made formal reply to the Japanese protest.1 (Statement No. 6.)

In stating its position the government of the United States admitted that beyond protesting it could do nothing to prevent legislative action by one of the states. It was pointed out, however, that the legislation in question was not political in the sense that it was part of any general national policy inconsistent with complete friendship between the two nations. It was asserted that it was wholly economic. The people of the State of California desired "to avoid certain conditions of competition in their agricultural activities."

Secretary Bryan took pains to assure the Japanese government that his government desired to further the understanding that bound the nations together. Besides the attempts to induce California to modify its legislation there was other evidence of this desire. The Japanese government, in common with the other governments of the world, had before it at this time a plan for world peace laid before the diplomats at Washington by Secretary Bryan April 24, 1913.2 (Statement No. 4.)

The Japanese ambassador informed the Secretary of State on June second that Japan accepted the plan “in principle." Moreover, toward the close of the month the

1 Diplomatic exchanges upon this subject may be found in Department of State, American-Japanese Discussions Relating to Land Tenure Law of California, 3-28.

2 It was announced by Secretary Bryan on May 30, 1913, that favourable responses had been received from Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Sweden, Brazil, Peru and Norway. An arbitration treaty with Great Britain was renewed on May 31, 1913.

general arbitration treaty between the two countries was renewed.1 On June fourth, however, Japan presented a second formal note of protest against the California land legislation, to which Secretary Bryan replied on July sixteenth. (Statement No. 7.) It was a reiteration and elaboration of the first reply. No more than in the first reply did the California attitude receive clear treatment. The Department of State put its emphasis upon the purpose and attitude of the national administration. It insisted that there was no question of discrimination on account of race, and also that the right to determine “who shall and who shall not be permitted to settle in its dominions and become a part of the body politic" must necessarily be left to the municipal law of each nation to "avoid the contentions which are so likely to disturb the harmony of international relations." Japan was naturally not satisfied. A third protest was made on August twenty-sixth and a fourth late in September.2

The policy of the Wilson administration embodied two distinctions, the one drawn between economic and political legislation, the other between action by a state and the expression of the good will of the nation. Moreover, it maintained that there was no violation of a treaty right. If assurance of harmony of interests represented the contribution of the administration in this crisis, it was in

1 This treaty of May 5, 1908, was one of a series of arbitration treaties negotiated during the secretaryship of Elihu Root. It would have expired August 24, 1913. The renewal was ratified by the Senate February 21, 1914, and ratifications exchanged May 23, 1914. 2 For subsequent discussion of Japanese protests see American Journal of International Law, VIII, 571.

keeping with the desire of those in charge to make the world one of peace and mutual agreement. But the Japanese protest, based fundamentally not upon the economic legislation of California, for that was an incident, but upon the discrimination against Japanese in the law of the United States, remained to be considered at a later time.1

MEXICO

For the time being the interest of the administration was centred elsewhere. On August 26, 1913, the same day that Japan had presented its third protest, General Huerta, who was in power in Mexico City and whom President Wilson had refrained from recognizing, took steps that led the United States to consider more intently, than it thus far had, its relations with the Mexican people.

Since the ninth of May Huerta had refused to recognize the American ambassador and on July sixteenth the latter was called to Washington for a conference. This was followed by his resignation. Early in August John Lind, former governor of Minnesota, was sent to Mexico City as the special agent of President Wilson.2 These

1 There is no discrimination in terms in the statutes of the United States, but by judicial interpretation of the law it has been held that the Japanese, among other races, cannot be naturalized. See J. B. Moore, Digest of International Law, III, 331. In the spring of 1917 in a paper before the American Academy of Political and Social Science Toyokichi Iyenaga discussed relations between Japan and the United States and asked the full recognition of the equality of Japanese now resident in the United States. "Japan, America and Durable Peace,” Annals of American Academy, LXXII, 124.

2 For basis for use of such agents and earlier instances of their

events emphasized the determination of the President not to recognize the government of Huerta. But he was of the opinion that the time had come when his policy of "hands off," announced in March, should give way to an offer to assist Mexico out of its difficulties. In making this change he was careful to emphasize the earlier assurance that the United States was acting in the spirit of disinterested friendship. Reason for his change he stated thus, "The present situation in Mexico is incompatible with the fulfilment of international obligations on the part of Mexico, with the civilized development of Mexico herself, and with the maintenance of tolerable political and economic conditions in Central America."

Through Mr. Lind he proposed the following terms of settlement: "(a) An immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed. (b) Security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part. (c) The consent of General Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election. (d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and co-operate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration." General Huerta rejected these proposals on the sixteenth of August.1

Eleven days later the President addressed Congress.

use see H. M. Wriston, "Presidential Special Agents in Diplomacy," American Political Science Review, X, 481.

1 The reply of Huerta may be found in American Journal of International Law, VII, Supplement, 284.

(Statement No. 8.) It was his purpose in doing this to lay definitely before, the nation the principle and content of his policy in Mexico, and, if possible, to bring to his support a body of sentiment so considerable as to make it clear that the administration spoke the purpose of the nation. Then, as at later times, Mr. Wilson felt the necessity of restating for foreign peoples the point of view of the American people, as well as the policy of his own administration, and as a preliminary to this he made the effort to pronounce to his own people the make-up of his policy, in order that there might be understanding and decision at home.

This was particularly necessary at this time inasmuch as the President was on the surface apparently preparing the United States to play in Mexico the rôle of "Big Policeman." 1 As the events proved and as his utterances had clearly foreshadowed, his purpose in this matter and his conception of the aid of America was decidedly not that ascribed to him at the time by the prominent leaders of public opinion, long accustomed to the ways and reasons of some of his immediate predecessors.

It may be well to recall that on taking office in 1913 Mr. Wilson had not only to formulate a foreign policy, but, in view of the fact that the Democratic party had not been in power for the sixteen years during which the

1 This phrase has been generally applied to a course of action pursued by President Roosevelt. It was stressed by him in his message to Congress on December 6, 1904. The European press so interpreted the course of President Wilson in Mexico; cited in Herbert Krays, "What European Countries Think of the Monroe Doctrine," Annals of American Academy, LIV, 110.