powerful state with a sea coast, but will its political life be any more harmonious than its past gives reason to expect?

Unless Russia is reassembled, will not the development of her parts, her commercial future, be darkened?

We may rejoice in Italy's recovery of her Irredenta, yet deprecate her greed to absorb the Adriatic littoral.

There is plenty of room for mutual jealousies; is any Talleyrand in sight to play upon them?

The territorial adjustments at Vienna were based upon a return to the status quo of 1792 in the main, but "compensations" were demanded in addition. Russia also was determined upon the possession of Warsaw, while Prussia claimed Saxony, which had adhered to Napoleon. These demands split the solidarity of the four leading Powers. France came in with Austria and Great Britain, consequently to keep the other two in check, and worked for a return to arms which was avoided by yielding in part to Russia's and Prussia's insistence.

In this we see the tendency of a coalition which has won its war to fall apart. The cementing influence' disappears and other earlier causes of friction revive. For the purification of national character, which, according to some, war brings about, does not abolish national selfishness.

The situation at Vienna was comparatively simple, however. An autocratic shuffling of the stakes and a redistribution on the line of least resistance satisfied the parties.

But to-day we have a more complicated set of problems and a more exacting and critical gallery, because it is a democratic body responsible to many peoples.

The territorial adjustments which are demanded are fairly revolutionary, setting up certain new states, shearing certain old ones, combining, effacing, protecting, repairing the crimes of past ages.

Moreover, the principles by which the powers profess to be guided are obscure and ill defined. Take one of the simplest cases, that of Alsace-Lorraine.

Mr. Wilson's reference to this in his fourteen pointed address said that the wrong of 1871 should be righted. He has also adhered to the principle of self-determination for small peoples.

Well, then, are Alsace-Lorraine to go back to France as the result of a plebiscite if restored at all, or not? On this we may be sure Germany will be vociferous.

Or consider the respective claims of Italy and the new and greater Servia to Illyria as far as Fiume. What settlement of this problem can be worked out which will not sow the seeds of future trouble?

How shall Constantinople and the Straits and Palestine be treated? But besides the difficult territorial problems are others even more apt to cause difference, and of a nature which the diplomats at Vienna could not have conceived.

Punishment for war crimes; how shall they be tried and how shall they be punished, yet unless tried and punished, the laws of war are no better than a dead letter!

Reparation for illegal ship sinkings, particularly of neutral owners; how can this be obtained when there are not German ships and German money enough to give reparation?

What is freedom of the seas; and if it means a weakening of the naval arm can it and should it be demanded of that British fleet which has saved civilization from German domination?

A league to enforce peace; something which everybody wants but no one is quite sure how it is to be brought about.

The question of disarmament, the abolition of conscription in its old form, without which we shall see a return to the race for armaments and the impoverishment of all peoples. How is this reconcilable with our demand for a great navy as "big as anyone's," say the sponsors of the plan. And then there is the tremendous problem of finding amongst our enemies that responsibility and that sovereignty with which alone we can deal.

The catalogue is long enough to point my moral. When you have a number of intricate and controversial questions to discuss; when the debaters are many and governed by a variety of motives, from greed to altruism, from sense to sentimentality; when the peoples of the world, watching each move in the game, are governed by unbridled democracy as never before; how can you get results?

Only, as it seems to the writer, by limiting the topics; by postponing the most controversial ones; by strenuous efforts to do justice; by establishing control in a few hands, which shall be dictatorial; and by taking to heart the warning of Vienna.

THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.

INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVES

AN interesting example of the possibility of establishing, on a practical and workable basis, international executive committees with certain delegated powers conferred upon them by the participating governments, for the purpose of securing joint international control in special spheres of common interest, is furnished by the successful operation during the war of international executives for nitrate of soda, tin, hides and leather, and certain other raw materials, and some food supplies.

These Executives, as they were called, were international joint committees organized by agreements between the United States and the principal Allied Governments, each committee being vested with certain well-defined executive powers relating to the procurement and distribution of some one or more of the materials mentioned to the best advantage of all the participating countries.

In the case of each of these materials the estimated world's supply available for the use of the Allies was inadequate for their requirements, and it was therefore necessary to adopt some method of stimulating production and at the same time to avoid unduly increasing the prices by competitive and unregulated buying; and to determine by common consent the share of these materials to be apportioned to each of the Allied countries and arrange for its allocation in accordance with their agreed requirements; and also to arrange for supplying each country from the markets most conveniently located for procuring its requirements with reference to shipping facilities which constituted a limiting factor in making the world's production available.

The general plan upon which all of these Executives were formed was for the appropriate governmental agency in each country to enter into a special agreement with the others, establishing the particular Executive created thereby and stipulating that it should be composed of an agreed number of representatives of each participating country with authority to carry out the specified arrangements agreed upon, with the proviso that these arrangements must be modified and readjusted from time to time by such further agreements as might be necessary in order to serve the best interests of all concerned. These

special agreements further provided for and defined, subject to the aforesaid reservation as to modifications and readjustments, the specific powers and duties of the Executives thereby established.

Different problems and conditions presented themselves in each case, requiring corresponding differences in treatment. In the case of nitrate of soda, for example, except for the supplementary supply produced through fixation plants and other artificial processes, which had been established during the war in the Allied countries, the entire available world's supply came from a single source, which was the natural nitrate beds in Chile, a neutral country, and the entire output of these beds was necessary to meet the requirements of the Allies. In the case of nitrate of soda, therefore, the problem was to arrange for the procurement of the largest possible output of nitrate from Chile at the lowest prices consistent with the greatest possible production, and to determine, by joint agreement among the Allies, how this supply should be allocated to the best advantage of the Allied interests.

To meet this situation an inter-allied agreement establishing the nitrate of soda Executive provided that all nitrate for use in the participating countries should be purchased only when and as authorized, and at prices fixed by the Executive, and that all purchases so authorized should be made under the direction of a Director of Purchases appointed by the Executive, and also that all nitrate so purchased should be pooled both as to quantity and price for the common interest of the governments concerned, and that the amount to be imported to each country should be determined by the Executive in accordance with prearranged allocations as fixed by the terms of the agreement.

Different methods of procurement and purchasing were found to be necessary in the case of some of the other raw materials mentioned, where only a part of the annual output came from neutral countries and a considerable quantity of the available supply was produced within the United States or in territories under the jurisdiction of some of the Allied Governments. In some cases it was found advisable, instead of empowering a single director of purchases to act for all, to arrange for several directors of purchases in the different markets, all acting under the direction of the Executive and in conjunction with each other for the mutual advantage of the several governments concerned. Again, in some cases it was found advisable

to allot to each country separate markets exclusively for its own purchases as well as to allot to each country its proportionate share of purchases made in a common market. In such cases it was provided that if the allocation of markets resulted in disadvantage to any of the participating countries through inequality of prices in different markets, then the cost of purchases in the different markets might be equalized by the Executive by monthly readjustments, so that all participating countries would pay the same average price for their respective shares, and the Executive was also authorized to require that all purchases made for account of more than one of the participating countries in a common market should be pooled as to quantity and price. In every case, however, each of the participating countries reserved to itself the right to determine the purchasing agencies or importing houses through which its allocated share should be purchased, either in its own markets or in the markets of other countries.

Another function of the Executive, which was common to all of these arrangements, was the authority to collect information as to methods adopted in the participating countries for economy in the domestic distribution and use of the raw material dealt with, and with power, whenever it was considered desirable, to make recommendations to each of the participating countries with reference thereto, and each of the countries was required to keep the Executive fully informed of all supplies on hand, and of all its purchases from all sources for its own use.

The underlying condition, which was essential to the success of these arrangements and which entered into all of them, was the governmental control exercised during the war in each of the participating countries over imports and exports, because it was necessary to agree, with reference to the materials under the control of each Executive, that the respective governments would exercise such control over their respective nationals as would prevent them from buying these materials through any channels except those provided for under the direction of the respective Executives.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the results secured through the control exercised by these Executives in regulating the price and the consumption of these materials, and in stimulating their production when the available supply was normally inadequate to meet the requirements of the Allies, as well as in arranging the