legislation by Congress, the court may prescribe the mode and form of proceedings, so as to attain the object for which jurisdiction was given. (Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.) It is left to Congress to organize the Supreme Court, to define its powers consistently with the Constitution, and to distribute the residue between it and the inferior courts. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) Although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court jurisdiction in suits affecting embassadors, ministers, and consuls, Congress may vest a concurrent jurisdiction in such inferior courts as may be established. (U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatchf. 259; Graham v. Stucken, 4 Blatchf. 50; Gittings v. Crawford, Taney, 1; but see Davis v. Packard, 6 Peters, 41; Mannhardt v. Souderstrom, 1 Binn. 138; Griffin v. Dominguez, 2 Duer, 656; Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg, & R. 545.) A State court has no jurisdiction over an offense committed by a consul (Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg. & R. 545); but an indictment against a private person for an assault upon an embassador or public minister is not a case affecting such minister. (U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467.) The original jurisdiction, in cases where a State is a party, refers to cases where jurisdiction might be exercised by reason of the character of the party in any suit in a Federal court (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), and it must be a case where the State is nominally a party and substantially affected (Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411; New Jersey v. New York, 5 Peters, 287; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; Ex parte Madrazo, 7 Peters, 627; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling etc. Br., 18 How. 421), a party to the record (Bank of U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904), or if it has a direct interest in the controversy (Pennsylvania v. Wheeling etc. Br., 9 How. 647; 13 How. 518), where disputes and controversies arise between the respective States (Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Ga. 532), as on questions of boundaries. (Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; New York v. Connecticut,

4 Dall. 1.) A State may bring an original suit against a citizen of another State, but not against one of her own (Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 10 Wall. 553; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), though a State may be authorizel to sue in the inferior courts. (State v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315; contra, State v. Trustees, 5 Bank. Reg. 466; 1 Hughes, 133.) Where the State is a party, it may be represented by the governor. (Kentucky v. Dennison, 21 How. 66.) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a case where a State is enforcing its penal laws (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), nor in a proceeding by an alien against a citizen. (Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65) The constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of all cases affecting consuls, does not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in such cases, also, upon the subordinate courts of the Union. (Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252.)

Equity jurisdiction.-The equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is independent of that conferred by the States upon their own courts, and cannot be affected by any legislation except that of the United States. (Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587.)

Authority of State courts.—The jurisdiction of State courts is not taken away except as to cases where such jurisdiction would be incompatible with the powers granted to the United States. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; 3 Serg. & R. 169; Teal v. Felton, 12 How. 284; State v. Randall, 2 Aik. 89; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill, 159; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130.) Where Federal courts have paramount jurisdiction, State courts are expressly prohibited from taking cognizance (In re Brinkman, 7 Bank. Reg. 426; Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 16; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 590); so, a State statute authorizing proceedings in rem for causes in admiralty is unconstitutional. (Crawford v. The Caroline Reed, 42 Cal. 469; In re Brinkman, 7 Bank. Reg.

426; Bird v. The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, overruling Richardson v. Cleveland, 5 Port. 251; Monroe v. Brady, 7 Ala. 59; The Farmer v. McCraw, 31 Ala. 659; The Beliast, 41 Ala. 50) Congress cannot confer jurisdic tion on a State tribunal. (Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112.) The jurisdiction of the State is co-extensive with the Territory (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 386; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 610); but a State legislature cannot confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts, or prescribe the means or mode of its exercise. (Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) No part of the criminal jurisdiction can be delegated to State tribunals (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; State v. Wells, 2 Hill (S. C.) 687; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112; State v. McBride, Rice, 400; Commonwealth v. Feely, 1 Va. Cas. 321), but a crime not made an offense by an act of Congress is cognizable in a State court. (State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317.) So State courts may punish for counterfeiting under a State law, unless exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Federal courts. (White v. Commonwealth, 4 Binn. 418; State v. Randall, 2 Ark. 89; State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey, 44.) A State court has jurisdiction to punish the forgery of a land warrant, where it has not been made a crime by act of Congress. (Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 Dall. App. 26.) State courts may entertain an action to recover a penalty for breach of a Federal statute. (Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Stearns v. U. S., 2 Paine, 300; Buckwalter v. U. S., 11 Serg. & R. 193. But see Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; Davidson v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Daua, 442; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34.) A State magistrate may commit a prisoner to be delivered over for prosecution to the United States. (Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Peters, 539; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156; Ex parte Smith. 5 Cowen, 273; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348; Ex parte Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276.)

Transfer of causes.-Congress may transfer a suit from one inferior tribunal to another. (Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; United States v. Ritchie, 17 How. 525; Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 442.) It may also provide for the removal of causes from State to Federal courts. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Mayor v

Cooper, 6 Wall. 247; Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Murray v. Patrie, 5 Blatchf. 343; Fisk v. N. P. R. R. Co., 6 Blatchf. 362; Clark v. Dick, 1 Dill. 8; Johnson v. Monell, Woolw. 390; McCormick v. Humphrey, 27 Ind. 144; Tod v. Fairfield, 15 Ohio St. 377; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant, 412; Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Graut, 420; Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) This power is only given by implication; it is the indirect means by which Federal courts acquire jurisdiction. (Railroad Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) A case may be removed from a State to a Federal court where it arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as well as where it arises between citizens of the different States. (Kulp v. Ricketts, 3 Grant, 420.) Congress may determine at what time its power may be invoked, and at what stage of the proceedings a trial may be removed to the Federal courts. (Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.) No State can take away the privilege conferred upon citizens of other States to sue in the Federal courts, by providing a special remedy in its own courts. (Mason v. Boom Comp., 3 Wall. Jr. 252.) Parties cannot by agreement oust jurisdiction in the federal judicia y. (Davis v. Packard, 6 Peters, 41, 7 Peters, 276; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 415; Cobb v. N. E. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 192; Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 421.) A statute requiring an agreement from a foreign corporation not to remove a cause is void (Morse v. Ins. Co., 20 Wail. 496; Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 155; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 463; but see Cont. Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 13 Alb. L. J. 311; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Pest, 23 Ohio St. 505); but if a license to transact business in a State is made to depend on the condition that the corporation shall not remove any case from a State to a Federal court, the State may revoke it if such removal is made. (State v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 15 Alb. L. J. 267; but see Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 461. See as to transfer into the Federal courts of all suits in the United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, Edwards v. Tanneret, 12 Wall. 446.)

§ 2. Extent of judicial power. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and

equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;-to all cases affecting embassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;-to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;-to controversies between two or more States;-between a State and citizens of another State;-between citizens of different States;-between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. (U. S. Const. art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 1.)

Jurisdiction.-"Shall extend" is used in an imperative sense, and imports an absolute grant ofpower. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304.) There are three classes of cases enumerated. In the latter class as to controversies, Congress may qualify the jurisdiction, either original or appelJate. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.) How jurisdiction shall be acquired, whether original or appellate, and the mode of pr cedure, are left to the wisdom of the legislature (Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247;) so Congress may give the Federal courts original jurisdiction in any cas to which appellate jurisdiction extends (Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738;) and may lawfully provide for suits, at the option of the parties, on all controversies between citizens of the different States. (Ga nes v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10.) When a question within the judicial power becomes an ingredient of the cause, Congress may give the Federal courts jurisdiction. (Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 9 Wheat. 738.) The questions which the case involves must determine its character. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738) Congress may provide that a national bank may sue and be sued in the national courts. (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Bank of U. S. v. Northumberland Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. 108, 4 Conn. 333; Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 317; Bk. of U. S. v. Roberts, 4