dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the ordinary processes of negotia- tion, to submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be rendered.
In case of arbitration, the matter or mat- ters at issue shall be referred to three arbi- trators, one of the three to be selected by each of the parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several parties and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbi- trators thus added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of Delegates.
On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Dele- gates, in case the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and conclusive.
When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the dispute shall
Bullitt Exhibit No. 4-Continued.
as in the so-called Peace Treaties of the United States.
Further, the Executive Council is not a body equipped for such inquiry. The Powers concerned always and naturally desire to be represented in the inquiring body, which should be able to meet in any part of the world which the Executive Council could not well do.
Accordingly, a series of paragraphs are suggested which embody the principles, and with some necessary modifications because of the multiple character of the Covenant, the language, of the Peace Treaties.
The substance of these provisions is a procedure of inquiry, followed by six months of renewed negotiations, during which periods there is to be no resort to force.
Such provisions of course permit the Parties to resort to any form of arbitration, if they so desire.
or to begin hostilities or to declare war pending the investigation and report of said Commission.
Each Contracting Power shall, by appoint- ment made within one month after ratifica- tion by it of this Covenant designate one Commissioner as a member of the Commis- sion mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Each Contracting Power may remove at any time, before investigation begins, the Com- missioner appointed by it, appointing his successor upon the same occasion. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
The Commission sitting in the investiga- tion of a dispute and reporting thereon, shall consist of those Commissioners ap- pointed by the Parties to the dispute, together with a like number of Commis- sioners chosen, one by each Party, and together with one Commissioner chosen by agreement of the Parties.
Failing any designation, appointment or choice under either of the two preceding paragraphs, such designation, appointment or choice as the case may be shall be made by vote of the Executive Council.
The expenses of the Commission in any investigation and report shall be paid by the Parties to the dispute, in equal propor- tions.
The Commission, in any investigation and report, shall make their own rules of proce- dure.
Any decision or conclusion of the Commission and the terms of its report shall be adopted by a majority thereof.
in be sagaubmitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as arbi- trators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding and conclusive without right of appeal.
If for any reason it should prove imprac- ticable to refer any matter in dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such media- tory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the refer- ence and give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary arrangements for a full hearing, investiga- tion, and consideration. It shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the controversy; and the Executive Council shall do every- thing in its power by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall be the privilege of the members of the Execu tive Council to publish their several con
In case of failure to agree upon the diplo- matic solution of a dispute the Contracting Powers, Parties to the dispute, shall submit it to said Commission for investigation and report. The convocation of the Commission may be made by any Party. The Commis- sion shall by preference sit in the country in which there are the greater facilities for the investigation, and the Contracting Powers shall furnish all the means and facilities required for the investigation and report. The report of the Commission shall be presented within a year counted from the date at which the Commission shall declare, by a declaration filed with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, that its work is begun, unless a prolongation of the time shall be accorded by the Parties. This report, which is purely advisory and does not bind the Parties as to any questions at issue, shall be prepared in various origi- nals, one of which shall be presented to each of the Parties and the other shall be presented to the Executive Council.
After presentation of the report mentioned in the preceding paragraph, six months' time will be given to renewed negotiations in order to bring about a solution of the ques- tion in view of the findings of said report; and if after this new term the Parties should be unable to reach a friendly arrangement, they will proceed to submit the dispute to arbitration under the terms of any conven- tion in force between them which they agree covers the question or questions investigated; if not so submitted to arbitra- tion, and thereby amicably adjusted, any Party may proceed to submit the dispute to the Executive Council for consideration
clusions or recommendations; and such publications shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the disputants.
Bullitt Exhibit No. 4-Continued.
The second paragraph provides for "com- pulsory" arbitration in certain cases, the classes of which are stated. The difficulty with all such classifications is that they are extraordinarily difficult of application. Frequently the parties do not agree as to precisely what the dispute involves, or within what classification of disputes it would fall.
Inquiry serves to clear up such questions and is desirable on that account alone. One natural tendency of such inquiry there- fore is to lead to arbitration by consent, in which case the procedure agreed on by the Parties is not material.
But while in form, the second paragraph provides for "compulsory" arbitration (the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs providing for the procedure), the final paragraph of the Article recognizes that the arbitration must really be voluntary, by the words "if for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter to arbitration.' "" One such reason would be that one or more of the Parties did not consider the dispute one within those agreed to be arbitrated, which would always be the case when one Party did not want arbitration.
It is accordingly submitted that arbitra- tion of disputes should be in form, as in fact, voluntary, as the disputes which will be arbitrated cannot be determined in advance. Further, that inquiry should be necessary in all cases not submitted to arbitration,
during a period of three months, for such mediatory action or recommendation as the Executive Council may deem wise in the circumstances. The Executive Council shall immediately accept the reference and give notice to the other Party or Parties, and shall make the necessary arrangements for a full hearing, investigation and con- sideration. The Executive Council shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dis- pute and shall make such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the merits of the controversy and calcu- lated to secure a just and lasting settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their possession which in any bears upon the facts or merits of the controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power by way of mediation or concilia- tion to bring about a peaceful settlement. The recommendations of the Executive Council shall be addressed to the disputants, and shall not have any binding force. Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish their several conclusions or recom- mendations; and such publications shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the disputants.
and that after inquiry, if agreement does not result, the Executive Council should take the dispute under consideration, sub- stantially as provided in the final para- graph of the Article.
Accordingly, the suggestion is that the provisions for so-called "compulsory" arbi- tration and the procedure thereon be omitted and that the procedure of inquiry and sub- sequent reference to the Executive Council be adopted as reaching the same results.
Incidentally this would avoid objections which have been successfully raised, and always will be raised in the Senate, to bind- ing and self-operative arbitration treaties.
An additional clause providing for the preservation of rights during dispute by the familiar means of a modus vivendi is sug- gested.
Finally there is suggested a Covenant against hostilities, which goes at least as far as the Covenant in the first paragraph of this Article.
The Contracting Powers severally cov- enant that while Parties to a dispute which is pending, and during the periods men- tioned in the two preceding paragraphs, they will not do or omit any act the Com- mission or omission of which would tend to prejudice the position or final rights of any other Party to the dispute, and that the terms of a modus vivendi shall be agreed upon, preserving the rights of the Parties, pending and until the final determination of the dispute. In any case where the Parties are unable to agree upon the terms of such a modus vivendi, the terms thereof shall be formulated by the Commission and a modus vivendi embodying these terms shall be executed by the Parties and carried out by them in good faith.
The Contracting Powers severally cov- enant that while Parties to a dispute sub- mitted to the Commission or under con- sideration by the Executive Council they will not commit any hostile act or commence hostilities or declare war against any other
Should any Contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under Article V, it shall thereby ipso facto become at war with all the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all trade or financial rela- tions, the prohibition of all intercourse between their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the pre- vention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of Nations or not.
It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State.
Bullitt Exhibit No. 4-Continued.
This Article provides by way of sanction for the breach of any covenant under the preceding Article, for an ipso facto war by all other members of the League upon the covenant-breaking State.
Doubtless the covenants referred to are those against committing hostilities, al- though there are covenants of another nature in the preceding Article as drawn.
A substantial objection to such a pro- vision is that it would be void if contained in a treaty of the United States, as Congress under the Constitution has the power to declare war. A war automatically arising upon a condition subsequent, pursuant to a treaty provision, is not a war declared by Congress.
It is not doubted that by treaty the United States could agree to declare war under cer- tain circumstances. If the circumstances arose, the failure of Congress to declare war would be a breach of the treaty; provisions of such nature are frequently found in treaties of alliance, which are within the treaty-making clause of the Constitution.
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