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equity (Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210; Hipp v. Babin, 19 How. 271; Lewis v. Cocks, 22 Wall. 466); so in case of an illegal tax to prevent a multiplicity of suits. (Union National Bank v. Chicago, 3 Biss. 82; Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108; First Nat. Bk. v. Douglass, 3 Dill. 298; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. McShane, 3 Dill. 303; Crane v. McCoy, 1 Bond, 422; Plummer v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 1 Holmes, 267; Garrison v. Memphis Ins. Co., 19 How. 312.

Remedy at law.-A bill in equity is not the appropriate rem dy to enforce a decree in chancery for the payment of money. (Tilford v. Oakley, Hemp. 197.) So a suit at law cannot be enjoined merely because the party has a good defense (Rogers v. Cincinnati, 5 McLean, 387); nor will a bill be entertained to recover possession of property taken from the marshal by the sheriff. (Knox v. Smith, 4 How. 298.) So a court of equity cannot decree that an indorser pay a note. (Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130.) A party cannot by bill in equity enforce payment of a policy (Graves v. Boston Mar. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch, 419); nor can a party maintain a bill to enforce a liability for falsely recommending another. (Russell v. Clarke, 7 Cranch, 69.) A municipal corporation cannot maintain a bill to cancel a bond issued without authority and in violation of official duty (Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373); nor can an insurance company maintain a bill to cancel a policy. (Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616; Home Ins. Co. v. Stanchfield, 1 Dill. 424.) The mere fact that the evidence is voluminous is not a ground for equitable intervention. (Bowen v. Chase, 94 U. S. 812.)

Remedy in equity.-Equity will entertain a bill for an account only where action for account is the proper remedy at law, or where a trustee is a party (Fowle v. Lawrason, 5 Peters, 495; Blakeley v. Biscoe, Hemp. 114); so a bill may be filed to correct a mistake in partnership accounts (Ivinson v. Hutton, 98 U. S. 79), but it cannot draw to itself every transaction in which an account is to be adjusted; it is only in transactions of great complexity or difficulty at law, or some discovery is required, that equity will interpose. (Fowle v. Lawrason, 5 Peters, 495.) A trustee or cestui que trust may file a bill to obtain posses

sion of land subject to the trust (Harrison v. Rowan, 4 Wash. C. C. 202); or an assignee in bankruptcy to obtain the value of property transferred by a partner. (Taylor v. Rasch, 5 Bank. Reg. 399.) If the United States claims priority of payment out of a trust fund (Hunter v. U. S., 5 Peters, 173), or has a claim against a party who has made a deed of trust, it may file a bill in equity against the trustee. (U. S. v. Myers, 2 Brock. 516.) A statute allowing supplementary proceedings does not prevent the filing of a creditor's bill (Putnam v. New Albany, 4 Biss. 365); or although a State law allows suit against a debtor of a debtor. (U. S. v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108.) If there is no adequate remedy at law, a stockholder may apply in equity to prevent a corporation from committing a breach of trust or violation of chartered rights (Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Wheeling v. Mayor, 1 Hughes, 90); and when a bill is filed to recover stock, an action at law for damages is not the proper remedy. (Kilgour v. N. O. Gaslight Co., 2 Woods, 144.) A feme covert may file a bill to recover money to which she is entitled (Hunt v. Danforth, 2 Curt. 592); or a legatee a bill against the executor to recover a legacy (Mayor v. Foulkrod, 4 Wash. C. C. 349); or a distributee to recover his share of the estate. (Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Pratt v. Northam, 5 Mason, 95.) A party in possession of land may file a bill to quiet title (Morton v. Root, 2 Dill. 312); but one who has the legal title cannot maintain a bill against parties in possession of the land. (Speigle v. Meredith, 4 Biss. 120.) The circuit court will entertain jurisdiction of a bill for relief against a judgment and sale thereunder on the ground of fraud. (Shelton v. Tiflin, 6 How. 163.) A party impeaching a judicial sale for fraud may proceed, although he has a remedy at law (Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall. 268; Cocks v. Izard, 7 Wall. 559); or although he can have his right to the property summarily determined in a State court. (Breeden v. Lee, 2 Hughes, 484.) A creditor may file a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. (Railroad Co. v. Howard, 7 Wall. 392; Bean v. Smith, 2 Mason, 252.) So a bill may be filed to recover money fraudulently appropriated by directors of a corporation. (Gingrat v. Dane, 4 Cliff. 260.) If a party has been induced by fraudulent representations to purchase land, he may file a bill to rescind a contract

(Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Peters, 210); so a bill may be sustained to establish a will fraudulently suppressed if it avoids a multiplicity of suits. (Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619.) If the question of fraud has been tried at law it cannot be reviewed in equity without suggestions of equitable circumstances which could not be availed of at law. (Smith v. McIver, 9 Wheat. 532.) A party who holds the bond of a corporation secured by a pledge may file a bill to enforce the pledge. (Valette v. W. V. Canal Co. 4 McLean, 192.)

Equity jurisdiction. The equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is subject to neither limitation nor restraint by the State authorities, and is uniform throughout the different States of the Union. (Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. Mayor etc., Cir. Ct. N. Y., 31 Fed. Rep. 312.) A court of the United States sitting in equity cannot control a principal surveyor of a military district in the discharge of his official duties, or take charge of the records of his.office, or declare their effect to be other than what appears on their face. (Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550.)

Injunction.-A court of equity will not interfere to stay proceedings in a number of actions of ejectment to abide the result of one (Peters v. Prevost, 1 Paine, 64); nor will it lie to restrain a threatened trespass unless it tends to irreparable mischief (LeRoy v. Wright, 4 Sawy. 530); but a denial of title is no reason for refusing to enjoin a trespass, if the trespass goes to the destruction of the estate. (U. S. v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271; LeRoy v. Wright, 4 Sawy. 530; Perry v. Parker, 1 Wood. & M. 280.) Yet it will not enjoin an injury where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law. (Parker v. W. L. C. & W. Co. 1 Black, 545.) If the sheriff attempts to take property from the possession of the marshal under a writ of replevin, he may be restrained to prevent a conflict of jurisdiction (Crane v. McCoy, 1 Bond, 422); but a mortgagee of personal property cannot restrain the sale under execution (La Mothe v. Fink, 12 Chic. L. N. 152); nor a person whose property is taken on execution against another (Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378); but if it would destroy the credit or break up the business of the owner,

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he may restrain the sale. (Watson v. Southerland, 5 Wall. 74.) Although an injunction is sought to prevent another from acting under an agreement, yet damages for its breach cannot be recovered (La Mothe Manuf. Co. v. Nat. Tube Works, 15 Blatchf. 432); but if it takes jurisdiction it will grant full relief, although the relief would be as full at law. (Gass v. Stinson, 2 Sum. 153; Warner v. Daniels, 1 Wood. & M. 90; Pierpont v. Fowle, 2 Wood. & M. 23; Foster v. Swasey, 2 Wood. & M. 217.)

§ 244 (724). Power to order production of books and writings in actions at law. -In the trial of actions at law, the courts of the United States may, on motion and due notice thereof, require the parties to produce books or writings in their possession or power which contain evidence pertinent to the issue, in cases and under circumstances where they might be compelled to produce the same by the ordinary rules of proceeding in chancery. If a plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give the like judgment for the defendant as in cases of nonsuit; and if a defendant fails to comply with such order, the court may, on motion, give judgment against him by default. (Rev. Stats. sec. 724.)

Production of books or writings.-Section seven hundred and twenty-four, Revised Statutes, limits the remedy to cases where issue is joined. (Jacques v. Collins, 2 Blatchf. 23; U. S. v. Hutton, 25 Int. Rev. Rec. 37.) It does not take away the right to relief by bill of discovery except where the remedy is given. (U. S. v. Hutton, 10 Ben. 269; Bryant v. Layland, 6 Fed. Rep. 127.) Its provisions extend to proceedings in rem to enforce a forfeiture (U. S. v. Barrels, 10 Int. Rev. Rec. 205; but see U. S. v. Packages, Gilp. 306), and to cases in bankruptcy. (In re Mendenhall, 9 Bank. Reg. 205.) The order can be made only in cases where relief might have been had by bill of discovery (Finch v. Rikeman, 2 Blatchf. 301); and

that a bill of discovery has been filed is no bar to the motion (Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401); nor that a copy of the paper has been filed in answer to the bill of discovery (Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401), unless the discovery has been completely effectual (Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401); but it does not apply in a case where a subpoena duces tecum issues to compel a witness to produce papers. (U. S. v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 566; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, 3 Cliff. 201.) In requiring the production of books or writing in evidence, Federal courts are governed by this section, and not by the provisions of State statutes. (Gregory v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 529.) The formalities of a bill of discovery are not requisite; a mere motion, with notice to the opposite party, and a description of the books or papers with sufficient certainty, is sufficient (Jacques v. Collins, 2 Blatchf. 23); and where letters are described by their subject-matter it is sufficiently explicit. (Vasse v. Mifflin, 4 Wash. C. C. 519.) The applicant must show that the paper exists. that it is in possession of the party, and that it is pertinent to the issue. (Triplett v. Bank of Washington, 3 Cranch C. C. 646; Jacques v. Collins, 2 Blatchf. 23; Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401; Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381.) An ex parte affidavit is sufficient (U. S. v. Packages, Gilp. 306); a motion is requisite (Thompson v. Selden, 20 How. 194; Maye v. Carbery, 2 Cranch C. C. 336; Bank of United States v. Kurtz, 2 Cranch C. C. 342; Macomber v. Clarke, 3 Cranch C. C. 347; Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381); and it may be made before the day of trial (Central Bank v. Taylor, 2 Cranch C. C. 427; Iasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt. 401); and notice to the party required to produce the books or writings must be given (Maye v. Carbery, 2 Cranch C. C. 336; Thompson v. Selden, 20 How. 195; Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381); and it must contain information that a motion will be made for a nonsult, or for judgment by default. (Bas v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 381.) It may be given to the party or to his attorney (Geyger v. Geyger, 2 Dall. 332; U. S. v. Barrels, 10 Int. Rev. Rec. 205), and must be reasonable (Macomber v. Clarke, 3 Cranch C. C. 347); for an order will not be made at the trial on motion without notice. (Sampson v. Johnson, 2 Cranch C. C. 107; Bank of U. S. v. Kurtz, 2

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