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Opinion of the Court.

reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." If the conscientious objector's claim for relief under this Section is denied by his local draft board, he is entitled to further review by an "appropriate appeal board." All such appeals are referred to the Department of Justice for an "appropriate inquiry" and a "hearing." The Department of Justice then makes a recommendation to the appeal board, which may or may not follow it in reviewing the local board's classification.

amended in 1951, 65 Stat. 75, 86, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V) § 456 (j), and the present language of § 6 (j) differs in immaterial respects from the language in the earlier statutes.

The full text of § 6 (j) of the Selective Service Act of 1948 reads: "Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces under this title, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, be deferred. Any person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board. Upon the filing of such appeal, the appeal board shall refer any such claim to the Department of Justice for inquiry and hearing. The Department of Justice, after appropriate inquiry, shall hold a hearing with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned, and such person. shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing. The Department of Justice shall, after such hearing, if the objections are found to be sustained, recommend to the appeal board that (1) if the

Opinion of the Court.

346 U.S.

These two cases are concerned with the procedure, established by regulation and practice, which is followed when a conscientious objector's appeal is referred to the Department of Justice. The Department has regularly used the FBI to investigate each appealing registrant's background and reputation for sincerity. A hearing is then held before a designated "hearing officer." The registrant is allowed to appear in person, and, if he chooses, he may bring with him an advisor and witnesses to testify in his behalf. Upon request, he is entitled to be instructed "as to the general nature and character" of any "unfavorable" evidence developed by the Departobjector is inducted into the armed forces under this title, he shall be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or (2) if the objector is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, he shall be deferred. If after such hearing the Department of Justice finds that his objections are not sustained, it shall recommend to the appeal board that such objections be not sustained. The appeal board shall, in making its decision, give consideration to, but shall not be bound to follow, the recommendation of the Department of Justice together with the record on appeal from the local board. Each person whose claim for exemption from combatant training and service because of conscientious objections is sustained shall be listed by the local board on a register of conscientious objectors."

There is a dearth of legislative history reflecting discussion in Congress about this phase of the Selective Service Act. The problem was discussed rather briefly during the Committee hearings on the 1940 Act. See Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs United States Senate on S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., and Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs House of Representatives on H. R. 10132, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. Compare H. R. Rep. No. 2903, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 5.

2 See 32 CFR § 1626.25 (1949 ed.); see also 17 Fed. Reg. 5449, June 18, 1952.

3 See, Instructions to Registrants Whose Claims for Exemption as Conscientious Objectors Have Been Appealed (a letter sent to the appealing registrant from the office of the Attorney General) reproduced in part in the record in the Nugent case, at p. 54.

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Opinion of the Court.

ment's investigation. But he is not permitted to see the FBI report, nor is he informed of the names of persons interviewed by the investigators.

It is the Department's refusal to disclose the entire FBI reports which precipitates the issues now before us. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that this procedure violates a registrant's rights under the Selective Service Act. We granted certiorari, 345 U. S. 915, because that determination seemed in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals 6 and because it dealt with an important problem in the administration of the Selective Service Act.

Each of the respondents claims to be a conscientious objector entitled to total exemption from military service. Each has been convicted of wilfully refusing to submit to induction in the armed forces of the United States." At their trials, respondents challenged the validity of their selective service classifications, claiming that they were fixed without basis in fact and without adherence to the procedures prescribed by § 6 (j) of the Act; each claimed that the Department of Justice's failure to show him the FBI reports rendered his classification illegal. The Court of Appeals, reversing each respondent's conviction, sustained the claims.

8

9

We think that the Court of Appeals erred. We think that the statutory scheme for review, within the selective service system, of exemptions claimed by conscientious

4 Ibid.

5 United States v. Nugent, 200 F. 2d 46, and United States v. Packer, 200 F. 2d 540.

See e. g., Imboden v. United States, 194 F. 2d 508 (C. A. 6th Cir. 1952); Elder v. United States, 202 F. 2d 465 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1953).

750 U. S. C. App. (Supp. V) § 462.

8 Cox v. United States, 332 U. S. 442 (1947).

9

Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946).

Opinion of the Court.

346 U.S.

objectors entitles them to no guarantee that the FBI reports must be produced for their inspection. We think the Department of Justice satisfies its duties under § 6 (j) when it accords a fair opportunity to the registrant to speak his piece before an impartial hearing officer; when it permits him to produce all relevant evidence in his own behalf and at the same time supplies him with a fair résumé of any adverse evidence in the investigator's report.10

Respondents urge that this is not enough. The argument rides hard upon the word "hearing" in § 6 (j). It

10 As to what constitutes a "fair résumé" see Imboden v. United States, supra. Compare United States v. Oller, 107 F. Supp. 54 (D. Conn. 1952), and United States v. Bouziden, 108 F. Supp. 395 (W. D. Okla. 1952).

We need not reach that question in these cases because in our view respondents cannot complain of any failure on the part of the Department of Justice to supply them with a summary of the evidence.

Respondent Nugent first indicated to his local board that he would only serve as a noncombatant. Thereafter, when required to submit additional information, he stated that he was opposed to any military service whatsoever. The local board, after a hearing, classified him as 1-A-O which rendered him eligible only for noncombatant military service. He appealed, claiming total exemption. Pursuant to §6 (j) his case was referred to the Department of Justice.

Instructions mailed to respondent Nugent informed him of his right to "request" the Hearing Officer to "advise" him of the "general nature and character of any evidence" which was "unfavorable" to his claim. Respondent never requested the Hearing Officer for any summary of the FBI investigation. He claims he was misled by the Hearing Officer's secretary who told him that the "files" were "favorable." But respondent made no effort to verify this statement; at no time did he say anything or make any request to the Hearing Officer concerning the FBI report.

Moreover, the Hearing Officer, in his own report on the case, said nothing which would indicate that the secretary's comment was erroneous. He did not purport to base his recommendation on material submitted by the FBI; rather his recommendation seems based upon Nugent's own conduct and testimony at the hearing coupled

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Opinion of the Court.

is suggested that the "hearing" prescribed by Congress was purposely designed to allow the registrant to refuteitem by item, if necessary-the matters discussed in the investigator's report." In sum, respondents assimilate the "hearing" in § 6 (j) to a trial and insist that it imports a right to confront every informant who may have rendered adverse comment to the FBI.

The statute does entitle the registrant to a "hearing," and of course no sham substitute will meet this requirement; but we do not think that the word "hearing"when put in the context of the whole scheme for review set forth in § 6 (j)-comprehends the formal and litigious procedures which respondents' interpretation would attribute to it. Instead, the word takes its meaning in this instance from an analysis of the precise function

with the fact that respondent, in his original classification questionnaire, had indicated a willingness to serve as a noncombatant-the classification to which he had been assigned.

An additional statement by a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, forwarding the Hearing Officer's report to the appeal board, also made no mention that there was adverse matter in the FBI report.

No part of the FBI report was transmitted to the appeal board. Thus the record before the appeal board contained no evidence secured by the FBI. In view of this, and in view of his failure to make any request to the Hearing Officer, we think that Nugent was not denied any right.

Nor was respondent Packer denied his right to be advised of the general nature of any evidence in the FBI report which might defeat his claim. In response to his question, the Hearing Officer told him that there was nothing unfavorable in it. The Hearing Officer's report, which was transmitted to the appeal board, corroborates this view. Nothing in the FBI report was transmitted to the appeal board, and thus it was given no indication that the FBI report was unfavorable.

11 See United States v. Geyer, 108 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1952), an opinion heavily relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its opinion in the Nugent case.

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