my composed of such elements is justified in resorting to retaliatory methods to compel its discontinuance.'

Wars with Savages. Civilized states, in carrying on necessary wars with barbarous races, or against nations which are partly civilized, but who do not understand, and so fail to observe, the laws of war, have peculiar duties and responsibilities towards such opponents. Their irregular and barbarous usages should be carefully studied, and the operations undertaken against them should be so planned and arranged as to render it impossible for serious violation of the rules of war to occur. The task is not one of serious or particular difficulty. Barbarous nations yield only to superior force or superior cunning. They violate the rules of civilized warfare chiefly in their cruel treatment of wounded and unwounded prisoners, and in their tendency to indiscriminate slaughter, pillage, and destruction while passing through inhabited districts. To remedy this, the forces employed against them should be of sufficient strength to accomplish the legitimate purpose of the war as expeditiously as possible. Forces inferior in strength to the enemy should never be employed. Wounded men should not be permitted to fall into their hands; straggling should be rigidly prohibited; small, isolated parties should not be employed beyond the lines of the army; and the tactical units of the invading force, in all marches and military operations, should be required to keep within supporting distance of each other."

Forces Employed at Sea. In conducting naval operations and in effecting captures at sea, a state makes use of its public armed vessels, manned by the officers and men of its regular naval establishment. Its naval force may be increased,

both in ships and men, by methods similar to those resorted to to increase its military strength. It may also make use of privateers.'

Privateers or maritime volunteers are armed vessels, commanded by private persons, who receive a commission from a belligerent government authorizing them to make captures of enemy ships and goods on the high seas. These commissions are called Letters of Marque. Letters of Marque and Reprisal are commissions of a somewhat similar character, which were formerly issued to private persons, authorizing them to make captures by way of reprisal, and in satisfaction for some injury done them by an offending state. This practice is now obsolete.

This

Although the practice of privateering is still sanctioned by international law, it seems hardly probable that it will be extensively resorted to in future wars. Its defence has been that it enabled a state which, from policy or want of means, maintained a small standing navy, to make a considerable increase in its naval force at the outbreak of war. increase, however, was attended with serious disadvantages. The force of privateers could only be used to effect captures of unarmed merchant ships. It was never available for general naval operations, and the damage done to the enemy, however great, was at best but indirect, and did not have the effect of weakening his military power. The belligerent employer of privateers incurred the same responsibility for captures made by these cruisers as it did for those made by its public armed vessels, while its control over their officers and crew was, at best, but feeble and indirect. It had but little security against their aggressions upon neutral rights, while it was absolutely responsible for acts done by them in their exercise of the rights of search and capture upon neutral vessels.' As neutral rights steadily increase, and are more and more

1 Risley, pp. 111-113; II Halleck, pp. 9-20; Boyd's Wheaton, §§ 357358a; Woolsey, §§ 127-129; III Phillimore, pp. 533-536; Manning, pp. 156-158; Hall, §§ 180-183; Lawrence, Int. Law, §§ 223, 224.

2 III Phillimore, pp. 150, 151, 533536; II Twiss. pp. 374-424; Manning, pp. 156,157; Hall, pp. 525, 526; Creasy, pp. 557, 558; Dana's Wheaton, $ 358, note 173; II Halleck, pp. 12-16; Risley, pp. 112, 113.

strongly insisted upon by neutral nations, the exercise of belligerent rights against them becomes constantly more difficult, involving a knowledge of international law which is rarely possessed by the commanding officers of private armed vessels, and presenting questions of the greatest intricacy and difficulty, which require in their decision the fullest knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of belligerents and neutrals. For these reasons the practice of privateering, which had always been regarded with disfavor, has within the last half century been much less frequently resorted to than formerly. Those states whose policy it is to maintain small naval establishments in time of peace find it possible to increase them, at the outbreak of war, by a resort to methods similar to those made use of in increasing their land forces. Ships are purchased or chartered by the government, and the vessels thus acquired are placed under the command of regular naval offiOver this force the control of the government is absolute and complete. It possesses the advantage that it can be used in all sorts of maritime undertakings, and is not restricted in its operations to the capture of unarmed merchant vessels.

cers.

The practice of privateering has been very much restricted by the operation of the rules of the Declaration of Paris, which will be discussed under the head of maritime capture.'

METHODS OF CARRYING on War

General Restrictions. With the strategical and tactical methods resorted to by trained and disciplined armies in their operations against each other, international law has but little. to do. Such operations must be carried on in accordance with the principle that no forcible measures against an enemy which involve the loss of human life are justifiable which do not bear directly upon the object for which the war is undertaken, and which do not materially contribute to bring it to an end. International public opinion severely judges useless 2197-2204, 2381-2397, 2548-2552, 2590.

III Dig. Int. Law, §§ 383-385; Dana's Wheaton, § 358, note 173; II Twiss, §§ 206, 207; IV Calvo, §§

and unnecessary operations, and sharply criticises mistakes and blunders which might have been avoided by a reasonable exercise of foresight and skill, and fixes the responsibility of error, in just proportions, upon the governments which authorize such measures and the generals who execute them.'

Rule of Good Faith; Use of Deceit. No measures can be resorted to against an enemy in war which involve a breach of good faith. An attack cannot be condemned, or complained of, because it partakes of the character of a surprise, because it is the duty of a belligerent to exercise such due vigilance as will render such measures abortive. Deceit, in the form of circulating false information in order that it may fall into the hands of the enemy, is justifiable, because it is the enemy's duty to weigh carefully the sources from which he receives intelligence. The services of traitors and deserters may be accepted, and the employment of spies for the purpose of obtaining information is legitimate, but no person can be compelled to act as a spy. The poisoning of wells and springs is prohibited, as it ever has been since the laws of war came into existence. The food and water supply of a besieged place may be shut off, however, with a view to hasten its surrender."

Use of the Enemy's Uniform and Flag. It is forbidden in war on land to make use of the enemy's flag for purposes of deceit. It is also forbidden to use the enemy's uniform except with some distinguishing mark, sufficiently striking in character to attract attention at a distance. On the sea the national flag of a public armed vessel must be displayed before an engagement begins, or a capture is made. These rules are based on the fact that flags and uniforms are used for the purpose of determining the national character of troops in the

1 Woolsey, §§ 131, 133; II Halleck, pp. 20-22; Risley, pp. 106, 107; Manning, pp. 208, 209; VI Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 2742, 2743; I Guelle, pp. 91-94; vol. ii. Revue de Droit International, pp. 643; iii. Ibid. 288; iv. Ibid. 1, 381; v. Ibid. 321, 366; Art. 23 Convention of the Hague, 1899.

II Halleck, p. 25; Woolsey, § 133; Risley, pp. 119–121; IV Calvo, §§ 2106-2122; VI Pradier-Fodéré, S$ 2747-2753: Hall, §§ 185-188; Bluntschli, §§ 557-565; I Guille, pp. 101-109; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. viii. §§ 155-158; III Dig. Int. Law, $$ 347-349.

field. A violation of these rules indicates a want of good faith, a quality equally obligatory in peace and war.'

Giving and Receiving Quarter, and Treatment of Individuals of the Enemy; Forbidden Practices. A belligerent cannot refuse to give quarter, nor can he announce his intention to give no quarter, except in case of some conduct of the enemy in gross violation of the laws of war, and then only in the way of retaliation for similar acts. The practice of firing upon outposts, picket - guards, and sentinels, except for the purpose of driving them in during a reconnoissance, or as a preliminary to a general advance, is strictly forbidden. These individuals of the enemy are particularly helpless. They take no part in operations of an aggressive character, and are always ordered not to attack. They are to resist only when themselves attacked, and yield ground only to a superior force of the enemy.

The rules of war forbid the robbery of individuals of the enemy who fall into the hands of a belligerent. Their clothing and private property are as secure from violent appropriation as are those of non-combatant citizens; arms and articles of public property in their possession become the property of the captor's government-never the private property of an individual. The wounding of prisoners, or the infliction of additional injuries upon those already wounded and helpless, is discountenanced upon pain of death, as offensive alike to humanity and the rules of civilized warfare. The power of these persons to do harm has been destroyed by the fact of wounding, or capture, and their helpless and distressing condition entitles them to the most considerate treatment. A similar reason forbids the use of forcible measures against prisoners

'II Halleck, pp. 25-29; Risley, pp. 119-121; Art. 7 Brussels Conference; I Guelle, pp. 102-106; Hall, § 187; VI Pradier-Fodéré, § 2760; Articles 22 and 23 Convention of the Hague, 1899; but see Bluntschli, § 565; who, possibly, confuses the use of false colors at sea with their use on land.

2

II Halleck, pp. 72-75; Arts. 12 and 13 Brussels Conference; Risley, pp. 124-127; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. viii. § 140; Art. 23 Convention of the Hague, 1899; III Phillimore, § 95; Paragraphs 60-64, American Instructions; IV Calvo, § 2143; Field, Int. Code, pp. 496, 497; Creasy, pp. 442-452; Bluntschli, §§ 580-584.