an embargo on trade in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States."

The refusal by the American government to press the cases against Great Britain had the effect of favouring sea power in the European conflict. Had the American government proceeded against Great Britain with embargo or reprisal it would have resulted in distinct advantage to the German cause. The decision of the American government was natural, as it was an adherence to the rules. But it carried with it the inevitability as far as the United States was concerned of actual participation when Germany insisted upon its demands.

The note of April 21, 1915, closed the controversy with Germany as far as it related to the shipment of arms to the Allies. But any satisfaction that might have been felt in the United States over its conclusion was marred by the general dissatisfaction with the German methods of propaganda which had served to give the matter so bitter a character.

For nine months the administration had maintained the policy of neutrality indicated at the outbreak of the war in Europe.1 From the outset this policy had embraced these elements: an insistence upon the supremacy of international law; a record of protest upon all matters

1 Detailed treatment of the position of the American government upon the more important points may be found in editorial comment, American Journal of International Law, IX, 456–473. See also M. Smith, "American Diplomacy in the European War," Political Science Quarterly, XXXI, 481-484, 488-494.

involving the United States as a neutral; a refusal to interfere in disputes not concerning the United States directly as a neutral; a defence of American actions as sanctioned by international practice; proposals for a modus vivendi in an effort to increase the security of non-belligerents. The fact that such a course favoured the sea power of Great Britain had brought controversy with Germany in such a way as to indicate that Germany demanded of the United States an action that would result in favour to its cause. Consequently aside from the routine matters of protest the business of neutrality involved dealing with the German demands. A growing appreciation of this fact was revealed in the actions and words of the President after the rejection of the American proposal of February 20, 1915. Should Germany force the submarine issue it would bring to the American government the problem of adequate protection of the position of neutrals. The President was to seek this protection through diplomacy and to do so with marked success. That he had not placed entire faith in it as an ultimate solution was indicated by his utterances in April upon the need of international co-operation and the wisdom of a greater participation by the United States in affairs affecting the world as a whole.

CHAPTER IV

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS

German Submarine Campaign - Policy of the Administration - Place of the United States in the World - Basis of American Protest Attitude of the Government Toward Mexico Pan-American Conference and Solution for Mexico— Championship of Integrity of Neutral Rights - German Propaganda in the United States President's Position on PreparedDuties of the United States International Peace.

ness

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EARLY in the conflict, as in former European wars, the Atlantic had seemed a barrier that separated the United States from the struggle. But as the war progressed the ocean seemed the highway that might lead to American participation. In attempting to make good the claim that changes in rules of the sea should be ratified by all nations President Wilson was following in the path long chosen by American diplomats, but to a greater degree than his predecessors he faced the necessity of making good the contention of neutrals in face of attack, not only upon property, but upon life itself. The United States had never in its history been quite able to ignore conflicts upon the sea. In the Great War it was the phase of the struggle that involved freedom of the sea that in time came to affect the vital interests of the United States.

Toward the close of April of 1915 it was apparent that

the German government was preparing to test the full value of the submarine for bringing into being the Ger

man conception of freedom of the seas.1 German submarines in the war zone

66

ing notice from the American public.

The activity of

claimed increas

On March 28,

1915, an American had been lost when a British steamer, the Falaba, had been sunk, and a month later an American vessel, the Cushing, had been shelled by an aeroplane. On May 1, 1915, an American steamer, the Gulflight, was sunk by a submarine and two American citizens were lost. Prior to this two American ships had been sunk by German mines. Moreover, the William P. Frye, also of American registry, had been captured and sunk by a German raider in the South Atlantic. These events and the increasingly aggressive character of propaganda in America had brought American excitement to a high pitch. German agencies had entered upon a campaign of intimidation, citing these attacks and threatening others, in an avowed effort to compel Americans and American shipping to keep out of the "war zone." On April 22, 1915, the German embassy at Washington was responsible for publication in the newspapers of a warning to Americans not to travel in British vessels.

When on May 7, 1915, the British liner Lusitania was sunk without warning and one hundred and twenty-four Americans were lost, the public mind was prepared for a crisis, and consequently for the administration the time of

1 See C. P. Anderson, "Freedom of the Seas," Annals of American Academy, LXXII, 65. Also C. G. Fenwick, "The Freedom of the Seas," American Political Science Review, XI, 386.

greatest test had come.

All precedent and the President's earlier words, not in his speeches, it is true, but in his dispatches, pointed to a break with Germany. Six days elapsed before a communication was sent to the German government. In the interim, three days after the sinking, the President addressed an audience of newly naturalized citizens at Philadelphia. (Statement No. 35.) What he said was scanned for a clue to his proposed action. The statement of basic principles that he had so often iterated from his entrance upon office was overlooked partly because the ideas were so familiar, but more perhaps because it was thought that the President would in some concrete way foreshadow a new treatment for this specific situation.

Two short paragraphs only could by any interpretation be regarded as an indication of what the President intended to do. He had led up to a call to America to set an example to a world rent with strife, and then suddenly astonished most of his countrymen by saying, “There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight." So astonished were they, and so obsessed with prevailing personifications of nations, that the sentence following was quite generally forgotten and its significance lost. Yet the second sentence contained the spirit of the President's policy since the outbreak of the war, and the spirit of his reply to Germany. He said, "There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right." By this the President meant that the United States was adhering to