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(By direction of the chairman the following memorandum entitled "The case of Japan in the neace treaty," by Toyokichi Iyenaga, is herewith printed in the record as follows:)

The Case Of Japan In The Peace Treaty.

By Toyokichi Iyenaga, Ph. D., professorial lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; director, East and West News Bureau, New Yort City, N. Y.

It is a very delicate matter for a foreigner to discuss an international question affecting his country, which has become the subject of controversy in the United State* Senate. Having profound respect for American traditions, I would not dream for a moment to overstep the bounds of propriety. I am, however, confident that the American people love fair play and would like to hear Japan's side of the case, as told by one of her sons. I feel also, as a recipient of all the blessings of American education a"d institutions, it is my duty to do my utmost for the continued maintenance of amicable relations between America and Japan pnd for the harmonious development of their respective interests and welfare. It is with these convictions that this leaflet is laid before you.

Japan's Paet In The War.

The world has short memory of the past. It is already beginnir"; to forget the sacrifices and efforts of the allied and associated powers and their concerted action, whi^h have brought Berlin war lords to their knees. We stand on the threshold of peace. Shall we delay its dawn? Endeavors are now being made to minimize the war contribution ot an ally and to win by tongue and pen, by intrigue and slander, what was achieved by the expenditure of blood and life energy. I am under no obligation to point this out by implication. To be frank, this is the present attitude of the Chinese agitators. True, compared with the stupendous exertions of the United States, Japan's part in the war was small. No self-respecting nation would want to brag of its performance in the world-wide struggle. Nevertheless, if we gauge the war situation with broad vision, Japan's contributions to the allied cause would. I trust, attain their proper dimensions.

Japan entered the war in obedience to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which imposed upon her the duty of conducting military operations in common with her ally in the regions of eastern Asia and its waters. I hardly need to emphasirf that the fulfillment of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese treaty was in perfect accord wiin Japan's national interests, for the German aggressive designs in the Far Ea.*t were * constant menace to her security and welfare.

Japan did her work with energy and thoroughness. She destroyed at one stroke lb* German power in the Far East by the reduction of the fortress of Tsingtao; hunted oat the enemy warships roving the adjoining seas; patrolled the South Seas, the Indian and Pacific Oceans, during the whole period of the war; convoyed the tn>ops of Australia and New Zealand to the battle fields of Europe and Asia: cooperated in the Mediterranean with the allied fleets in their operations against the enemy submarines prevented the filtration of German influence and spread of Bolshevism into Kas: Siberia; guarded the Hawaiian Islands and Pacific coast against the danger of German raiders, thus liberating the American Navy to devote its entire energy to its arduous task on the Atlantic and European waters; subscribed to the allied loans to the full extent of her financial capacity; provided the Entente Powers with munitions and other war materials; placed many ships at the disposal of the American Government for the transportation of munitions and cooperated with it in every possible manwr. and, finally, she stood ever ready to respond to the call of her allies in case of necessity That she did not fight on the European battle fields was not of her choice alone.

The real significance of Japan's participation in the war will. I hope, stand in bolder relief if we let the imagination play a little and picture to ourselves the contingencies that might have arisen had not the Japanese army and navy been mobilized against the Central Powers. Would the channel of communication and commerce between Europe and the Orient, between America and the Far East, with all that its security means, have been as safe as it had been for the entire period of the war? What part of the allied fleets, in addition to those already dispatched, must of necessity have been withdrawn from the home waters to safeguard the road from Aden to Shanghai, to th* great joy of Von Tirpitz and his coteries? Would not Germany, with her stroncbasr at Kiaochow, have played a formidable role in disturbing the tranquillity of China, to the great detriment of the allied cause? Would not German propaganda, one* »• active in stirring up revolt in India and in the Straits Settlements, have been some measure of success, to the prejudice of Britain's interests in her Asiatic dominions? In short, how was peace in the Far East and the Indian and Pacific Oceans, covering almost half of the globe, preserved during the entire period of the war and how were the interests of the Entente Powers therein safeguarded? I venture to say that Japan's allies during those dark days of the unsurpassed conflict took full cognizance of these facts and were not slow to give proper recognition.


Would that Japan were blessed by bounteous Providence so that she could follow the example of America and forego of her own accord any material compensation for her war efforts. For full comprehension of Japan's position I would ask that Americans to detach themselves for a moment from their own standpoint, from the most favorable position they find themselves in. With vast dominion and unlimited resources at her command, the United States can leisurely follow the path of idealism which she has chosen. For her mighty efforts during the war, for the sacrifice of 300,000 of her sons, and the expenditure of billions of treasure, American asks for no material compensation, but is content with the consciousness of having saved trance and civilization from the scourge of German militarism. Confident of her giant strength and of the unique prestige bom of her moral grsatness, American can now adaress herself to the new task of leadership in world affairs which has been thrust upon her as the outcome of the war.

The position of Japan is different. Circumscribed within a narrowly limited area, with scanty resources, and crowded with two-thirds of the entire population of America, Japan's problem of existence is not an easy one. Modem Japan, since her renascence half a century ago, had a hard, up-hill struggle to reach her maturity and present status. Only by dint of energy, perseverance, and patriotic sacrifices of the people haa the Japanese nation succeeded in entering the ranks of the five powers. Under the circumstances, constant vigilance, careful husbanding of her resources, and wise safeguarding of the fruits of whatever efforts she makes, are essential to Japan's existence and to maintaining her present standing. Flanked by huge neighbors, whose weal or woe, strength or weakness, is bound to affect hor own peace and seouritv, Japan is faring an unparalleled predicament. Such a nation, however idealistic at heart, can not afford to spend its energy for altruistic purposes alone, and neglect to take every precautionary step necessary to insure its independence. The policy of self-preservation and of assuring the position she has attained is the one Japan is given To pursue.

Every experience which Japan has gained is a priceless lesson to her. In 1805 she tasted the bitter cup of being deprived of the best fruits of victory in the costly war with China through the machinations of certain European powers, and not long after of witnessing those fruits slip from China's grasp and fall into European hands. Is it difficult, then, to understand that, in order to forestall a repetition of this experience at the peace conference which was to settle the World War, Japan felt it necessary to assure herself of the support of her claims by her allies at the peace table? This will explain the agreements entered into in 1017 between Japan on the one hand and Great Britain. France, Italy, and Russia on the other, as well as the China-Japan agreements of lOlo and 1018. Can we justly blame Japan for concluding these conventions, in view of the fact 1hat the world has short memory of the past, as I said at. the outset? At the same time, it should no1 be forgotten that these agreements were made after the Great War had been raging for two years and a half, and that by these instruments Japan reciprocally undertook to support the respective claims of her allies on (lennan territories and colonies at the peace conference.


The aforesaid treaties are the basis of articles lofi, 157, and 158 of the Versailles treaty. The terms of the latter treaty are substantially the same as those specified in the former. So long, therefore, as these treaties stand, so long will the Shantung clause of the Versailles treaty stand. Consequently, Chinese advocates are consistent, at least, when in trying to annul the Shantung decision, they advocate the abrogation of the China-Japan treaty of 1915. This, however, is out of the question. Great Britain, France, and Italy stand upon their honor. N'or will Japan ever consent to be a party to the abrogation of the treaty of 1015. Moreover, in adopting such a grave course, China must be prepared to turn into "scraps of paper" many of the treaties she has concluded with other powers. No stateman, 1 presume, will subscribe to such a program of upsetting the international order now maintained in China and reenactmg in that country the cha'w and anarchy of Bolshevik Russia.

America's Stand On The Shantung Decision.

That the United States has assumed a different position with regard to the Shantung decision from what I have stated is intelligible. The country entered the war in April, 1917, and is not a party to the agreements concluded among the Allies during February and March of the same year. Nor has it recognized the China-Japan treaty of 1915. According to the disclosure made in President Wilson's statement of August 6 of the circumstances that led to the Shantung decision, we are made aware that the President agreed to it upon the basis of the policy—as detailed in the above statement— declared by the Japanese peace envoys, Baron Makinoand Viscount Chinda. In the discussion that was to decide one of the most hotly disputed questions at the Paris conference, President Wilson further enlightens us that "reference was made to the enforcement of the agreements of 1915 and 1918 only in case China failed to cooperate fully in carrying out the policy outlined in the statement of Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda." By thus supplementing the statement issued on August 6 by Viscount Uchida, President Wilson has, I believe, taken pains to make his stand clear to the American people. It is made plain to all careful observers that the Shantung decision was the result of the compromise effected by principal representatives of the great powers. America can not very well call to account the allied powers for the conduct of the war or the arrangements made among them prior to her entrance into the war. This appears to me to afford an explanation of what President Wilson told his callers, as was often reported in newspapers, to the effect that America alone could not settle the terms of peace.


The Shantung program announced by Japan's peace envoys and now elaborated by her foreign minister is (1) to restore Kiaochow in pursuance of the assurance given at the peace conference and in fullfillment of the pledge she gave to China in 1915; (2) to operate the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railroad as a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise without any discrimination in treatment against other nationals, Chinese policing the road; (3) to establish in Tsingtao a general foreign settlement, instead of an exclusive Japanese settlement,'as was at first contemplated: (4) to completely withdraw the Japanese troops now guarding the territory upon the completion of these arrangements with China. In this way Shantung will come to attain the same status ruling in other Provinces of China. The Shantung settlement, therefore, does not infringe upon the territorial integrity of China or her independence. Bather does it serve to recover China's sovereignty which Germany had in fact over-ridden at Kiaochow in 1898.

After the reaffirmation by Viscount Uchida of the pledge repeatedly made by Japan 'e responsible statesmen and her representatives at Pans and Washington to restore Kiaochow to China, deed alone would convince those who still doubt Japan's sincerity of purpose. How such a step can be taken before China signs the treaty, I do not know. The execution of the contract can not take place while the other party is out of the ring. The responsibility of delaying the steps leading to the redeeming of Japan's pledge can not be shirked by China so long as she refuses to sign the Versailles treaty. The deadlock, however, can not last long. I entertain a strong hope that China will soon see the wisdom of adopting a course that will insure the benefit)" vouchsafed her by the Versailles treaty by affixing her seal to it, and avoid the danger involved in making a separate peace with Germany.


The one and sole weakness in the Shantung decision, I will admit, is the outward appearance it unavoidably partakes that the Allies have given the award to Japan at the expense of a friendly nation, and that Japan has become heir to the leasehold and rights which Germany extorted from China on the barest of pretenses.

The status of Kiaochow under German occupation was. however, scarcely different from that of Port Arthur and Dalny under Russian occupation. Nevertheless, when one compares the terms of the Shantung settlement with those of the Portsmouth treaty he will immediately notice a very marked difference. The treaty which was concluded through the good offices of President Roosevelt transferred to Japan without much ado the Russian leasehold of Kwangtung territory, wherein Port Arthur is located, of the South Manchurian Railway and of all the rights and privilege* appertaining thereto, together with the right of stationing troops to guard the line. By the Versailles arrangement, on the other hand, the Kiaochow leasehold will be given up, the railroad is" to be brought under joint management, and a trace of military occupation will be completely wiped out by the withdrawal of Japanese troops tnn Shantung.


It is well to remember that the German-China Treaty of 1898 received the recognition of most of the gre.it powers, including the United States, and had been in force for 18 years. During this period not a voice of protest was raised by the Chinese or by the citizens of other powers against Germany's leasehold of Kiaochow or her activities in Shantung. For all practical purposes Kiaochow was German territory, and at the outbreak ot the war it was used as the base of military and naval operations against the Allies. The Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railroad transported the German forces and supplies. It, was this enemy territory and property that Japan wrested in 1914 and thus wiped out the menace of Germany in the Far East. Viscount Uchida rr-minds us in his late statement that in the ultimatum addressed to Germany by Japan on August 1"'. 1914. the latter power demanded of the former to deliver Kiaochow not later than September 15, 1914, without condition or compensation, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China, and that this demand has never elicited any protest from China or any other power. It would be easy enough to say, now that the war is over, that China could without difficulty have ousted the Germans. To argue against such a contention would be silly. Yet there is one point loudly noised abroad against which I can not help protesting. It has been asserted that China has I'een prevented by the machinations of Japan from entering the war at its first stage. This is a falsifying of history. The conditions prevailing in China at the time of the outbreak of the Great War and the details of her final entrance into it are exhaustively described by Mr. Kawakami in his book entitled "Japan and World Peace."

It is further asserted by those who espouse China's cause that the declaration of war against Germany by China had the effect of abrogating the treaty of 1898 and restoring to China all rights which she granted to Germany. It is true that war cancels political treaties of a temporary nature between belligerents; but under international law it would seem, as Senator Robinson so ably maintains, that "such a treaty as that between China and Germany, in which China agreed to accept the status of other nations with which Germany was at peace, in so far as the leased territory is concerned, would not be abrogated ipso facto by the outbreak of war between China and liermany." Aside from this contention, there is one incontestible document—incontwtible unless it is made void by force—by which China agreed upon the transfer of these German rights to Japan by stipulating in it to "give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government mav hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung." 'That China was acting in good faith to execute the terms of this treaty, with no intention of abrogating it, is clearly shown by the conclusion of the agreement of "18. This agreement, which China herself initiated, was the sequel of the former treaty—I mean the China-Japan treaty of 1915. The contracting of loans for the purpose of building railways in Shantung, with other enterprises China has undertaken in conjunction with Japan since 1915, is a strong confirmation of my contention.


Whether foreign leaseholds, settlementa, and concessions in China, together with railroads operated under foreign management, should or should not be tolerated is a '(uestion of highest importance demanding the most careful consideration of the Tv orld leaders. The fundamental principle underlying the Shantung question is nothing 1'Ut the question whether or not to tolerate this state of affairs in China, and equity demands, it seems to me, the solution of the two in one way or the other. This, of course, opens up a vast problem of China's reconstruction. The establishment of foreign settlements is the result of the policy of seclusion China has pursued. Thev are *t the present day the only avenues through which foreign commerce flows and the business of foreign merchants transacted. The abolition of foreign settlements would necessitate the opening up of the whole country. With it will arise the question of the abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction and that of recovery of the tariff autonomy and other no less weighty questions. These are, however, irrelevant to the subject 1 am presenting.

The actual fact is that there are in China several foreign leaseholds and foreign settlements, that China has in the past granted for one reason or another industrial and economic rights and concessions to foreign powers, and that many railroads in that country are placed under foreign management. I can, therefore, see no reasoD "ny Japan alone should be singled out and made the target of attack. Japan above all other nations hag the unimpeachable right, because of the propinquity of her territory to that of China, to safeguard her special interests therein if any power is permitted to retain its vested interests at all.

I daresay that Japan will follow the suit of other powers if they decide to give up the leaseholds and settlements they maintain in China; if they return to her the rights and concessions they have secured therein and withdraw their troops now quartered at Peking, Tientsin, and other places; and, further, if China sufficiently demonstrates her ability to defend herself and maintain her integrity by her own arms instead of shifting the burden to Japan to stand in the Far East as a bulwark against outside aggression. Then Japan is safe, China free and will have attained all that she is clamoring for to-day. Among the great five the United States is the onl> disinterested power, free from the web which history has woven. This, if I am n<>t mistaken, is the reason whv China, backed by scores of foreign advisers, is moving heaven and earth to persuade America to come to her own views, and is putting to a test the talent of intrigue and persuasion, which she has inherited through centuries, against hard realities. I am, however, inclined to think that the American people, who, however idealistic, hold as their first principle the doctrine of independence and "self-help," will first see, before they commit themselves and take upon themselves the burden of China, what she has done to help herself. The history of the past few decades is a sad commentary upon China's lack ot 'self-help." In fact, the genius of intrigue and wrangling, with which the Chinese are so strikingly endowed, i* rending the country into factions and leading it to disintegration and disaster. I shall go no further upon this subject, for it would be un-Christian to try to pick a beam in another's eye. Japan's shortcomings and blunders, especially in her dealings with China, have been many and grievous—this I would be the first to admit. At the same time I hold that in the adjustment of international issues we should plant our tee: upon firm ground of facts, not upon the Utopian plane.

That the millenium has come neither to the world nor to the Paris conference i* sufficiently demonstrated by the defeat of the Japanese proposal to put among the articles of the covenant of the league of nations the principle of equality of nations and fair treatment of their nationals. Nothing could be more in accord with the principle of justice and humanity than this proposal. Its defeat shows that we have to take into consideration the idiosyncrasies, temperaments, and prejudices prevailing among different races, and the actual conditions ruling in the world, in order to build up a safe and solid foundation for international order. If we applv one principle of our liking to solve a problem, we should be ready to accept the application of the same principle in the unraveling of other problems. If we refuse to accept Japan's proposal above mentioned on the ground that the world, as it is, is not ready for its adoption at the present time, we can not consistently decry the Shantung settlement, which, however imperfect it. may seem from a purely idealistic standpoint, rests upon hard realities—the world as it is—that is to say, international agreements, historical precedents, and the existing state of affairs in China.

Japan's Participation In The Development Op China's Resources.

Japan has a good cause for her participation in the development of China's resources. She has a crowded population, which is increasing approximately at the rate of SOO.(M> per annum. Furthermore, this crowded and ever-increasing population is debarred by some nations of white race from seeking its fortune in the most favored and sparsel> populated regions of the globe. How. then, can Japan feed, clothe, and shelter her people? The best and safest road leading to the solution of this pressing problem lies in the development of her industries and expansion of her commerce. In pursuing this policy, Japan is sadly handicapped by the lack of raw material. But in her neighbor's territory there are vast resources, untouched and unused, the unfolding oi which will not only meet Japan's wants but will equally benefit China and the world at large. Japan maintains that she is entitled to the privilege of cooperating with China in the unearthing of the treasures that lie unutilized. America. I am confident, will not grudge to see justice in Japan's claims. It is just as wrong to impute America with the thought of obstructing Japan in every avenue of her growth as it u unjust to charge Japan with harboring sinister designs upon the Philippines or Hawaii The sooner these unwarranted suspicions and fears are set at rest the better for tbr future of both countries.

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