was not a constitution or government: not, however, for the reason which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and the latter not, but from the difference of the origin from which the two compacts are derived. According to our American conception, the people alone can form constitutions or governments, and not their agents. It is this difference, and this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old Confederation been the act of the people of the several States, and not of their Governments, that instrument, imperfect as it was, would have been a constitution, and the agency which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is the true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not that, in regard to which the Senator seems to be bewildered.

There is another point on which this difference throws important light, and which has been frequently referred to in debate on this and former occasions. I refer to the expression in the preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of "forming a more perfect union," and in the letter of General Washington, laying the draft of the Convention before the old Congress, in which he speaks of "consolidating the Union"; both of which I conceive to refer simply to the fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union between the States themselves, and not a union like that which had existed between the Governments of the States.

We will now proceed to consider some of the conclusions which necessarily follow from the facts and positions already established. They enable us to decide a question of vital importance under our system: Where does sovereignty reside? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours is a federal system, as I conceive I conclusively have, that fact of itself determines the question which I have proposed. It is of the very essence of such a system that the

sovereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole; or, to use the language of Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system, and the whole the multiple; and not the whole the unit and the parts the fraction. Ours, then, is a government of twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact, for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a common government as their joint agent, and not a union of the twenty-four sovereignties into one, which, according to the language of the Virginia Resolutions, already cited, would form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise that the Senator from Virginia should avow himself the advocate of these very resolutions, when he distinctly maintained the idea of the union of the States in one sovereignty, which is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of a consolidated government.

Another consequence is equally clear, that, whatever modifications were made in the condition of the States under the present Constitution, they extended only to the exercise of their powers by compact, and not to the sovereignty itself, and are such as sovereigns are competent to make: it being a conceded point that it is competent to them to stipulate to exercise their powers in a particular manner, or to abstain altogether from their exercise, or to delegate them to agents, without in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The plain state of the facts as regards our Government is, that these States have agreed by compact to exercise their sovereign powers jointly, as already stated; and that, for this purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign capacity, thereby making it the Constitution of each State, in no wise distinguished from their own separate Constitutions, but in the superadded obligation of compact of faith mutually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have stipulated, among other things, that it may be amended by three-fourths of the States: that

is, they have conceded to each other by compact the right to add new powers or to subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the States, without requiring, as otherwise would have been the case, the consent of all: a modification no more inconsistent, as has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I allude furnishes strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I contend, in the States severally, as the amendments are effected, not by any one threefourths, but by any three-fourths of the States, indicating that the sovereignty is in each of the States.

If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the allegiance of the people is to their several States, and that treason consists in resistance to the joint authority of the States united, not, as has been absurdly contended, in resistance to the Government of the United States, which, by the provisions of the Constitution, has only the right of punishing....

Having now said what I intended in relation to my first resolution, both in reply to the Senator from Massachusetts, and in vindication of its correctness, I will now proceed to consider the conclusion drawn from it in the second resolution —that the General Government is not the exclusive and final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the States, as parties of the compact, have a right to judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the compact, and of the mode and measure of redress.

It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body, to premise that our system comprehends two distinct governments, the General and State Governments, which, properly considered, form but one; the former representing the joint authority of the States in their confederate capacity, and the latter that of each State separately. I have

premised this fact simply with a view of presenting distinctly the answer to the argument offered by the Senator from Massachusetts to prove that the General Government has a final and exclusive right to judge, not only of its delegated powers, but also of those reserved to the States. That gentleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a government - which he defines to be an organized body, endowed with both will, and power, and authority in proprio vigore to execute its purpose - has a right inherently to judge of its powers. It is not my intention to comment upon the definition of the Senator, though it would not be difficult to show that his ideas of government are not very American. My object is to deal with the conclusion, and not the definition. Admit, then, that the Government has the right of judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then, will he withhold, upon his own principle, the right of judging from the State Governments, which he has attributed to the General Government? If it belongs to one, on his principle it belongs to both; and if to both, when they differ, the veto, so abhorred by the Senator, is the necessary result: as neither, if the right be possessed by both, can control the other.

The Senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order to sustain his main position, he fell back on that clause of the Constitution which provides that "this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."

This is admitted no one has ever denied that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are of paramount authority. But it is equally undeniable that laws not made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority, but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null and void; which presents the question, Who are to judge whether the laws be or be not pursuant to the

Constitution? And thus the difficulty, instead of being taken away, is removed but one step further back. This the Senator also felt, and has attempted to overcome, by setting up, on the part of Congress and the judiciary, the final and exclusive right of judging, both for the Federal Government and the States, as to the extent of their respective powers. That I may do full justice to the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own words. He states:

That there is a supreme law, composed of the constitution, the laws passed in pursuance of it, and the treaties; but in cases coming before Congress, not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be subjects of judicial discussion, Congress must interpret the constitution so often as it has occasion to pass laws; and in cases capable of assuming a judicial shape, the Supreme Court must be the final interpreter.

Now, passing over this vague and loose phraseology, I would ask the Senator upon what principle can he concede this extensive power to the legislative and judicial departments, and withhold it entirely from the Executive? If one has the right it cannot be withheld from the other. I would also ask him on what principle- if the departments of the General Government are to possess the right of judging, finally and conclusively, of their respective powers-on what principle can the same right be withheld from the State Governments, which, as well as the General Government, properly considered, are but departments of the same general system, and form together, properly speaking, but one government? This was a favorite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose wisdom I have a respect increasing with my experience, and who I have frequently heard say that most of the misconceptions and errors in relation to our system originated in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system. I would further tell the Senator that, if this right be withheld from the State Governments; if this restraining