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territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China."
And Japan wrote an identical note agreeing to that.
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir. Might I say to the Senator in reference to that, that the Chinese Government was much embarassed by the conflict of the interpretations which were given to it by the two legations, the American legation and the Japanese legation, the American legation emphasizing that the purport of the Lansing-Ishii agreement was to confirm the principle of the "open door" and equal opportunity, and the Japanese Government emphasizing the fact that the purport of the agreement was to recognize Japan's special interests in China. For that reason the Chinese Government issued the statement which it did.
Senator Johnson of California. At the time the Lansing-Ishii agreement was made, China and the United States were on the most friendlv terms, were thev not?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. And at that time we had already stated to the world our principles in the new world era of self-determination of the rights of weak nations, their protection, and that they should not be permitted to be traded upon by the strong. Do you recall those circumstances, which in substance I have stated, but not verbatim?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; those were given out through the American legation in Peking and published widely through the Chinese press.
Senator Johnson of California. Now during the time of the negotiations between Secretary of State Lansing and Ishii, was China invited to participate?
Mr. Ferguson. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. In determining the interests of Japan of one sort or another, as the case may be, and of China, was China consulted at all by the United States, its friend?
Mr. Ferguson. At the time of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, you mean?
Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ferguson. No, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. And did China know anything about the disposition of China, so far as she was disposed of in the Lansing-Ishii agreement, until after it had been consummated, signed, and executed?
Mr. Ferguson. Absolutely not.
Senator Johnson of California. You recall, of course, the 21 demands that were made by Japan upon China?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. Do you remember that at the time of the first suggestion of those demands, Japan enjoined upon China silence, and asked or demanded that China should not malce known the demands?
Mr. Ferguson. That was an explicit demand by the Japanese minister who presented them to the President of China.
Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall subsequently, when they had been published or had become known to other powers, a specific public denial made by Japan that any such demands had been made?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. Was there such denial?
Mr. Ferguson. There was.
Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall that subsequently to that time, when the matter had become sufficiently public so that the other nations were inquiring, Japan stated to the other nations the demands that had been made?
Mr. Ferguson. It gave a version.
Senator Johnson of California. That is what I mean.
Mr. Ferguson. Those were communicated to several powers.
Senator Johnson of California. Will you state whether or not that version was an accurate one or an entirely distorted version of the 21 points or demands?
Mr. Ferguson. There were three versions of the 21 demands. There was the original version as handed to the President of China, January 18, 1915, by the Japanese minister; there is an incorrect version as communicated by the Japanese Government to the other powers in response to their inquiries; and there is the third version, which is Japan's revised demands as presented to China, April 26, 1915.
Senator Johnson of California. This last revised version omitted some of the original demands, did it not?
Mr. Ferguson. It omitted Group 5, but provided that several of the items under group 5 should be arranged by the exchange of notes between China and Japan. The most notable omission in the third version of these demands was in reference to nothing being given to any third power. I should say the most notable omission or change in the second and third versions from the first version was the omission of what was recognized everywhere to be a very objectionable phrase, and that is reference to any third power. -*
Senator Johnson of California. Let me chronologically state the situation, and then will you please say whether or not I state it accurately. Japan presented, in January, 21 demands to China.
Mr. Ferguson. Under five groups.
Senator Johnson of California. Under five groups. At the time of the presentation of those demands Japan commanded China to keep still about it and not to communicate them to the world. Thereafter they were either communicated by China or learned by other powers, who requested of Japan a statement concerning the demand, whereupon Japan, to the powers thus asking, communicated a statement of the demands at variance with the fact and not the demands that she had presented to China. Thereafter protests were made and group 5 of the demands was withdrawn by Japan. Thereafter an ultimatum was issued by Japan to China concerning the other demands, backed up by preparation of its military and its naval forces, and then China yielded to the demands, with the elimination of group 5, because of the military and naval preparations which were about to carry into effect Japan's intentions. Have I stated it correctly?
Mr. Ferguson. I should say yes, sir, with the exception of this fact, that from the presentation of the demands—the first instance until the final agreement which led up to the ultimatum—to the final conference, rather—the demands as discussed between China and Japan were the original 21 demands as presented in January 1915. That was considered always as the basis of the discussion, and the question was, on the side of China, to whittle those down so as to give away as little as possible, and that resulted in the third version which I quoted, the version of April 26, which was Japan's final statement of as far as she would go in yielding what she had originalh demanded.
Senator Johnson of California. Prior to that time had not the United States protested to Japan concerning certain of the demands'
Mr. Ferguson. I understand so, though that of course is not naturally under my personal knowledge, sir, except as I know what has been published in the matter. I have no means from mv official position of knowing what took place between the United States Government and Japan.
Senator Johnson of California. But during this period the United States was in that continued intimate friendliness with China that has existed for a long period of time?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir; and through the American legation at Peking was constantly and consistently urging China not to yield to these demands. I think it is no breach of confidence if I state that. I would ask that this be not inserted if in the opinion of the chairman it is a breach of confidence. But that is within my knowledge, that throughout all that period the United States minister in Peking was continually urging the Chinese Government not to accede to these demands.
Senator Brandegee. Who was the American minister at that time?
Mr. Ferguson. The same who is representing the Government now, Dr. Reinsch.
Senator Knox. Was he acting under instructions from this Govrenment or on his own account?
Mr. Ferguson. I have no means of knowing that. That was a matter between him and the Government.
Senator Knox. He personally is a warm friend to China?
Mr. Ferguson. He is a very warm friend and consults unofficially and officially constantly with the foreign office, the president, and the premier.
Senator Johnson of California. At that time, the relationship between China and the United States being as you indicate, they sat down with Ishii, and in a measure, at least, disposed of China's fate without ever consulting China or advising her of the fact that we were about to do it, or in any way letting her know that her particular fat*1 was being dealt with at all?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnson of California. That is all.
Mr. Ferguson. Let me state in that connection I have a great personal fear that the arrangement under the covenant of the league of nations concerning regional understandings would include the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and would be an indirect way of confirming: by the Senate that agreement as well as the Root-Takahira agreement and what other agreements I do not know, but I suppose that the Lansing-Ishii agreement would come under the head of regional understandings.
Senator Brandegee. You spoke yesterday, I think of China having signed the treaty under protest?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brandegee. What was the character of her protest and when was it made?
Mr. Ferguson. The protest was made at the conference when the ultimatum was given, and after the whole thing was practically decided on the part of Japan, and no further yielding after April 26. There was parleying for several days, and naval preparations and military preparations by Japan, ending with the presentation of the ultimatum of May 7. During all that time there were parleyings, hut there was no change in what was decided upon at that time, and during the progress of the negotiations previous to April 26, on two distinct occasions the Japanese threatened that if their requests were not agreed to, the promise to restore Kiaochow would be withdrawn.
Senptor Brandegee. That was a threat to break the treatv. was it not?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, sir.
Senator Brandegee. Of course none of these protests on the part of China which you sa\ were made at the conference prior to the actual signature of the treaty were in writing, were they?
Mr. Ferguson. No, sir: but the_\ were all later put in writing and there was issued an "Official statement by the Chinese Government respecting the Chino-Jananese negotiations now brought to a contusion by China's compliance with the terms of Japan's ultimatum delivered on May 7, 1915."
That was communicated duly to all the various legations in Peking.
Senator Brandegee. In what publication does that appear? Have you it in the pamphlet before you?
Mr. Ferguson. I have it.
Senator Brandegee. What is the title?
Mr. Ferguson. It is appendices.
Senator Brandegee. It is appendices of what?
Mr. Ferguson. Appendices o*f Mr. Millard's book on the far eastern question. I have also an official copy in my notes.
Senator Brandegee. I wish you would put that written protest or statment that China issued in relation to this treaty into the record, if yon please. How long is it—not the whole appendix, but the protest?
Mr. Ferguson. The whole statement covers 15 pages.
Senator Brandegee. That is China's statement of the whole case?
Mr. Ferguson. That is China's statement of the whole case.
Senator Brandegee. I would like to have that put into the record, if there is no objection.
(The statement referred to is here printed in full as follows:)
Official Statement By The Chinese Government Respecting The Sino-japAnese Negotiations Now Brought To A Conclusion By China's Compliance With The Terms Op Japan's Ultimatum Delivered On May 7, 1915.
At 3 o'clock on the afternoon of May 7, 1915, his excellency the Japanese minister in Peking delivered to the Chinese Government in-person an ultimatum from the Imperial Japanese Government, with an accompanying note of seven articles. The concluding sentences of the ultimatum read thus:
"The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o clock p. m. on the 9th day of May. It is herebv declared that if no satisfactory reply is ret eived before or at the specified time the Imperial Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary."
The Chinese Government, having received and accepted the ultimatum, feel constrained to make a frank and plain statement of the facts connected with the negotiations which were abruptly terminated by this drastic action on the part of Japan.
The Chinese Government have constantly aimed, as they still aim, at consolidating the friendship existing between China and Japan, and, in this period of travail in other parts of the world, have been particularly solicitous of preserving peace in the Far East. Unexpectedly on January 18, 1915, his excellency the Japanese minister in Peking, in pursuance of instru'tions from his Government, adopted the unusual procedure of presenting to his ex* ellency the President of the Republic of China a list (hereto appended) of 21 momentous demands, arranged in five groups. The first four groups were each introduced by a preamble, but there was no preamble or explanation to the fifth group. In respect of the character of the demand? in this group, however, no difference was indicated in the document between them and those embodied in the preceding groups.
Although there was no cause for such a d-marche, the Chinese Government, in deference to the wishes of the Imperial Japanese Government, at once agreed to open negotiations on those articles which it was possible for China to consider, nornuhstanding that it was palpable that the whole of the demands were intended to extend the rights and interests of Japan without securing a quid pro quo of anv kind for China.
China approached the pending conferences in a spirit of utmost friendliness and with a determination to deal with all questions frankly and sincerely. Before negotiations were actually commenced, the Japanese minister raised many questions with regard to the number of delegates proposed to represent China, the number of conferences to be held in each week, and the method of discussion. The Chinese Government, though their views differed from those of the Japanese minuter, yielded in all these respects to his contentions in the hope of avoiding any delay in the' negotiation*. The objections of the Japanese minister to the customary recording and signing of the minutes of each conference, which the Chinese Government suggested as a necessary and advisable precaution, as well as one calculated to facilitate future reference, were also accepted. Nor did the Chinese Government retaliate in anv way when in the course of the negotiations the Japanese Minister twice suspended the conference*, obviously with the object of compelling compliance with his views on certain point? at the time under discussion. Even when delay was threatened owing to the unfortunate injury sustained by the Japanese Minister as a result of a fall from his horse. the Chinese delegates, in order to avert interruption, proposed that the conferences should be continued at the Japanese Legation, which proposal was accepted. Lat#»r when, on March 22, the Japanese Government dispatched large bodies of troops to South Manchuria and Shantung for the ostensible purpose of relieving the garrison — whose term of service had not then expired—the Japanese Minister stated at the conference, in reply to a direct question as to when the retiring troops would be withdrawn, that this would not be done until negotiations could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Although this minatory step caused much excitement, indignation, and! alarm on the part of the Chinese people, and made it difficult for the Chinese Government to continue the conferences, they successfully exerted efforts to avert a rupture and thus enabled the negotiations smoothly to proceed. All this demonstrate? that the Chinese Government were dominated by a sincere desire to expedite the protrre* of the conferences; and that the Japanese Government recognized this important fact was made clear on March 11 when the Japanese Minister conveyed to the Chinese Government an expression of his Government's appreciation of China's franknese and sincerity in the conduct of the negotiations.
One of the supplementary proposals was in these terms:
From February 2, when the negotiations were commenced, to April 17, 24 conferences were held in all. Throughout this whole period the Chinese Government steadfastly strove to arrive at an amicable settlement and made every concenaoa pnsible.
Of the 21 demands originally submitted by Japan, China agreed to 15, some in priaciple and some textually, (i being initialed by both parties.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DEMANDS TO WHICH CHINA AOREBD.
At the first conference, held on February 2, China agreed inprinciple to the first article of the Shantung group of demands which provides that China should give her assent to the transfer of Germany's rights in Shantung to Japan. The Chinese Gm.-roment maintained at first that the subject of this demand related to the post Ml cm