versy is between citizens of different States, the case is not removable (Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 467; First Nat. Bank v. King W. I. Co., 2 Cent. L. J. 505); so a judgment creditor cannot remove a cause where the controversy is between citizens of the same State. (Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 467.) If complainant and some of the defendants are citizens of the same State, the cause cannot be removed (N. J. Zinc Co. v. Trotter, 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 410); even where one defendant is a citizen of the State, it cannot be removed. (Hervey v. Illinois M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103.) Where action is brought against several defendants, only one of whom is a citizen of the State, the right as to the subject-matter does not attach under the first clause, nor under the second clause, because there is no severable controversy. (Hyde v. Ruble, 3 Morr. Trans. 516; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205.) Where parties on both sides are necessary to the claims of one of the parties, the cause is not removable (Hanover F. Ins. Co. v. Keogh, 7 Fed. Rep. 764); and even under the Judiciary Act, if an indispensable party is a citizen of the same State with the plaintiff, jurisdiction would be defeated (Vannevar v. Bryant, 21 Wall. 41; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 192; Wilson v. Blodgett, 4 McLean, 360; Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How. 29; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130; Clearwater v. Meredith, 21 How. 89; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280; Commercial etc. Bk. v. Slocum, 14 Peters, 65); so a stockholder cannot remove a cause to have stock issues declared void. (Shumway v. C. & I. R. Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 385.) Heirs and devisees of the debtor are necessary parties to a bill to subject real estate of the debtor to the satisfaction of his debts (Walker v. Powers, 3 Morr. Trans. 260); but a widow who has renounced her rights under a will is not a necessary party in a suit to annul the will (Chester v. Chester, 7 Fed. Rep. 1); yet the executors are, if they are trustees for the party seeking to avoid the will. (Price v. Foreman, 12 Fed. Rep. 801; 11 Biss. 328.) A bill in equity to establish a resulting trust in land in possession of a mortgagor is not removable where defendants are inseparable (Price v. Foreman, 12 Fed. Rep. 801; 11 Biss. 328); so, one or more of several trustees cannot remove (Clarke v. Opdyke, 17 N. Y. Supr. 383); and the beneficiary of a trust is a necessary party.

(Lauriate v. Stratton, 11 Fed. Rep. 107.) Where the bill asserts the obligation of a bond, or an interest covenant against obligor, he is a necessary party. (Chaffraix v. Board of Liquidation, 11 Fed. Rep. 638.) A bank is a necessary party in a suit by the widow for the money of her husband held on deposit (Bailey v. New York Sav. Bk., 18 Blatchf. 77); so, the next friend of a feme covert is a necessary party. (Ruckmann v. Palisades L. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 367.) An action to enforce a joint liability cannot be removed (Yulee v. Vose, 99 U. S. 539); so of an action brought against joint tort-feasors, one being a resi dent and the other a non-resident. (Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Rand v. Walker, 117 U. S. 340; Plymouth etc. Gold Min. Co. v. Amador etc. Canal Co., 118 U. S. 264; Fidelity Ins. etc. Co. v. Huntington, 117 U. S. 280; Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U. S. 408; Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; Putnam v. Ingraham, 114 U. S. 57; Texas Transp. Co. v. Seeligson, 122 U. S. 519; Kelly v. Houghton, 23 Fed. Rep. 417; Chapman v. Chapman, 28 Fed. Rep. 1; Judah v. Iowa Barb Wire Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 561; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Brown, 32 Fed. Rep. 337; Weller v. Tobacco Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 860.)

The whole controversy removed. — Under this section the whole suit must be removed (Sew. Mach. Co.'s Case, 18 Wall. 553; S. C., 110 Mass. 81; Ellis v. Sisson, 11 Fed. Rep. 353, 11 Biss. 187; Barney v. Latham, 11 The Reporter, N. S. 721; Carraher v. Brennan, 7 Biss. 497; Hervey v. Illinois etc. R. Co., 8 Biss. 103; Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods, 397; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457; Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277; Burch v. Des Moines & St. P. R. Co., 56 Iowa, 449), and not, like the Act of 1866, a part of it. (Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 467; S. C., 8 Chic. L. N. 49; Hervey v. I. M. R. W. Co., 7 Biss. 103.) It cannot be removed as to one defendant, and left standing as to others. (Chamoers v. Holland, 11 Fed. Rep. 209; 3 McCrary, 538; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205; Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336.) The first clause of this section requires all the plaintiffs or all the defendants to have the right to remove, and applies to the ordinary actions at common law, where there

is only one party on each side. (Maine v. Gilman, 10 Fed. Rep. 214.) It relates to a single individual controversy in which all on the moving side are necessary parties, when all must unite, while the second clause contemplates cases in which there are persons whose presence is not necessary. (Smith v. McKay, 4 Fed. Rep. 353.) Where the action was by the citizen of a State against several defendants, and the circuit court had jurisdiction from the amount in controversy, any one of the defendants may apply for a removal if the matter can be fully determined between them. (McLean v. Chicago & St. P. R. Co., 16 Blatchf. 319; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 6 Fed. Rep. 226; Stapleton v. Reynolds, 9 Chic. L. N. 33; Evans v. Faxon, 10 Fed. Rep. 312; 11 Biss. 175; Hervey v. Illinois & Midland R. Co.; 7 Biss. 103; Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods, 397; First Presb. Soc. of G. B. v. Goodrich T. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 257; 10 Biss. 312;. Maine v. Gilman, 10 Fed. Rep. 214; Wormser v. Dahlman, 57 How. Pr. 286); but the controversy must be wholly between them (Evans v. Faxon, 10 Fed. Rep. 312; 11 Biss. 175; Walsh v. Memphis C. & N. W. R. Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 797; 2 McCrary, 156; McLean v. St. Paul & Chicago R. Co., 16 Blatchf. 309; Ellerman v. New Orleans, M. T. & R. Co., 2 Woods, 120; Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 656; First Presb. Soc. of G. B. v. Goodrich T. Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 257; 10 Biss. 312); and the whole suit must be removed (Carraher v. Brennan, 7 Biss. 497; Board v. Kan. Pac. R., 4 Dill. 277; Burch v. Des Moines & St. P. R. Co., 46 Iowa, 449; Barney v. Latham, 11 Law Reporter, N. S. 93; Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 467); for, if not wholly between them, it cannot be removed, although the controversy of the defendant could be disposed of separately. (Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods, 397.) The suit may be removed, although it does not arise under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States (Low v. Wayne Co. Sav. Bk., 14 Blatchf. 449), and irrespective of its quality as equitable or legal (Ketchum v. Black Riv. Lum. Co., 4 Fed. Rep. 139); or although there may be other controversies in the suit between other parties (Hervey v. Illinois M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103; Bybee v. Hawkett, 5 Fed. Rep. 1; 6 Sawy. 593; Stevens v. Richardson, 9 Fed. Rep. 191; 20 Blatchf. 53; Evans v. Faxon,

10 Fed. Rep. 312; 11 Biss. 175;) or although the controversy removed is only incidental, as the removal takes the principal controversy, and all other controversies, to the circuit court (Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. C. P. & S. R. Co., 12 Chic. L. N. 65); or although one of the controversies taken alone be between citizens of the same State. (Sheldon v. Keokuk N. W. Line P. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 789; 9 Biss. 307.) The removal of the suit as to one defendant removes it as to all (Stapleton v. Reynolds, 9 Chic. L. N. 33); and all the defendants need not join. (Stapleton v. Reynolds, 9 Chic. L. N. 33; Davis v. Cook, 9 Nev. 134.) Where all the parties have the requisite citizenship, one alone may petition. (Arapahoe Co. v. Kansas P. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277; Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods, 397; Carswell v. Schley, 59 Ga. 17.) This clause applies to suits where there may be distinct controversies between different sets of plaintiffs and defendants (Maine v. Gilman, 10 Fed. Rep. 214; Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205), when the parties may be so transposed on opposite sides, according to their interests, as to effect a determination of their rights. (Burke v. Flood, 1 Fed. Rep. 541; C Sawy. 220.) Under this clause, each individual plaintiff must be a citizen of a State different from that of each individual defendant. (Burke v. Flood, 1 Fed. Rep. 541; S. C., 6 Sawy. 220; Van Brunt v. Corbin, 14 Blatchf. 496; In re Frazer, 10 Chic. L. N. 390; Ruble v. Hyde, 3 Fed. Rep. 330; 1 McCrary, 513.) If some of the plaintiffs or some of the defendants are citizens of the same State, one alone cannot remove the cause. (Hervey v. Illinois M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103; Ruckman v. Palisades Land Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 367.) The case may be removed where the parties applying have interpleaded, as where intervenors charge fraud and want of jurisdiction. (Burdick v. Peterson, 6 Fed. Rep. 840; 2 McCrary, 135; Tower v. Ficklin, 60 Ga. 373; Healy v. Provost, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 240; see Postmaster-general v. Cross, 4 Wash. C. C. 326; Martin v. Taylor, 4 Wash. C. C. 1.) Either one or more may apply for a removal, although other parties are citizens of the same State with those on the opposite side. (Boone v. Iowa & M. Const. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 401; 3 McCrary, 310; In re Iowa & M. Const. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 401; 3 McCrary, 310.) If the real litigation is between citizens of differ

ent States, the case is within this section, notwithstanding some of the adversary parties may be citizens of the same State with some of the defendants. (Girardey v. Moore, 3 Woods, 397; Nat. Union Bank_v. Dodge, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 304; see Shepard v. K. N. L. Pack. Co., 12 Chic. L. N. 220.) Where the controversy is severable, a joint tortfeasor may remove (Lockhart v. Horn, 1 Woods, 634; and see Sheldon v. Keokuk N. L. P. Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 789; 9 Biss. 307; Taylor v. Rockefeller, 7 Cent. L. J. 349; Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 9 Biss. 307); and where plaintiff has united controversies which can be fully determined as between the parties, citizens of another State may remove the cause (Clark v. Chicago M. & S. P. R. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 355; 3 McCrary, 591; Sweet v. Same, 11 Fed. Rep. 365); but if the cause of action is joint, it cannot be removed on the petition of one only (Stevens v. Richardson, 9 Fed. Rep. 191.) The right of removal in such cases is on the condition that the case can be wholly determined as to the parties (Nat. Union Bank v. Dodge, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 304); so if three separate actions are brought, and the same defense is made in each, and a judgment in one will determine the whole controversy, they may be removed if the joint amount incontrovertibly exceeds five hundred dollars. (Carraher v. Brennan, 7 Biss. 497; Ellerman v. New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co., 2 Woods, 120; Smith v. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co., 2 Tenn. Ch. 656; Smith v. McKay, 4 Fed. Rep. 353; Hervey v. Illinois M. R. Co., 7 Biss. 103; Chicago v. Gage, 6 Biss. 467; Osgood v. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co., 6 Biss. 330; Board v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Dill. 277; Burnham v. D. & M. R. Co., 4 Dill. 503.) Where five attachments were separately sued out against one stock of goods, the question of ownership is a single controversy. (Anderson v. Gerding, 3 Woods, 487.) There may be a removal of that part of a cause which concerns the original parties (Temple v. Smith, 4 Fed. Rep. 392; 2 McCrary, 226), notwithstanding that a State statute may declare that the trial as to certain other parties cannot be separated from the trial of the main cause. (Ellerman v.

New Orleans M. & T. R. Co., 2 Woods, 120.) But the circuit court has no authority to decide an action not yet before it, to obtain jurisdiction over one of several tenants in common. (Ex parte Turner, 3 Wall. Jr. 258.)