or nonproperty frauds. This has been true since Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479. We do not agree with the Court's analysis of the indictment that the offenses charged in Count I are "knowingly making a false statement" in a naturalization proceeding or aiding to obtain a certificate of naturalization by fraud. These are the overt acts of the Count I conspiracy, not the substantive offense of defrauding the Government in its administrative processes charged in Count I.

As Count I describes the substantive offense of conspiracy to defraud the United States, we do not agree with the Court's statement that:

"The use in Count I of language copied from the second clause of the conspiracy statute merely cloaks a factual charge of conspiring to cause, or knowingly to aid, Bridges to make a false statement under oath in his naturalization proceeding, or to obtain by false statements a Certificate of Naturalization to which he was not entitled."

To prove the substantive offense of conspiracy under § 371 it is necessary to prove the fraud. It cannot be said that a false statement as to Communist membership in a naturalization hearing would not be a fraud against the administration of the naturalization laws within the language of Haas v. Henkel, supra, of "impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government." P. 479.

We therefore would affirm the judgment below as to Count I. Petitioners have also contended here that the conviction is barred because the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel require us to hold that Bridges' nonmembership during the crucial period has been judi

See also United States v. Cohn, 270 U. S. 339, 346; Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182, 188; cf. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U. S. 702.

cially determined. They point to the Landis proceedings of 1938, referred to in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 138, this Court's decision in that case, and the naturalization proceedings themselves of 1945. None of these, though, are res judicata, since this is a criminal cause. Nor can collateral estoppel be invoked. There has been no court holding that Bridges has not been a Communist. The Landis determination of then nonmembership was not a judicial one. Pearson v. Williams, 202 U. S. 281. In Bridges v. Wixon, supra, no holding on the factual question of membership was reached. And the naturalization proceedings did not determine nonmembership, because Bridges could legally have been granted citizenship even had he been found by the Court to have been a member of the Communist Party. See 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed.) §§ 705, 707, which merely prohibited grant of naturalization to members of organizations advocating the overthrow of the Government, or to those not attached to the Constitution. This has been changed. 8 U. S. C. A. § 1424 (a)(2). There is no necessary identity in law between Communist Party members and such persons. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118. Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 536, n. 22.

As our views have not prevailed as to Count I, we forbear to express any views as to Counts II and III.

Syllabus.

UNITED STATES v. GRAINGER.

NO. 634. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.*

Argued May 4-5, 1953.-Decided June 15, 1953.

1. The running of the general three-year statute of limitations on federal prosecutions for crimes, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282, was suspended by the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287, as to violations, in 1945 and 1946, of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 287. Pp. 240-244.

(a) The offenses charged here of attempting to obtain payments from the Commodity Credit Corporation in amounts based upon knowingly false certifications to that corporation by the accused that certain purchases of wool had been made by him when he knew that no such purchases had been made by him or, at least, that no such purchases had been made by him at prices as high as those he certified that he paid, are offenses of a pecuniary nature. Pp. 240-241.

(b) Offenses which occurred in 1945 or 1946, preceding the President's proclamation of December 31, 1946, declaring that the hostilities of World War II terminated on that day, come within the period to which the Suspension Act applies. P. 241.

(c) Fraud upon the United States is an essential ingredient of violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 287. Pp. 241-243.

(d) In the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act, the phrase "involving fraud . . . in any manner" makes the Act applicable to offenses which are fairly identifiable as those in which fraud is an essential ingredient, by whatever words they be defined; it does not limit the application of the Act to such offenses as Congress has denominated as "frauds" by using that very word or one of its derivatives. The same reasoning applies to conspiracies to commit such offenses. Pp. 243-244.

*Together with No. 635, United States v. Clavere et al., and No. 636, United States v. Clavere et al., both also on appeal from the same Court.

Opinion of the Court.

346 U.S.

2. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act had the effect of extending through 1952 the time for the prosecution of the offenses to which it applied. Pp. 244-246.

3. In relation to those offenses here involved which were committed in 1945 and 1946, during the period of suspension, the general three-year limitation prescribed by 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282 began to run for the first time on January 1, 1950, and expired December 31, 1952. Pp. 246–247.

4. The codification of the Criminal Code, June 25, 1948, effective September 1, 1948, did not change the situation respecting the extension through 1952 of the time for prosecuting the offenses to which the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act applied. Pp. 247-248.

5. The Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act is applicable to the indictments here involved for offenses committed in 1945 and 1946 and the United States could thus prosecute them in 1952, except that (1) this conclusion does not apply to any overt act alleged in No. 636 to have been committed in 1947, and (2) this conclusion does not apply to overt acts set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, under Count Two of the Indictment in No. 636, which are not explicit enough to show that the issuance or endorsement of certain checks there described constituted an attempt to defraud the United States. Pp. 236-248; p. 237, n. 1.

Reversed and remanded.

John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Robert L. Stern, then Acting Solicitor General, Beatrice Rosenberg and John R. Wilkins. Walter J. Cummings, Jr., then Solicitor General, was on the Statement as to Jurisdiction.

Jack J. Miller argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee in No. 634.

John V. Lewis argued the cause for appellees in Nos. 635 and 636. With him on the brief was Clyde C. Sherwood.

MR. JUSTICE BURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases were argued immediately following No. 548, Bridges v. United States, ante, p. 209. They concern the

235

Opinion of the Court.

Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act which we found inapplicable to the offenses stated in the Bridges indictment. These cases, however, involve different offenses and we hold the Suspension Act applicable to the instant indictments for offenses committed in 1945 and 1946 and we hold that the United States may thus prosecute them in 1952.1

2

The principal questions here are: (1) whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act suspended the running of the general three-year statute of limitations as to violations of the false claims clause of the False Claims Act, and (2) if so, whether the indictments for such offenses, found in 1952, were timely. For the reasons hereafter stated, our answer to each question is in the affirmative.

These indictments were filed in 1952 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The indictment in No. 634 charges appellee Grainger, in 16 counts, with having "unlawfully, know

1 This conclusion does not apply to any overt act alleged in No. 636 to have been committed in 1947. Any such act was committed after the President's proclamation of the termination of hostilities December 31, 1946, 3 CFR, 1946 Supp., 77-78, and, therefore, after the period to which the Suspension Act applied. United States v. Smith, 342 U. S. 225.

The indictment in No. 636 is not explicit enough as to the overt acts set forth in paragraphs numbered 2, 3 and 4, under Count Two, to show that the issuance or endorsement of certain checks there described constituted an attempt to defraud the United States. The Suspension Act, accordingly, does not appear to be applicable to them. These items have not been separately discussed by the parties, and are mentioned here to avoid the application of our general conclusions to them in the absence of further consideration.

218 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3287.

318 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 3282.

4

§ 35 (A) of the Criminal Code, 52 Stat. 197, 18 U. S. C. § 80, now 18 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 287.