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The rule above stated, however, is subject to the qualification that the injury complained of must have been inflicted during hostilities carried on in accordance with the generally recognized rules of civilized war.' The belligerent parties to a particular war, whether the war be external or internal in character, are presumed to follow the laws of war in the conduct of their military operations. If a belligerent fails to do so, however, the enemy, by a resort to acts of retaliation, may compel him to observe the rules of civilized warfare. If neutral states or their subjects suffer injury as a consequence of such failure, the injury may be redressed in the diplomatic way, or, if sufficiently serious, may authorize a resort to forcible measures of redress.

Responsibility of a State for Injuries Inflicted during Internal Wars. Where property of individuals, whether citizens or aliens, is injured during the progress of an insurrection or rebellion, a similar rule of responsibility prevails. In this connection, however, a distinction exists between the destruction of property due to lawlessness or mob violence and injury or destruction caused by insurgents in the prosecution of regular military operations. Foreigners who become resident in a particular state, or who own property therein, acquire such residence or ownership with full knowledge that internal disorders are likely to occur, and that, in consequence of such disorders, property may be injured or destroyed, either by those who are engaged in violating the laws or by the government itself in its endeavor to restore order. "The assembling of mobs happens in all countries; popular violence occasionally breaks out everywhere, setting law at defiance, trampling on the rights of citizens and private men, and sometimes on those of public officers and the agents of foreign governments especially entitled to protection. In

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these cases public faith and national honor require not only that such outrages should be disavowed, but also that the perpetrators of them should be punished wherever it is possible to bring them to justice; and, further, that full satisfaction should be made in cases in which a duty rests with the government, according to the general principles of law, public faith, and the obligations of treaties."'

When, however, the internal disorder attains the proportions of an organized rebellion, and the supreme government resorts to warlike methods with a view to its suppression, the operations undertaken to restore the authority and supremacy of the central government are carried on in accordance with the laws of war, and the parties, as they occupy the status of belligerents, become charged with the rights, duties, and responsibilities of belligerents as determined by the rules of international law."

References. The student will find the subject of war most fully treated in the works of Halleck, Risley, and Phillimore in English, and in those of Calvo, Pradier-Fodéré, Guelle, and Ortolan in French. For discussions of the definition, justification, and causes of war, see also Vattel, liv. iii. chaps. i. and iii.; I Halleck, chaps. xv. and xvi.; Heffter, §§ 113-119; IV Calvo, §§ 1860-1898; II Twiss, §§ 22-41; VI Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 26502670; III Phillimore, pp. 1-17, 85-89; Bluntschli, §§ 510-536; II Ferguson, §§ 169–172; Hall, §§ 123–126; Lawrence, “International Law," § 155; Woolsey, §§ 114-117; Creasy, §§ 380-394. For the declaration of war and its effects, see Vattel, liv. iii. chap. iv.; Owen, “Declaration of War"; Bluntschli, §§ 510-536; II Ferguson, §§ 173-175; IV Calvo, §§ 1899–2032: III Phillimore, pp. 85-149; III Digest of International Law, §§ 333–337a,

1 66 The rule is not to be construed as proclaiming immunity to a belligerent for every outrage which may be perpetrated by those in its service, simply because they occurred during the time and upon the theatre in which hostilities were prosecuted. The injury, it may be conceded, must result from such military or naval measures as by the code of civilized war

fare are recognized as legitimate." -II Dig. Int. Law, § 225. II Ibid. § 226; I Calvo, § 205; Hall, § 65; Bluntschli, § 380; Klüber, § 79; I Dig. Int. Law, §§ 46, 67.

III Calvo, §§ 1280-1297; II Dig. Int. Law, §§ 223-225; Revue de Droit International, vol. i. p. 417; Bluntschli, § 380, bis; Hall, § 65; Vattel, liv. iii., chap. xviii. §§ 292295.

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347-351; VI Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 2670–2720; II Ortolan, pp. 11-23; Heffter, §§ 120-123; Risley, “Law of War"; Guelle, pp. 36-66; Bluntschli, $$ 510-536; I Halleck, chap. xvii.; Hall, §§ 123-126; II Twiss, §§ 31-41. For the rules of war on land, see Vattel, liv. iii. chaps. v. viii.-xiii.; II Halleck, chaps. xviii.-xx.; Risley, "The Law of War"; IV Calvo, §§ 2033– 2065; VI Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 2721-2794; VII Ibid. §§ 2795-2880; Hall, §§ 15-18, 127-135; Heffter, §§ 537-643; Dr. Lieber's "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States," Appendix A; “The Rules of War adopted by the Institute of International Law, at its Session at Oxford in 1880," Appendix F; "The Rules and Usages of War on Land adopted by the International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899," Appendix E; Lawrence, "International Law," §§ 169-174; II Twiss, §§ 62-71; III Digest International Law, §§ 347-351; Précis des Lois de Guerre," J. Guelle. For the treatment of property on land, see Vattel, liv. iii. chap. v. §§ 69-77; Ibid. chap. ix. §§ 160-173; Heffter, §§ 537-556, 644-663; II Halleck, chap. xxi.; Hall, §§ 136–142; IV Calvo, §§ 2199-2293; Dana's Wheaton, § 346, note 169; VI Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 2994–3065; II Twiss, §§ 62-71. For the rules of temporary occupation, see Hall, §§ 153161; VII Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 2939-3065; Lawrence, "International Law," §§ 200-204; De Martens, "Précis," §§ 280-282; Klüber, § 265; Bluntschli, §§ 644-663; II Ferguson, §§ 187, 269; Heffter, §§ 537-556, 644-663; I Digest International Law, § 3; III Ibid. § 339; II Halleck, chaps. xxxiii. xxxiv.; Snow, pp. 109-113; Manning, pp. 188, 189; and Dana's Wheaton, § 346, note 169. For requisitions and contributions, see VII Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 3020–3065; Vattel, liv. iii. chap. ix. § 165; Bluntschli, §§ 653-656; Lawrence, “International Law," § 204; IV Calvo, §§ 2231-2293; II Guelle, pp. 176–238; Dana's Wheaton, § 346; III Digest International Law, § 339; III F. De Martens, §§ 263, 264; II Halleck, pp. 109-114. For the subject of conquest, see "Le Droit de Conquête," by M. L. A. de Montluc, vol. iii. Revue de Droit International," p. 551; v. Ibid. p. 581; Hall, §§ 204-206; Dana's Wheaton, § 346, note 169; IV Calvo, §§ 24532490; I Digest International Law, §§ 3, 4, 11; III Ibid. § 354; Klüber, §§ 255-259; II De Martens, "Précis," §§ 279, 300, 333; Heffter, §§ 133,179; II Halleck, pp. 480-509; see, also, "La Guerre Actuelle," by C. F. RolinJacquemyn, in vol. ii. “Revue de Droit International,” pp. 643–718; iii. Ibid. pp. 288-384; iv. Ibid. p. 481; “L'Enfantement du Droit par Guerre," by H. Brocher de la Fléchère, vol. x. Revue de Droit International," p. 473; xii. Ibid. pp. 60, 206; "The Administration of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870-1871," by Dr. Edward Loening, vol. iv. "Revue de Droit International," p. 622; v. Ibid. p. 69; "Hostilities Without Declaration," by M. Féraud-Giraud, vol. xvii. "Revue de Droit International," pp. 19-49. For attempts to codify the laws and usages of war, see the rules suggested by H. Brocher, vol. iv. "Revue de Droit International," pp. 25,

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381, 406; v. Ibid. pp. 321-351, 566–577; for those of the Institute of International Law, see Les Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles, 1874," vol. vii. "Revue de Droit International," pp. 438-461; ix. Ibid. p. 133; for the code proposed by M. Ernest Lehr, “Les Lois de la Guerre sur Terre et sur Mer," see vol. xxv. Revue de Droit International," pp. 321-337; for the similar project of Dr. Geffcken, see vol. xxvi. Ibid. p. 596. For proposals respecting general or proportional disarmament, and the settlement of international disputes without a resort to war, see “The Ultimate Problem of International Jurisprudence," by Professor James Lorimer, II Lorimer, pp. 183–298; “Political and Legal Remedies for War," by Professor Sheldon Amos; "The Evolution of Peace," by Professor T. J. Lawrence; Lawrence,“Essays in Modern International Law," pp. 234–278; "Propositions to Abate War," by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, "International Law," pp. 207-228; see, also, "The Declaration of the International Peace Conference at The Hague," in respect to the diminution of military expenditure, and "The Convention for the Peaceable Adjustment of International Disputes adopted by the Peace Conference at The Hague, on July 29, 1899."

CHAPTER XI

MARITIME CAPTURE: PRIZE: THE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF PRIZE-COURTS

Tendency of the Rules of Maritime War. The rules of war regarding the treatment of private property on land have been characterized by a marked and constant improvement since the beginning of modern history. To appreciate this change, it is only necessary to compare the laws of war on land, as they are now understood, with the barbarous practices that prevailed during the Thirty Years' War, or even with the corresponding usages during the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of this century. The tendency has been to give to war on land the character of an armed contest between belligerent governments, restricting its operations and effects to the armed forces engaged on either side, and exempting private persons and private property from its hardships wherever such exemption has been possible. There has been no such general improvement in the laws having to do with the treatment of private property at sea, and the rules regulating maritime capture have advanced but little since they were codified, more than eight hundred years ago, in the Consolato del Mare. As different states have, at different times, obtained undue preponderance at sea, their invariable tendency has been to shape the rules of maritime capture rather in accordance with their views of temporary policy and self-interest than in accordance with the rights of neutrals and the demands of humanity and civilization. From time to time proposals have been made to exempt from capture at sea all private property not contraband of war. These proposals have never been favorably received, however,

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