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munication with the State Department. It was very urgent, and the thing had to be concluded quickly, or everyone there thought that it should be concluded quickly, because they felt that if they did not get the Chinese to act promptly the various Japanese intrigues would get to work, and they would succeed possibly in preventing China from taking any action. They were holding almost hourly sessions there for two or three days. Two or three times a day Dr. Reinsch was in consultation with the Chinese Premier, Tuen Chi Jui, and Li-Un-Hung, the President at that time-Gen. Li-Un-Hung. They wanted definite assurances. Dr. Reinsch said: "The cable is interrupted, and I can not communicate with my government at this moment, but I feel justified in telling you verbally my opinion that in the event that you follow the advice of the United States now and sever displomatic relations with Germany, and in the event that that leads us into war with Germany, you can count upon the diplomatic support of the United States in seeing that China's rights are protected in the peace settlement." The result of these negotiations was that China did take that action, and, as the document shows, upon the advice of the United States, severed diplomatic relations with Germany. That eventually brought China into the war as an enemy of Germany.

The next important event in this connection was the signing of the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement, which occurred here in Washington, signed on the 2d of November, 1917. Meanwhile, both the United States and China had declared war on Germany.

The Lansing-Ishii agreement followed the general lines of previous statements of the United States regarding China-the socalled Hay doctrine formula, which had been repeated now in eight or nine international agreements of one kind or another, which had been repeated in the Root-Takahira agreement signed in 1907; that is, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China, and the "open door"; but it was significant in that it contained in its preliminary paragraphs a recognition of Japan's special position relating to China. That agreement was made, the negotiations were conducted, without China being informed, without consulting China in any way. China first learned of it when it was published. I might say in that connection that it was given premature publication at Peking by Japan. As the document itself shows, it was signed on the 2d of November, 1917. By a sort of general agreement, the two Governments were to give it simultaneous publication on November 7 at a stated hour-to give it simultaneous publication in Tokio and in Washington. However, as we know now, I think it was two days, even, before the thing was signed-it was either October 31 or October 30-that the contents of the agreement were communicated to the Russian Government by Japan through the Russian ambassador at Tokio.

As I say, it was to have been given simultaneous publication on the 7th of November. On the 4th of November-and meanwhile our Government had not even informed our embassy at Tokyo or our legation at Peking of this matter at all-on the 4th of November the Japanese minister at Peking officially informed the Wei Chow Pou-that is, the Chinese Foreign Office of the signing of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and provided them with a text in Japanese and Chinese. In those texts in Japanese and Chinese, the phrase "special position"

was translated in a way to amount to a recognition of Japan's paramountcy in China. The Chinese Government was naturally dumfounded at this thing, and immediately went to the American legation.

Now, if you know anything of the diplomatic atmosphere of Peking under those circumstances, the way that would look to the Chinese was this: Japan comes and tells them of this thing under the cir cumstances, which gives it the circumstantial appearance that "Now, we are paramount here, and we inform you about this, and if you do not believe us go up and ask the American legation." They went over to the American legation and inquired, and the American legation had never heard of it, of course. It immediately cabled for information. Meanwhile, through Japanese sources at Peking, and Chinese sources, too-they were bound to blab a thing like that; it completely flustered them-the Chinese Government and the Chinese Foreign Office and the newspaper men there in Peking got hold of it, and the result was a little telegram carried by the Associated Press and Reuter's New Service all over the world, to the effect that this had been signed, and the news was given out at Peking. I was in New York when I read that short telegram in the papers, and then our Government, of course, cabled the text immediately to the minister at Peking, to the legation at Peking, and we then communicated it to the Chinese Government; but our translation of the term "special position" differed very materially, when translated into Chinese, from the way that Japan had translated it in the original text communicated by Japan. That led to some little diplomatic controversy there at Peking, but we stuck to our text, and Japan sticks to hers, and so that matter stands to this day, so far as I know; the Chinese having two texts of this thing in their Foreign Office, one the first one communicated by Japan in Japanese and Chinese, in which the term "special position" is translated into the equivalant of paramountcy, and our text, which translates into the interpretation which Mr. Lansing exhibited to you in his examination the other day, which, so far as I know, has been the first official delineation of the American position on the subject. Meanwhile it has stood in China's eyes in that obscure position, with all of the circumstantial indications favoring the Japanese interpretation.

Moreover, Japan went ahead and acted on her interpretation. From that time she assumed a position of paramountcy in relation to China. She went ahead and began the establishment of civil gov ernment over Shantung Province. She extended her civil government régime in Manchuria. She began actually to acquire the possessions and the position of a sovereign in those parts of China where she had obtained a foothold by the methods I have indicated. She went on, and she obtained, through that influence, a great influence at Peking. The Chinese Government, you might say, threw up their hands and said: "Well, America will not support us; they have recognized Japan's paramountcy; we have got to do the best we can." Japan bribed several high Chinese officials up there, and began to press for other secret agreements and things. However, the Chinese Government resisted. They did obtain a so-called supplementary agreement to the 1915 agreement, signed, I believe, in September, 1918; but they could not get that signed at Peking. They seemed to have reached the Chinese minister over in Tokio by the money

process-I am only repeating the open accusations made in the press of China-and got him to sign a memorandum, the so-called secret 1918 agreement, which is further confirmatory of Japan's position in Shantung, and which amounted to the fact that they would have certain additional railway concessions there over and above what Germany had had, and that, providing the peace conference would give Japan Germany's position in Shantung, China would consent. That thing was signed at Tokio by the Chinese minister, and if that holds China, that is all there is. It was never confirmed by the Chinese parliament; it was never confirmed by a meeting of the Chinese cabinet or anything. Now, that is what that so-called 1918 agreement rests upon.

Senator POMERENE. Will it interrupt you to ask you just this question, to clear that up: Does the Chinese law require ratification by the Chinese Parliament?

Mr. MILLARD. Yes; the only constitution that is in existence.
Senator POMERENE. Excuse me for interrupting you.

Mr. MILLARD. You see, China has been in a more or less turbulent state ever since the revolution. They have a so-called constitution and under their forms it would have required at least ratification by the cabinet and also ratification by the Parliament. It was never ratified. In fact, the text of it was never even disclosed to anybody until the Paris peace conference.

That brings us along up to, say, the armistice. I was in Peking at the time, and China made preparations

Senator HITCHCOCK. Before you leave that, will you please make it clear whether there was any disagreement between the Ishii note in Japanese and the American note in English?

Mr. MILLARD. As I say, it was a question of translation. Of course, we can all read the American note in English, but we can not read it in Japanese or Chinese. Now, the Japanese Government, of course, immediately telegraphed this out to Tokio and then telegraphed it over to Pekin, and they had translations made. They had a translation made into Chinese and another translation made into Japanese, those, of course, being the languages of the two Governments.

Senator HITCHCOCK. Is there any question whether the Japanese note is correctly translated into Chinese?

Mr. MILLARD. That, of course, as I say, led to a dispute, because our sinologues say that our translation is the better translation. Senator HITCHCOCK. Is the translation of the Japanese note into Chinese?

Mr. MILLARD. Our translation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement into Chinese is accepted by everybody except Japan. She made her own translation.

Senator BORAH. As I understand, in translating it into Chinese and Japanese they used a certain word

Mr. MILLARD. They used a certain character.

Senator BORAH. They used a character or word.

Mr. MILLARD. They used a different character than we used in our translation.

Senator BORAH. Which indicated "special interest" or "paramount," according to which character was used.

Mr. MILLARD. Something which they translate paramount. Senator BORAH. Ours indicates nothing but "special interest." Mr. MILLARD. Ours indicates the interpretation which Mr. Lansing gave you gentlemen the other day. There is just that difference, but as you say, it is a very important difference.

Senator POMERENE. In view of these questions may I ask this further question: Are you able to state whether the word which was used by the Japanese was correctly translated into our word "paramountcy?"

Mr. MILLARD. There would be no way of making an exact translation, but the sense of it would be that according to the sinologues. Our legation has Chinese experts, as every legation has, and these sinologues got together and translated this thing, and the general unanimity of opinion outside of the Japanese legation is that our translation is correct and theirs is a translation fixed up to suit what they want to put in there.

Senator POMERENE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. You may continue, Mr. Millard.

Mr. MILLARD. Now the next step would come after the armistice, when China began to make her preparations. The Japanese had been making a fight up there for some time by which they were attempting to secure representation in China. They even produced at Peking-they never had the nerve to produce it at Paris-an agreement which this same Chinese minister, Mr. Lou, had signed, whereby Japan was to represent China at the peace conference.

However, when they tried to put that over, China absolutely resisted that, and of course the British, American, and all other legations said, "Do not recognize anything like that. You send your own delegation." They did that. They nominated their representatives. They sent their minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Lou Tseng-tsiang. Then the Chinese delegates had been working with various experts on the subject of their case, how they would present it at the peace conference, and the matters they would want to bring up at the peace conference. I understand you have summoned Mr. Ferguson to appear. He was among the foreign advisers they had employed. When I was in Peking, last October, I went up there, and I had two interviews with the Chinese minister of foreign affairs, merely in my capacity as a journalist, in which we discussed these various matters, and what China ought to do, and what China purposed to bring up, and things like that. Just about that time the Chinese foreign office went up to our legation and said, "Now, we have followed along with you people. We came into the war under your wing, and we are going to continue in that way. We are going to Paris in that way. We are not going there under the wing of Japan, like she is trying to fix it up, and here is what we propose to ask. What do you think about it?" And they laid down a list of the matters which China wanted to bring up at the peace conference. I will say that I have this information in a way so that I do not doubt its substantiel accuracy, and I presume that that list perhaps was cabled by Dr. Rice, the American minister, to the State Department, and eventually the Chinese were advised by our Government that it would be better if they would not raise certain questions.

I might mention what those questions are. One of them was the question of extraterritoriality in China. Another was the question

of future financial cooperation in China, and these various concessions and one thing and another. China wanted to obtain from the Powers over there a general declaration written somehow into the treaty, which would form the groundwork for a real reconstructive policy in China, which would rid her of the burden of all these secret and published regional understandings, and all these various concessions interfering with Chinese territorial integrity and economy, which in one way and another have been forced on her by that method.

As I understand it our Government advised China somewhat to this effect, that it would tend to befog the issue. Our Government, I understand, was in perfect sympathy with what China wanted to do by these things, but she said, "Now, the Paris conference will be concerned with the making of peace with Germany, and perhaps it will be advisable if China will not raise any questions at Paris except those which are directly concerned with her relations with Germany." Of course the Shantung question was directly concerned, and a few matters associated with the Shantung question, but our Government said, "Do not raise all these other questions, because they will open up the whole subject so that perhaps it will impair your chances of getting the Shantung question raised in the right way." And I will say that, in my opinion, that advice was exactly sound, and that if my advice had been asked at that moment I would have advised China in the same way. In fact I did so at Paris.

I do not think it is fortunate the way the thing turned out, but I mean looking at it from the way the situation appeared then, I would have given the same advice that our Government is presumed to have given on that occasion. China took with her to Paris her chief British adviser, Dr. George E. Morrison, for twenty-odd years the famous foreign correspondent of the London Times, and for the last seven years employed as foreign adviser on foreign affairs to the Chinese Government. They took Dr. Leconte, a Frenchman, who for a long time has been employed over there as counsel. The Japanese tried to force them to take Dr. Riga, the Japanese legal adviser, whom in one way and another they had forced upon the Chinese Government, but they would not take him, because they knew that if Dr. Riga had gone along the Chinese delegation would have been privy to everything the Chinese delegation did. They refused to take Dr. Riga, but they took Dr. Morrison and Dr. Leconte, and they desired to take one or two Americans, but I have explained about that.

That brings us on to Paris. China went over there and confined the presentation of her case to the Shantung issue, which, of course, was entirely a question with Germany, complicated by Japan's interposition. At a plenary session-I was under the impression that it was early in February, but I see Mr. Lansing the other day fixed it, believe, at anuary 29, which probably is the correct date-at a plenary session of the council of ten in Paris, before it narrowed down to a council of four-my knowledge of this, as you gentlemen understand, is second hand. I was not present.

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The account which I am going to give now was, however, given to me circumstantially by two plenipotentiaries who sat at the table, and their accounts substantially coincided. They did not differ in any material degree in their recollection of what transpired. The

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