imported. Counsel contends that the cases cited are controlling and reverse the ruling in United States v. Leigh (supra). We can not concur with this view, for as we take it the cases involve a different state of facts from that here presented. The automobile, part of which was held free and part dutiable, was imported as a household effect and not as merchandise; and the court apparently considered the new parts alone, as in the light of imported merchandise. In the other case cited, the court deemed the furnished needlecases not to be entireties, but as two separate and nonattached, articles each dutiable or classifiable by itself. The case at bar differs in this respect, i. e., the carding machine without card clothing would be uselessthat is, it would not be a carding machine at all. The machines are imported in knocked-down condition, each part being absolutely essential to make a perfect working machine, and consequently an entirety and dutiable as such. If this were not so, the reasoning would apply as well to the other individual parts, and not only would the card clothing be separately dutiable, but also the bolts, bars, nuts, beams, castings, and all the other parts of the completed machine.

The analogous case with the one we have here under consideration would be that of the automobile with the tires therefor shipped in the same case but not attached to each other. That case is pending on appeal (suit 4915) from a decision by this Board, G. A. 6567 (T. D. 28044), wherein the Government's contention that said articles were entireties was sustained. We hold that the machines and card clothing belonging to them are entireties dutiable under paragraph 193, as claimed in the protests. Protests 222425, 222744, 253612, and 256873, having been formally abandoned by the importer, are hereby overruled, and in regard thereto the decision of the collector is affirmed. The claim in all other protests under paragraph 193 is sustained as to the card clothing contained in cases specified in such protests by marks and numbers, and to that extent the decision of the collector is reversed.

(T. D. 28803-G. A. 6730.)

Cotton yarn-Embroidery cotton.

1. Cotton yarn in skeins from 15,000 to 21,000 yards each Held dutiable as yarn under paragraph 302, tariff act of 1897.

2. The merchandise known commercially in July, 1897, as embroidery cotton was put up in small skeins.-Loeb v. United States (150 Fed. Rep., 327; T. D. 27752) followed; G. A. 5372 (T. D. 24560) overruled.

United States General Appraisers, New York, February 21, 1908. In the matter of protest 272073 of Julius Sternfeld against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 2 (FISCHER, HOWELL, and DE VRIES, General Appraisers).

DE VRIES, General Appraiser: This merchandise consists of certain cotton yarn. The appraiser reports as follows:

The merchandise in question consists of embroidery cotton, put up in large skeins containing 15,670 and 21,170 yards, respectively. * This embroidery cotton

is identical with that put up in small skeins and boxed and the subject of T. D. 26070.

The collector assessed duty on the yarn as embroidery cotton at the rate of one-half of 1 cent per hundred yards under paragraph 303, tariff act of 1897. The protestant claims the merchandise is dutiable as cotton yarn under paragraph 302 of said act.

In Loeb v. United States (150 Fed. Rep., 327; T. D. 27752) the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit said:

It appears that "embroidery cotton" was a well-known commercial term when the act of 1897 was passed, and there is nothing in the phraseology of the paragraph to indicate that Congress intended to make "chief use" or "individual use" the test for classification rather than the commercial meaning of the words it used. The testimony as to commercial designation which was taken before the Board was indefinite and unsatisfactory, but after the cause came into the circuit court three fully competent witnesses, associated for many years with the largest wholesale dealers in embroidery cotton, testified to the meaning of those words in trade and commerce on and prior to July 24, 1897, and that this No. 60 5-ply yarn was not within the class of embroidery

cottons.

One of the three witnesses referred to by the court did not testify as to what the article was that was known commercially as embroidery cotton at the time of the passage of the act, nor did the court find what it was. We quote from the testimony of the other two witnesses as follows:

T. D. McWEENEY

Q. Were you familiar on July 24, 1897, and prior thereto, with an article commer cially known as embroidery cotton?-A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what form did it come?-A. It came in skeins of 20 meters; little short skeins. Q. You have testified that embroidery cotton always came in 20-meter lengths?— A. Yes; it came in 20 and it came in 40 and 50, the kind that I handle.

PHILIP J. KRACKEHL:

Q. How long have you been famliar with that article (embroidery cotton)?-A. About thirty two years.

Q. Deal in it largely?-A. Well, in fair quantities.

*

*

*

Q. Please give us the difference from a trade standpoint between cotton thread and embroidery cotton.-A. The way we have handled embroidery cotton, it all comes done up in certain lengths in skeins and labeled "Embroidery cotton."

In G. A. 5372 (T. D. 24560) the Board had before it a similar question. An examination of the record in that case shows that Julius Sternfeld, the importer in this case, testified as follows:

Q. What is the distinction between the goods known commercially in this country as embroidery cotton and the cotton on which you protest to-day?-A. The distinction is that embroidery cotton is made in small skeins to be ready for the trade, to be sold over the counter for a penny or two pennies a skein, while cotton yarn is imported in bulk or in large skeins, so it is not salable over the counter.

In G. A. 5936 (T. D. 26070), the decision cited in the report of the appraiser above quoted, the Board found certain merchandise to have been known commercially as embroidery cotton, and described it as follows:

This merchandise is in small skeins, and printed upon the greater number of these are the words, in English, "Embroidery cotton."

From the decisions cited and the testimony quoted we find that the yarn known commercially in 1897 as "embroidery cotton" was put up in small skeins like that covered by G. A. 5936 (T. D. 26070), as described in the testimony (supra).

The Board is constrained to follow the decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for the second circuit in the Loeb case (supra), the legitimate import of which compels us to hold that the term "embroidery cottons," notwithstanding its plural significance as used in the statute, is used in a commercial sense and not in a descriptive sense. The necessary corollary is that G. A. 5372 (T. D. 24560) should be overruled. Accordingly the Board overrules said decision and follows the decision of the circuit court of appeals in the Loeb case (supra).

The protest is sustained, the decision of the collector reversed, and reliquidation accordingly will follow.

(T. D. 28804-G. A. 6731.)

Glass plates, rough cut or unwrought.

Cylinder-glass plates, colored or uncolored, which by reason of their high cost are not adapted commercially for glaziers' or decorative purposes, and which are manufactured with special care for the purpose of rendering them suitable for use in the manufacture of optical instruments, spectacles, and eyeglasses, are entitled to free entry under paragraph 565, tariff act of 1897, and are not dutiable as cylinder, crown, or common window glass at the rates per pound according to size provided by paragraph 101 and the additional duty of 5 per cent ad valorem prescribed by paragraph 107, if colored.

United States General Appraisers, New York, February 25, 1908. In the matter of protests 225245, etc., of Wiswall & Tichenor et al. against the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York.

Before Board 1 (LUNT, SHARRETTS, and MCCLELLAND, General Appraisers). SHARRETTS, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question consists of cylinder-glass plates, unpolished, ranging in dimensions between 2 inches square and 8 by 15 inches, that covered by protest 225245 being colored, and that covered by protest 278555 is uncolored. Duty was assessed on the former at the rate of 13 cents per pound and 5 per cent ad valorem under the respective provisions of paragraphs 101 and 107, and on the latter at 13 cents per pound under paragraph 101 of the tariff act of 1897, the importers claiming free entry for the goods under paragraph 565 as glass plates or disks, rough cut or unwrought, for use in the manufacture of optical instruments, spectacles, and eyeglasses, and suitable only for such use.

Glass for optical purposes is manufactured in small furnaces containing covered crucibles. Special attention is given to the purity

of the materials used and the heat to which they are subjected during the process of manufacture, to secure freedom from bubbles and other blemishes in the interior of the glass. This process is tedious and makes the cost of glass for lenses more than double that of glass designed for glazing or decorative purposes. Glass, to be suitable for use in the manufacture of spectacles or eyeglasses, must be absolutely free from internal defects such as seeds, bubbles, cords, and striæ of all kinds, external blemishes being not material, as they are eliminated in the process of grinding.

It has been urged by the Government that the glass included in the importations in question is sheet or cylinder glass and not plate glass; hence the provision in paragraph 565 for glass plates or disks is not applicable to the merchandise.

The term "plates or disks" refers to the form and not the manner of fabrication of the glass. Indeed, plate glass is never used in the manufacture of lenses for optical instruments, spectacles, or eyeglasses. This fact alone would seem sufficient to dispose of the Government's contention; but were this not so there is sufficient evidence to show that the glass in dispute is known commercially as plates and sheets. A further contention of the Government as stated by the appraiser in a special report to the collector accompanying one of these protests is to the effect that the glass is commercially known as optical glass, but that, by reason of its size, it is suitable for use for other than optical purposes. This contention would have more force if paragraph 565 imposed a limit upon the size of the plates or disks provided for therein.

It is not disputed that the importations in question were made for and are intended for exclusive use by the purchaser in the manufacture of optical instruments, spectacles, and eyeglasses. That fact, however, is not sufficient to control the classification of the goods, provided they are suitable for other purposes. On the other hand, the fact that the glass could be used for glaziers' or ornamental or decorative purposes is not sufficient to remove it from classification under paragraph 565, provided commercially it is not adapted to such uses; and no better test of fitness for use can b suggested than value.

The preponderance of evidence shows that the cost of this glass removed it from use commercially for any purpose other than the manufacture of optical instruments, spectacles, and eyeglasses.

Based on the evidence and the exhibits, we find that the merchandise is glass plates, rough cut or unwrought, for use in the manufacture of optical instruments, spectacles, and eyeglasses, and suitable only for such use, and hold that it is entitled to free entry under paragraph 565.

The protests are accordingly sustained and the decision of the collector in each case is reversed.

(T. D. 28805.)

Abstracts of decisions of Board of General Appraisers.

Board 1.-Lunt, Sharretts, and McClelland. Board 2.-Fischer, Howell, and De Vries. Board 3.-Waite, Somerville, and Hay.

BEFORE BOARD 1, FEBRUARY 17, 1908.

No. 18225.-SHELLFISH.-Protests 263745, etc., of R. Ichida et al. (San Francisco). Opinion by Lunt, G. A.

Cuttlefish were held free of duty under paragraph 659, tariff act of 1897, as shellfish.

No. 18226.-SCRAP TOBACCO.-Protests 271972, etc., of Juan F. Portuondo Cigar Manufacturing Company (Philadelphia).

Merchandise classified under the provision in paragraph 215, tariff act of 1897, for "all other tobacco, manufactured or unmanufactured," was claimed to be dutiable under paragraph 463 as waste" or under section 6 as an unenumerated unmanufactured article.

*

LUNT, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question is invoiced as “leaf tobacco scraps," and consists of pieces broken from the tobacco of which cigars are manufactured and which the testimony shows can be and is used as fillers for cigars. The protests are overruled on the authority of G. A. 5385 (T. D. 24580). Note also Seeberger v. Castro (153 U. S., 32) and United States v. Schroder (93 Fed. Rep., 448).

No. 18227.-PROTESTS ABANDONED. —Protests 278142, etc., of Magnus & Lauer et al. (New York) and protest 286984 of Wm. H. Thornley (San Francisco). Opinions by Lunt, G. A.

Protests abandoned.

BEFORE BOARD 2, FEBRUARY 17, 1908.

No. 18228.-PROTESTS ABANDONED. -Protests 60227 b, etc., of Salts Textile Manufacturing Company (Bridgeport). Opinion by Howell, G. A.

Protests abandoned.

BEFORE BOARD 3, FEBRUARY 17, 1908.

No. 18229.-CONCENTRATED FRUIT JUICE. - Protests 265741, etc., of E. C. Rich (New York).

Merchandise classified as an unenumerated manufactured article under section 6, tariff act of 1897, was claimed to be dutiable under paragraph 299 as fruit juice, either directly or by similitude.

* *

WAITE, General Appraiser: The merchandise in question was invoiced as raspberry, strawberry, and pineapple "pure fruit juice free from alcohol." * We deem it necessary to discuss only the claim based on paragraph 299, that being the claim upon which the importer relies. This importation is not, in our opinion, fruit juice as it was known at the time of the passage of the act, July 24, 1897. The evidence shows that the fruit juice which must have been in the contemplation of the lawmakers at that time was the juice as it was expressed from the fruit, with perhaps some additional alcohol as a preservative, being a thin, watery liquid, not condensed or otherwise increased in strength or value. The article here involved, the evidence shows, is produced by subjecting fruit juice to a process of evaporation and pasteurization, which extracts the water and results in a preparation of greatly increased strength,