These cities soon claimed exclusive dominion over certain waters for purposes of trade, and forbade all commerce with such coasts to the ships of other cities. Their right to such exclusive intercourse was denied, and numerous wars were undertaken, some in support of, and others in opposition to, these claims.

Venice was the first of the Mediterranean cities to attain to any considerable degree of commercial supremacy, and, so early as the twelfth century, asserted a right to the exclusive navigation of the Adriatic. This claim was sanctioned by Pope Alexander III., in 1177,' and was long maintained against all opposition. At a later period similar claims were advanced by Genoa and Pisa. The discovery of the sea route to India by Portugal, and of the western continent by Spain, largely reduced, and eventually destroyed, the commercial importance of the Mediterranean cities, and transferred the sovereignty of the seas to the two latter powers, by whom, in turn, the most extravagant claims were asserted to maritime dominion. As the claims brought forward by Spain and Portugal were in some degree conflicting, they were submitted to the pope, Alexander VII., who, in 1493, established, as a boundary between them, a meridian line passing through a point 100 leagues west of the Azores Islands. All of the earth's surface east of that line which formed no part of the domin ions of any Christian prince was declared to belong to Portugal; while all to the west of the same line was, subject to a similar restriction, decreed to Spain. Claims somewhat similar in character were advanced, at a later period, by England and Holland, only to encounter the most serious and obstinate resistance, which resulted in their final abandonment. The last instance of such a claim being advanced to any considerable portion of the high seas was that of Russia, who asserted the right of exclusive navigation of that part of the Pacific lying north of the fifty-fourth degree of north latitude, on the ground

1 Azuni, vol. i. p. 78; IV Calvo, S$ 2495-2499; Hall, § 208.

2

Azuni, vol. i. p. 106. See, also, Pp. 13, 14, ante.

that it possessed the coasts of both continents above that line. This claim, however, was relinquished upon the representations of England and the United States, and has never been reasserted.'

If the claims which have been made, at different times, to exclusive maritime dominion be examined, it will be found that each of them is susceptible of being resolved into two parts:

(a.) A claim to a kind of territorial sovereignty over a portion of the high seas, with the adjacent coasts.

(b.) A claim to the right of exclusive commercial intercourse with the territories whose coasts were washed by the waters over which jurisdiction was asserted.

The first of these claims has been vigorously opposed since the middle of the seventeenth century, and with such success that all such claims have long since been abandoned, never to be reasserted.

The second continued to exist, and was long recognized as just and equitable. As new territories were acquired by different European powers, either by colonization or by conquest, the exclusive privilege of trading with them was claimed by the parent or conquering state, and, tacitly or expressly, recognized by other states of the civilized world."

The Monopoly of Colonial Trade. Although the claim of a parent state to a practical monopoly of colonial trade was finally recognized, such recognition was not conceded without opposition, nor was the colonial monopoly itself a source of unmixed benefit to the state enjoying it. In time of peace it was a fruitful source of revenue, and afforded a favorable market for the productions of the mother country. In the event of war, however, if the parent state occupied the position of a belligerent, its vessels engaged in the colonial trade became liable to capture and confiscation, and it was impossible to measure the resulting loss by the money value of the ships

1 See Treaties and Conventions 2 IV Calvo, §§ 2494-2499; Hall, of the U. S. with Foreign Powers § 208; II Twiss, §§ 208-210. (Washington, 1889), pp. 931-933.

and cargoes which were captured by the enemy. A large part of the belligerent's commerce was destroyed, or diverted to other channels, and was but slowly revived after the peace. To obviate this attempts were made, at times, by several European states, to transfer their colonial trade to a neutral flag during the period of hostilities. As this course deprived a belligerent of the right to injure his enemy, by a resort to one of the most powerful means of coercion then recognized by the laws of war, such transfers of trade were stoutly resisted, chiefly by the British Government, whose maritime preponderance had become so firmly established by the middle of the eighteenth century as to enable it to enforce respect, in so far as its own interests were concerned, to whatever views of maritime warfare were deemed by it to be correct and in accordance with international law.

The Rule of 1756. The practice contended for by Great Britain, that a belligerent could not transfer his colonial trade to a neutral during an existing war, and that neutral merchant vessels engaged in such trade acquired a hostile character by so doing, and were thus made liable to capture and condemnation, has become known to publicists as the Rule of 1756.' The view thus advanced by Great Britain was extended to all colonial trade with neutrals in 1793, by the attempted enforcement of a rule that the colonial trade of a belligerent, which that belligerent had undertaken to throw open to all nations without reserve by a general and, on its face, permanent regulation, could not be participated in by neutrals, and that neutral ships engaged in such trade would become liable to capture as ships of the enemy. This is known as the Rule of 1793, and its enforcement was immediately opposed by France and Spain, and, at a later period, by the United States. A principle or rule, asserted, or even enforced, by one powerful state, is not a rule of international law; to become such it must

II Halleck, pp. 325-330; III the Anna Katherina, 4 Ibid. 118; Phillimore, $$ 221-223; Boyd's the Rendsburg, Ibid. 121; the Wheaton, § 508; the Princesa, 2 C. Vrow Anna Katherina, 5 Ibid. Rob. 52; the Emanuel, Ibid. 186; 161.

receive the sanction of all, or nearly all, of the civilized states of the world. The principle underlying the Rule of 1756 is now accepted, as applying to coasting trade, by the principal maritime powers. But the Rule of 1793 has received no such general sanction, and its enforcement, if persisted in, would have given rise to most serious complications. Its severity, however, was relaxed as practical free trade was gradually conceded to colonies, largely upon their demand to enter the markets of the world upon equal terms with the mother countries.' Development of the Theory of Neutrality among the Non-Maritime States of Europe. The power and importance of the Mediterranean cities were entirely maritime, and were due to the energy and industry with which they prosecuted their commercial undertakings. They had but little power on land; they rarely asserted claims to territorial supremacy, and so were rarely engaged in wars, other than those caused by their conflicting commercial interests. It was for this reason that they progressed but little, in their development of the theory of neutrality, beyond the establishment of the rules regulating the subject of maritime capture. The relations of the great European states, which were gradually acquiring something of their present territorial form, were not such as to favor the development of any consistent or enduring theory of neutral obligation. Their relations were more generally hostile than peaceful; private and dynastic wars were common, and the brief periods during which hostilities were interrupted or suspended were usually devoted to the preparation of new schemes of conquest or dominion. Some progress must have been made, however, as the necessities of the great powers made peace occasionally desirable. But it was impossible for the conception of neutrality to obtain general recognition until the desire of the powers to remain at peace had acquired sufficient strength to become at least equal to the desire for war and conquest. In the absence of positive evidence, it

'II Halleck, pp. 330-339; I Life and Letters of Joseph Story, p. 287; 4 Rob. Adm. Rep. App. A.

is fair to presume that the rudiments of the theory were first recognized by those states which became neutral by reason of their distance from the theatre of war, and from a consequent lack of direct interest in the war or its results. When the principle of the balance of power first began to be understood, it seems to have been regarded as possible to maintain it in no other way than by waging war against the state, or states, which threatened it. Indeed, it was not merely threatened, it was repeatedly attacked, and was in constant danger of overthrow, which could be effectively prevented only by force of arms. This state of affairs contributed powerfully to retard the growth of the theory of neutrality, since every important state in Europe was obliged to take part, as principal or ally, in the numerous wars which were undertaken whenever the equilibrium was disturbed.'

Influence of England upon the Development of the Modern Theory of Neutrality. The insular situation of England, so placed as to be secure from attack except by sea, enabled, and to some extent constrained, that power to adopt a policy of partial abstinence from interference in Continental affairs, and to decline taking part in Continental wars in which it had no important interests at stake. Not only was England able to decline participation in such wars, thus placing her in a position of practical neutrality, but her power on land and sea was so great as to enable her to insist upon her neutrality being respected by belligerents. She thus became, to a certain extent, an advocate of neutrality, and an example to other powers of the advantage of remaining neutral.'

General Acceptance of the Modern Theory in the Seventeenth Century: its Later History. Although its progress had been extremely slow, the principle of neutrality had received such general recognition by the middle of the seventeenth century as to lead Grotius to devote a portion of his work to a discussion of the rights and duties of neutrals.

'Hall, §§ 209, 210; II Ferguson,

2 IV Calvo, §§ 2499, 2500; Hall,

pp. 511-515; IV Calvo, §§ 2495- §§ 208-217. 2538; Lawrence, § 244.