Government-with the minister of Foreign Affairs, Count von Bülow-which resulted in what is called the Hay doctrine. Of course the Hay-von Bülow notes are published. I have them here. Senator SWANSON. Will you put those notes in the record?

Senator BRANDEGEE. You do not mean to put them in now, but put them in afterwards?

Mr. MILLARD. On page 448 of this book, "Mr. Hay, American Secretary of State, to Mr. White, American Ambassador of Germany." That is, it was communicated in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. That was Andrew D. White?

Mr. MILLARD. I suppose so. Yes, Andrew D. White, Mr. Hay's note is "Washington, September 6, 1899," and Count von Bülow's is February 19, 1900.

Senator BRANDEGEE. On what page of that book does that occur? Where is it printed?

Mr. MILLARD. In this book?

Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes.

Mr. MILLARD. It is in the appendices, pages 448 to 450. Of course it is in Rockhill's Treaties, and in all the textbooks.

Senator BORAH. Those things are in that book, and are much more accessible than they would be in this interminable record. Of course it is in that book Contemporary Politics in the Far East, also. Senator BRANDEGEE. Will you let me ask you one thing, not connected with this particular thing. When did you first hear of this particular treaty between Great Britain and Japan providing that Great Britain will have Shantung? In 1917, was it not?

Mr. MILLARD. 1917? I first heard of it at Paris.

Senator BRANDEGEE. When?

Mr. MILLARD. About the 1st or 2d of Apri-last April.
Senator BRANDEGEE. 1918?

Mr. MILLARD. 1919.

Senator BRANDEGEE. That is all.

Mr. MILLARD. I will come to that a little later.

Senator SWANSON. Now, will you tell us, from your interpretation of the Hay doctrine, the open-door policy, from those two communications, how far it goes, and how it affects trade and commerce of this country?

Mr. MILLARD. The Hay doctrine was designed, as it appears on its face, to extract from the German Government a statement, which it did extract, that in acquiring the leasehold of Kiaochow and the subsequent railway agreement signed a year or so after the lease, Germany disclaimed by those acquisitions any preferential position in China, any impairment of Chinese sovereignty, any intention or purpose to use her position at Kiaochow to discriminate against the free commerce in China of other nations, or the rights of other nations under the clause of the so-called most-favored nations clause of the treaty that is our position; we have a very favorable treaty with China. The notes, as I say, speak for themselves. Now, then when Mr. Hay got the German Government on record then he approached the opposite Governments, the British, the French, and the Japanese, and the other Governments.

Senator SWANSON. Before you proceed, was that a protest against the sovereignty that Germany acquired? Did the note contain any protest against sovereignty?

Mr. MILLARD. You can read the note.

Senator SWANSON. I just wanted that clear. It simply asks for equal trade relations and things of that sort.

Mr. MILLARD. It started out with the usual diplomatic language, that it should be cleared up and would be to the advantage of everybody if they would state their positions.

Senator SWANSON. I had an idea that the determination was that no rights acquired by Germany should interfere in any manner with the rights and the position of the United States.

Mr. MILLARD. No; with the integrity of all nations, and also that China's rights were to be unimpaired.

Senator SWANSON. I did not notice that particularly.

Senator KNOX. Territorial integrity is specifically mentioned.
Mr. MILLARD. Territorial integrity is mentioned.

Senator KNOX. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion, that Senator Johnson has asked the witness to narrate in his own way this story and the witness is accustomed to giving a consecutive narration of events. I would like to hear that and then have questions asked afterwards. I think we could get a much better idea if we would let Mr. Millard go on and answer Senator Johnson's question in his own way, and then put such questions as we wish.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that no Senator is to ask any question until he has concluded his statement?

Senator KNOX. Oh, I do not mean no question.

Senator SWANSON. If other Senators ask questions, I want the same right. I want to have his interpretation of what the Hay doctrine did.

Senator MCCUMBER. We have been deviating from that rule a great deal since we began the examination of witnesses.

Senator KNOX. But none have been so accustomed to express themselves consecutively as Mr. Millard.

Senator SWANSON. I am perfectly willing that he proceed without interruption.

Senator KNOx. I think it will contribute to the information of all of us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a better way to let him make his statement.

Senator SWANSON. So long as all the Senators do not interrupt. The CHAIRMAN. Of course that is understood.

Senator MCCUMBER. As his next statement is on a different subject, if I understood Mr. Millard correctly, Germany renounced any claim over Shantung.

Mr. MILLARD. I would say that it amounted to that, a disclaimer of any purpose to infringe upon the integrity of China or interfere with the general open door or various things of that kind.

Senator MCCUMBER. She claimed no sovereign rights over the territory.

Mr. MILLARD. She disclaimed. That was the purpose of the Hay note, and it accomplished that.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Japan disclaims any sovereignty over Shantung and agrees to give it back.

Mr. MILLARD. It is difficult to know.

Senator BORAH. Can not we have an understanding that the witness may make a statement, and then ask questions if we want to?

Senator SWANSON. It is perfectly agreeable to me.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Senator Johnson has the witness.

Senator JOHNSON of California. I asked a general question, and we have not advanced very far on it. I ask that no particular rule be pursued except that which the committee deem appropriate, but I would be glad if the witness could proceed with his statement under such rule as may be prescribed by the committee.

Mr. MILLARD. I merely brought that in because I think it is important to understand in relation to this Shantung situation to-day the different steps by which this Shantung situation has arisen.

Senator JOHNSON of California. Now, if you will proceed historically and come down to the Shantung decision, describe what it was, its effect upon China, upon Japan, and upon our country.

Mr. MILLARD. I think it is pertinent in this connection to point out that after the promulgation of what was termed the Hay doctrine, after Mr. Hay had gotten this communication from the German Government, and then had subsequently got the assent of the other Governments to the thing in principle, the whole thing constituted a general international understanding known as the Hay doctrine.

Various Governments, however, continued among themselves to make what we now have a new phrase for, "regional understandings" regarding China. There exists at the present time in the neighborhood of 20 known regional understandings affecting China, and others are suspected to exist. For instance, among the regional understandings, soon after Germany's acquisition of Shantung there was a regional understanding between the British and German Governments whereby Great Britain in effect recognized Germany's superior position or sphere in Shantung. That agreement held presumably up until the abrogation by declaration of war in 1914 of all agreements between the British and German Governments. And then various other trades were made in the Far East, regional understandings or collateral trades on the side among the various nations to reduce the balance, due to Germany's acquisition of that position there.

One of the very pertinent things in that connection was the AngloJapanese alliance. There is very good authority for the statement that the Anglo-Japanese alliance was first proposed by Germany in the form of a tri-partite alliance-Germany, Japan, and Great Britain. Germany approached the Japanese Government first, and the Japanese Government evidently took the thing under favorable consideration, and approached the British Government. The British Government at that time seemed to have been animated by a different hypothesis, and they did not want any alignment in the Far East between Germany and Japan; so finally they succeeded in sidetracking that, and the alliance was made between Japan and Great Britain solely, and excluding Germany. I mention that for the bearing that Germany was gradually being pushed into a position off by herself. and in my mind those were among the contributing causes that finally led to this clash in 1914. One thing led to another. You built up and kept building up combinations, a wall, and Germany was trying to break out in different directions.

I have brought in that question of regional understandings and their existence because you will see the pertinency of that later.

We come along now up to the time of the beginning of the great war. There were different demonstrations in the interim there of the application of these various regional understandings, operating, you may say, inside of the Hay doctrine, and antagonistic to it. Mr. Knox's efforts to neutralize the railways of Manchuria constituted one strong demonstration of the fact that there were combinations inside of combinations there, regional understandings of powers among themselves, which, when it came to a showdown, superseded their acquiescence to the Hay doctrine.

When the Great War broke out suddenly, Japan almost immediately took the occasion to send an ultimatum to Germany, practically demanding that she get out of Shantung, to which Germany never replied, and that resulted in a declaration of war and the Japanese expedition which captured the port of Tsingtau. China made efforts to preserve her neutrality. She made efforts in which the American legation at Peking took some part, but the time was very short. The proposal that Tsingtau be neutralized, that it be turned over to China, and various ways to keep China from being involved in the thing were proposed. Japan did not want any of those things. She moved quickly, and proceeded to go over there and land her troops. In her occupation of the Province she immediately, from the beginning, went further than Germany had ever done. She did not confine her military operations to the leased German territory at all. She overran the whole Province almost immediately; seized the whole railway up to the capital of the Province over its entire length, established her troops and police clear outside the railway, and various other parts; and in that way she made a rapid military penetration of this entire Province, which condition exists to the present day.

China's various efforts to prevent that were unavailing; and the next move in that game-the other powers were preoccupied with the desperate struggle in Europe, and unable to interpose any effective action in the Far East-so Japan came along in 1915 with her 21 demands, which she sought first to impose upon China by secrecy. When that was impossible, the Chinese realized the character of the demands, and they happened to have quite a strong man as President of China at that time, Yuen Che Kai, a strong, able man. He communicated it to other governments. The thing was brought out into the light, and raised such an outcry that although Japan persisted in pressing the demands, and China was finally compelled to yield, they were in somewhat modified form over the form in which they had been originally presented. That was in 1915. However, the United States Government took an official exception to that 1915 treaty, which is all in the record.

Senator POMERENE. You say the United States Government took an exception?

Mr. MILLARD. Took an exception; yes, sir. The United States Government took an official exception, which is published, and which is included in that book; and the Chinese Government took exception also by stating that it signed under compulsion.

From the standpoint of the United States, the next important official maneuver, if you may call it that, was the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Oh, no; let me go back a little.

After our Government severed diplomatic relations with Germany. which I believe was early in February, 1917, we approached the Chinese Government officially. I was in Peking at the time. The United States Government officially, through the American minister at Peking, approached the Chinese Government with an invitation and advice that we join with her in severing diplomatic relations with Germany. That was very strongly urged upon the Chinese Government, and for several days there was a very strong diplomatic fight raised in Peking, the German and Austrian legations, of course, opposing it, and the Japanese legation opposing it very strongly, but in a secret way. The British, French, and Russian legations were sympathetic to the proposal, and such influence as they had was exerted in favor of China accepting the American invitation. China did. Well, at that time China was favorably inclined to this proposal. I might say that on two previous occasions China had offered to join the Allies. Both times she had been prevented by the objections of Japan. Japan would not let her come in. Her influence with the other allied powers was so strong that China was not allowed to join.

the Allies.

The result was that when we came along and urged China to join with us we had not at that time declared war on Germany, but we urged her to take the preliminary step and join us in severing diplomatic relations with Germany, which every one felt would be a prelude to war-China was dubious, having been repulsed twice in efforts to join the allies by the Japanese objections; and having knowledge that at that moment the Japanese legation and all the Japanese influences at Peking were fighting bitterly the proposal that China act upon the advice of the United States, the Chinese Government wanted certain assurances. That is, they wanted to know where they would get off. They said: "Suppose we do follow your advice and come in: Now, we want certain assurances. We would like to have definite assurances of the Allies that our territorial integrity will be protected in the peace settlement." An effort was made by the Chinese Government at that time to get such assurances from the French and British Governments. The French and British legations at Peking, while they urged China to follow the advice of the United States, communicated with their Governments, and they could not give any definite assurances; but they told the Chinese Government-tnat is, the British minister and the French minister to Peking told the Chinese Government-"You come on in; you follow along with the United States, and come on in, and we are quite sure you will be taken care of."

The thing hung fire for two or three days just on that point, China quite willing to come in, but saying: "No; tell us just exactly, will you, if we come in, will you guarantee our territorial integrity!" They finally, when they got that kind of a negative reply from the British and French Governments, went after Dr. Reinsch, and said. "Well, at least the American Government can say that you will support us in protecting our territorial integrity." Now, I have this account from Dr. Reinsch, the American minister at PekingDr. Paul Reinsch.

It happened that just at that moment there was a break in the Pacific cable, and for several days Dr. Reinsch was out of cable com