannot too soon set up the machinery and let it get to work in the settlement of the controversies which continue to arouse apprehension and concern among those who seek to see a sure foundation laid for a permanent peace.

To adopt an international code of principles for the guidance of an international court of justice is, I believe, as essential as the creation of the court itself. After every great international war changes in methods and weapons have compelled a revision of the rules of warfare. The principles have not changed so much as their application to new conditions. The changes that will have to be made after this war, which for magnitude and ingenuity in the destruction of life and property surpassed all previous wars, are numerous and radical. In the past, governments have employed their armies and navies against one another as champions of their respective nations. The noncombatants of the populations have formed a class which was without military value and which was on that account free from hostile attack. But today each able-bodied individual in a state, though not serving in the armed forces of a belligerent, is a distinct asset in the prosecution of a war. The workman in the shop, the peasant in the field, the miner underground, the sailor on the merchant ship, are necessary factors in the prosecution of a war as they never were before. This Great War has been a war of peoples, and not a war of armies and navies alone. Whole nations have been mobilized in the supreme effort to vanquish their enemies. How

this manifest fact will affect the rules for the immunity and protection of noncombatants is a question which will require very careful consideration.

The introduction of the submarine, the aeroplane, and the dirigible, made possible by the invention of the internal-combustion engine, the use of the wireless telegraph and telephone, and the employment of lethal gases, of supercannon and possibly of aerial torpedoes make obsolete many rules formerly observed but now ignored.

What is to become of the rules of blockade as they existed prior to 1914? Are we to continue the farce of distinguishing between articles contraband and noncontraband? What will be the rights and duties of neutrals after the experience of the last five years? Will there be and can there be such a thing as neutrality when a war involves many nations and shatters the commercial and social order of the whole earth? These are some of the problems which will have to be solved by those who will be charged with redrafting the rules of war on land and sea.

New and puzzling questions are also presented as to the application of principles of right in times of peace. The employment of aircraft and undersea vessels in commerce and communication, the regulation of the use of wireless telegraphy, the rights as to the operation of ocean cables, and other subjects of like nature should be fully discussed before the principles of international law are put into final codified form. Then, too, there is another group of subjects as to which definite principles should be laid down in order that the present uncertainty and confusion of rights may be removed. Among these subjects are the right of expatriation and naturalization, the precise nature of business domicile, the right to retain title to ocean cables cut or diverted during a war, and others which it is needless to recite, as enough has been stated to show the importance of the task which lies before the conference charged with the codification of the principles of law applicable in time of peace and the rules of conduct in time of war.

The system of mandatories under the League of Nations as provided in the Covenant, which to the casual observer appears simple in principle and application, is a novelty in political authority which

the more it is studied from the legal standpoint the greater the number of problems which it presents.

The determination of the possession of the sovereignty over territory is essential to the determination of international rights and obligations. In the case of territory subject to a mandatory, the question therefore arises as to who possesses the sovereignty of such territory. Certainly not the mandatory which derives its authority solely from an agreement conferring upon it a limited exercise of sovereign rights. Is it then the League of Nations which possesses the full sovereignty, the exercise of which is delivered in part only to an agent or trustee? That would seem to be the logical answer, and yet consider the questions which that answer raises. Does the League of Nations possess the attributes of an independent state so that it can function as a possessor of sovereignty over territory? Is the League then a supernational world state clothed with world sovereignty? If the League possesses the sovereignty, can it avoid responsibility for the misconduct of its agent, the mandatory? If the League is not capable of possessing sovereignty, then who does possess it, who is responsible for the acts of the mandatory; and upon what ultimate authority does the League base the issuance of a mandate?

I might present a score of other questions of a similar nature which with those propounded will have to be definitely answered some time if the mandatory system comes into operation. To-day these questions are academic and may be considered technical, and no doubt by many are so considered, but it may not be long before they become concrete and very practical. It is not an overstatement to say that nine-tenths of all international controversies arise over questions pertaining to the possession of sovereignty and the conflict of sovereign rights. I do not think that mandatories and the source of their authority can escape from the test of the legality of their exercise of sovereign rights. The system must be philosophically and logically worked out from the legal point of view or it will result in confusion. I do not say this in disparagement of the system, but only as a reminder that often that which appears simple is exceedingly complex when analyzed. It is needless, however, to say this to a body of jurists whose experience has taught them that difficulties are only

too often hidden in a statute or a treaty provision, which seems at first plain and easy of enforcement. Personally, I believe that a definite legal formula can be found to bring the mandatory system into harmony with the conception of sovereignty, and the determination of international rights and obligations. But I am not prepared at this time to propound a theory to meet fully the situation, which possesses novel features, to say the least.

In addition to the variety of questions thus raised in connection with the idea of mandates, the principles governing the establishment of international servitudes will require careful study in order that they may be more clearly formulated than they have been in the past. While there have been in certain instances rights of way over territory, the rules applicable to them have not been as fully defined as in the case of the common use of international waterways and of special rights in territorial waters. The new theory of servitudes on land differs from the old, which was based on expediency and mutual advantage, in that the new depends on an assertion of right which arises from an asserted principle that a nation ought not to be against its will barred from the sea, the common property and highway of mankind, and thus deprived of the opportunity to engage in ocean-borne commerce. How far this principle should go in support of the right to free ports and land transit is a question which must be answered with due regard to the rights of territorial sovereignty and national safety.

I might expand the list of subjects for consideration suggested by the Treaty of Peace which will invite the learning and wisdom of those who will, I sincerely hope, be charged with the codification of the principles of international law. Even if I subject myself to the charge of repetition, let me say that I most earnestly advocate the formulation of such a code by an international conference of jurists and publicists. With a definite standard of legal rights sanctioned by the nations the administration of international relations as well as the administration of international justice will become more consistent and less a prey to expediency and political opportunism.

There is one other subject of a legal character of which I desire to speak because it has excited much general discussion at home