1836, by the Commonwealth, of assessments on stock, there have been paid, out of the treasury, for interest on loans and scrip, and for the salaries of the State Directors in the Western Railroad, in round numbers, three hundred and seventy thousand dollars. This amount may not be perfectly accurate; but it is as nearly correct as it is possible to make it, owing to the difficulty of separating all the small items. The actual amount, including all expenses incurred in managing the stock, is probably somewhat larger. Within the same time, there have been received into the treasury, for dividends, one hundred and eighty thousand dollars. It thus appears, that the State has paid out one hundred and ninety thousand dollars more than she has received, on account of her connection with this road. At the present market-price of the stock, being about six per cent. above par, the Common wealth's shares might be sold for an aggregate premium of about seventy thousand dollars. At this moment, then, the copartnership of the State with this corporation might be dissolved, at a sacrifice, to the State treasury, of one hundred and twenty thousand dollars. Two months ago, when the stock was barely at par, the dissolution would have involved a sacrifice of a hundred and ninety thousand dollars. Six months ago, when it stood at its highest point, the loss would have been only about fifty thousand dollars. Hereafter, it may be more or less, as the price of the stock shall be affected by a thousand contingencies, or the possibility of ultimate loss may be excluded by the monopoly which special legislation shall secure to a State favorite, and by the consequent excess of the dividends on the stock over the interest on the scrip.

The policy of the State, in originally subscribing for this stock, need not now be discussed. The result has crowned the policy; and, with most minds, theoretical objections weigh little against apparent advantages. Admitting the policy to have been a wise one, the only question, at present, is, has not the necessity of the Commonwealth's connection with that corporation, as a stockholder, ceased to exist? Farther: may not the injury to the State, resulting from that connection, more than counterbalance any possible advantage to the treasury? These are grave questions, which cannot now be fully discussed. It

is proposed only to present some general considerations, which seem conclusive, and which may serve to aid the inquiries of the legislature upon a matter becoming daily one of greater public interest.

It would seem to be unnecessary to adduce arguments in support of the position that the Commonwealth should not sustain, to any one of the corporations of her creation, the relation of stockholder, unless that relation is absolutely essential to, or, at least, intimately connected with, the general welfare. Her citizens have a right to demand that, in similar circumstances, similar corporate privileges shall be granted to all applicants; and it is perfectly apparent that, when the supposed duty of the Commonwealth to protect her interests, as a stockholder in a particular corporation, conflicts with her duty to dispense equal favors to all her citizens, the relation gives rise to just complaints, and may result in flagrant injustice.

The copartnership of the Commonwealth with the Western Railroad Corporation was once, undoubtedly, necessary; that necessity, it is believed, no longer exists. The character of that enterprise is now established. It is no longer a doubtful experiment. It is now pouring into the heart of the state, to be distributed through all its extremities, a tide of business and wealth, which, should every dollar invested by the state in the enterprise be sunk, would more than compensate for the loss. This enterprise, of itself, and similar enterprises throughout the state, stimulated in their inception, and sustained to their completion, by the success of this, have secured to the State a worldwide reputation for energetic, sagacious, and far-seeing policy, of which every son of Massachusetts may well be proud. The capacities and resources of the road are now such that, with tolerable management, it can hardly fail to continue to offer to capitalists a most desirable mode of investment. As a matter of speculation, therefore, it is quite probable that the state treasury will gain by a continuation of the copartnership. The amount of this gain will depend somewhat upon the policy which the State shall adopt, in relation to other applications from citizens of the State for railroad facilities. If, owing to the connection of the State with this corporation, or to any

other causes, the legislature shall confirm the monopoly which it seems to have been its settled policy to concede to this corporation, if applicants for lines of railroad which may possibly compete with this state favorite are to be deprived of railroad accommodations, lest the state treasury should suffer, then undoubtedly, the earnings of the Western will continue to increase, as they have increased for the last six years, (from $512,688, in 1842, to $1,325,336 in 1847,) and the stock will become the most valuable in the state. If such is to be the policy of the legislature, and the copartnership is to be continued to make money, it would seem better that the Commonwealth should purchase the entire stock, and rely, for the support of the government, upon the chances of speculation, rather than upon the old-fashioned ways and means of revenue.

If, on the other hand, the legislature, disregarding the temporary loss which the treasury might sustain from a change of policy, should place all sections of the Commonwealth upon an equal footing, and dispense legislative favors with an impartial hand, it might be a problem whether the dividends on that stock would afford more than a fair return for the investment, and whether the treasury would, for a long time, receive more than enough to pay arrearages and current interest on the state scrip. Of one thing there can be no doubt,-that the state would realize, from the stimulation of the now-discouraged industry, and the developement of the now-unproductive resources of certain sections of the state, which such a change of policy would effect, advantages, in comparison with which her railroad dividends are contemptible.

But the connection of the Commonwealth with this corporation, as a stockholder, is not only unnecessary but mischievous. It would seem to be an obviously true proposition, that the Commonwealth ought not to sustain, to any of her citizens, the relation of creditor, in such a shape, or to such an extent, as to involve a collision with the individual. If she has money to invest, let it be invested in such a manner that the security upon property shall be ample without controversy with persons; if she has property to dispose of, let her convey it upon receipt of an equivalent.

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The state now owns stock in the Western Railroad to the amount of one million one hundred and seventy-six thousand four hundred dollars. She also owes the treasurer of that corporation one hundred and thirty-two thousand three hundred dollars, borrowed to pay for new stock taken last year in that same Western Railroad! The caution contained in the proverb, "the borrower is servant to the lender," may not apply to this Commonwealth; but surely it needs no argument to prove that an interest, to this extent, cannot fail to affect the action of the legislature, which is the guardian of that interest.

The fact is notorious, that the connection of the Commonwealth with this road has given rise to complaints, from numerous bodies of her citizens and from various sections of the state, of undue influence exerted upon committees of the legislature, and upon the legislature itself, and of a partial distribution of legislative favors. The singular spectacle has been repeatedly presented, of the attorney of the Western Railroad, paid for the purpose, in part from the funds of the state, opposing, before committees of the legislature, the petitions of citizens of the Commonwealth for railroad facilities; opposing them, too, not on the ground that the granting of them would injure the Commonwealth, but that it might diminish Western Railroad dividends; directors, chosen by the legislature for the purpose, attend the hearings, not to see that the state receives no detriment, but that the treasury loses no dollars. Such a spectacle has, for some weeks past, been presented every afternoon. Legal ingenuity and learning, and scientific attainments of the highest order, have been put in requisition to deprive a portion of the citizens of the state of railroad facilities, which, a few years ago, were freely granted to another section of the state, and which are still freely granted in all cases, except where the granting might possibly deprive an already overloaded beneficiary of future favors. The spectacle is, it seems to us, anomalous, undignified, and discreditable.

The same picayune spirit presides over the deliberations of the legislature. For twelve years, up to this very hour, in all debates, in either branch, upon matters directly or indirectly connected with this corporation, appeals to the obligation of the

legislature to protect the pecuniary interest of the state in this road, have been prominent and effectual. Legislators, sworn to support the constitution, which declares that every citizen "ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and without delay;" have come to consider it their duty to extend special favor to this corporation, regardless of, and at the expense of, whatever other interests. "It is the foster-child of the state." True; but Massachusetts has many as worthy a child as this; and the instincts of parental affection are sadly outraged when the favors, which, as the gentle rain from heaven, should gladden all alike, are lavished upon one pet, and that, the heartiest and the lustiest of the family.

The local interests of those portions of the state through which this road passes, are allied to the corporation and state interests, and thus an influence is formed too potent to be successfully contended with by petitioners for any object which may possibly injure this great interest.

Nor does the evil end here. The creation of the various railroad corporations in the state has called into existence, fullarmed at their first birth, an equal number of strenuous sticklers for "vested rights"-rights, by the way, as sacred as any other rights, neither more nor less so. The instincts of selfdefence, or the impulses of selfishness, prompt all these corporations to make common cause against every real or fancied invader of the vested rights of any one; and thus the connection of the state with the Western Railroad brings her into this unholy alliance, not only against petitioners for roads interfering with the supposed rights of the Western Railroad, but also against petitioners from all parts of the state, any of whom may seem to threaten the preserves of one of the lords of the

manor.

The aggregate of the capital stocks of what may be termed the trunk-roads in the state, embracing the Western Road and those which terminate in Boston, is twenty-five millions of dollars. These vast moneyed interests, whenever the supposed rights or dividends of any one are endangered, rally in their defence, with a concentration as perfect, for all practical pur