Слике страница
PDF
ePub

LIVE IN ADULTERY

See, also, Live Together.

To constitute "living in adultery," there must be more than a single act, but there need not be a living together continuously, or for a given time, nor is it necessary for the man to abide in the same house with the

woman; but the offense is committed if he at stated periods, or frequently, spends the day or night, or any considerable part of his time, with a woman, not his wife, at such times having carnal knowledge of her at will, though at other times he be domiciled with his wife. Baker v. Baker, 124 S. W. 866, 867, 136 Ky. 617.

A single act of criminal intercourse does not constitute "living in adultery or fornication." Lawson v. State, 42 S. E. 752, 116 Ga. 571 (citing McLeland v. State, 25 Ga. 477; Bish. St. Crimes, § 697).

One act, or even occasional acts, of illicit intercourse do not constitute the of fense of "living together in a state of adultery or fornication, or of adultery and fornication," in violation of Pen. Code 1895, § 381. Winkles v. State, 61 S. E. 1128, 1129, 4 Ga. App. 559.

LIVE TOGETHER

See, also, Live in Adultery.

A husband and wife are "living together" when they dwell under the same roof, eat at the same table, and hold themselves out to the world and conduct themselves towards each other as husband and wife, and it is incorrect to say that they are living as husband and wife when they do not occupy the same room or have sexual intercourse. Levy v. Goldsoll (Tex.) 131 S. W. 420, 421.

The mere fact that a man took his meals at the house of a married woman did not constitute a "living together" by such man and woman, within the meaning of the statute defining the crime of adultery. Paul V. State, 90 S. W. 171, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 20.

Where defendant had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix while she was living in defendant's house as his general servant, during the illness of defendant's wife, defendant was not guilty under an indictment charging that defendant and prosecutrix "lived together and had carnal intercourse." The statute does not intend to convey the idea that a married man with a family was "living together" with a servant merely because the servant might occupy a room in the house of the master. To give the statute such construction would be to hold that, where a landlord or family slept under the same roof with the servant, this would be a “living together" with the servant. Boswell v. State, 85 S. W. 1076, 1077, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 47, 122 Am. St. Rep. 731.

Civil Code, art. 1481 providing that those who "have lived together" in open concubinage are incapable of making to each other

any donation of immovables, does not mean that the parties must have dwelt or resided together. Succession of Jahraus, 38 South. 417, 418, 114 La. 456. LIVED UPON

26, 1909 (Laws 1909, c. 196), punishing any Where, on a trial for violating Act April person who shall knowingly live on or be supported in whole or in part by the money procured by any female through the prostithe fact that the money given him by a tution of any other female, accused relied on third person was received in payment of debts or to redeem jewelry for the third person, and the third person testified that she never gave accused any money for his own use, a charge authorizing a conviction if accused received money from the third person with knowledge that the same was derived through the prostitution of another, and that he used the same for his own living or personal expenses, was erroneous, because broader than the statute, and as eliminating the defense; the phrase "lived upon" meaning to be maintained in life; to acquire a livelihood; to subsist with, on, or by, as to live on spoils. Trozzo v. People, 117 Pac. 150, 156, 51 Colo. 323.

LIVE ENGINE

An engine having no steam is called a "dead engine," and one with steam is a "live engine." Turner v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 111 Pac. 433, 83 Kan. 315. LIVE SPRINGS

Springs occupying a space of about onehalf acre in a ten-acre tract, marshy part of the year, resting right upon the brow of a of water standing around in the springs, of little drop-off, so that there was quite a lot which it looked as there might be five or six, but into which no stream led, and the water though, during a part of the wet season, some from which formed no channel or stream,

of the water would flow down the hillside for a short distance and disappear in the soil, were not "live springs," but constituted nothing more than a bog occasioned by seepage of the water. Dickey v. Maddux, 93 Pac. 1090, 1091, 48 Wash. 411.

LIVE STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY

A "live stock insurance company" incorporated under Rev. St. 1895, art. 642, subd. 46, authorizing the incorporation of fire, marine, life, and live stock insurance companies, to conduct a live stock insurance company on a mutual or co-operative plan without capital stock, and to issue policies of indemnity on live stock to its members, is a live stock insurance company conducted on the mutual or co-operative plan, and is not a "mutual relief association" within article 3096, providing that nothing in the titletitle 58, entitled "Incorporation of Insurance Companies"-shall apply to mutual relief as

Bociations. State v. Burgess, 109 S. W. tation and adultery, mean the living together 922, 923, 101 Tex. 524.

[blocks in formation]

as husband and wife; and to justify a conviction it must appear that there existed between defendants an adulterous cohabitation. People v. Breeding, 126 Pac. 179, 181, 19 Cal.

An information drawn under section 27, | App. 359. c. 495, p. 823, Sess. Laws 1905, relating to

See Issue (Descendants).

LIVERY STABLE

the inspection by the "live stock sanitary LIVING ISSUE
commissioner" of cattle imported from places
beyond the south line of the state, which
charges a want of inspection by the live
stock sanitary "commission," and charges
generally the want of any inspection, is not
invalidated by the omission of the terminal
syllable "er" from the word used to describe
the official having power to make the in-
spection, since there is no substantial differ-
ence between a commission composed of a
body of individuals having lawful warrant
to perform certain acts and a commissioner
having identical authority. Both terms are
general characterizations without fixed legal
signification and import an office with pre-
scribed duties. State v. Asbell, 86 Pac. 457,
458, 74 Kan. 397, 121 Am. St. Rep. 345.
LIVE WIRE

The term "live wire" is used in electricity to describe a wire charged with a dangerous voltage of electricity. Potts v. Shreveport Belt Ry. Co., 34 South. 103, 110 La. 1, 98 Am. St. Rep. 452.

A "live wire" is one charged with a deadly current of electricity. City of Owensboro v. Knox's Adm'r, 76 S. W. 191, 192, 116 Ky. 451.

A "live wire" is one charged with a deadly current of electricity. Mangan's Adm'r v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 91 S. W. 703, 705, 122 Ky. 476, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459 (quoting and adopting City of Owensboro v. Knox's Adm'r, 76 S. W. 191, 116 Ky. 451).

LIVING

The word "living," as ordinarily used in reference to legatees, without anything in the context to qualify its meaning, signifies such légatees as are living at the time of making the will. Bryant v. Flanders, 87 N. E. 574, 575, 201 Mass. 373.

Child en ventre sa mere

The term "en ventre sa mere" comes clearly within the description "a child living at the time of its father's death." State v. Atwood, 102 Pac. 295, 297, 54 Or. 526, 21 Ann.

Cas. 516.

LIVING HEIRS

See Remaining Living Heirs.
LIVING IN STATE OF COHABITA-
TION AND ADULTERY

The words "living in a state of cohabitation and adultery" in Pen. Code, 269a, as amended by Act March 21, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 426), punishing living in a state of cohabi3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-11

As mercantile pursuit, see Mercantile. A "livery stable" is a building where horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire; a "place where horses are groomed, fed, and hired; where vehicles are let;" a stable where horses are kept at livery and hire, and vehicles are let; a stable where horses are kept for hire, and where stabling is provided. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206 (quoting and adopting definition in Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094; Stand. Dict.; and Webster, International Dict.).

A "livery stable" is ordinarily a place where horses and carriages are kept to be let for hire, and, in the ordinary conduct of the business, the horse or vehicle so let is in charge and under the control of the hirer or his representative. City of Des Moines v. Bolton, 102 N. W. 1045, 1046, 128 Iowa, 108, 5 Ann. Cas. 906. LIVERY STABLE KEEPER

A "livery stable keeper" has been defined to be the keeper of a stable where horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire; one whose business it is to keep horses for hire or to let, or to keep, feed, or board, horses for others; one who takes horses to bait and board, and he usually keeps horses to let; the keeper of a stable where horses are groomed, fed, and hired, where vehicles are let; the keeper of a stable where horses are kept at livery and hire, and vehicles are let, where horses are kept for hire and stabling is provided. While it is not absolutely necessary for a stable keeper to exercise all the different functions mentioned in the above definitions in order to be a livery stable keeper, his business must be substantially that as indicated. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206 (quoting Abbott, Law Dict.; Anderson, Law Dict.; Black, Law Dict.; Stand. Dict.; Webster, International Dict.; Groves v. Kilgore, 72 Me. 489; Williams v. Garignes, 30 La. Ann. 1094).

A "livery stable keeper" is "one whose business it is to keep horses for hire, or to let, or to keep, feed, or board, horses for others"; one who takes horses to bait and board; and he usually keeps horses to let. It is not absolutely necessary for a livery stable keeper to exercise all of the different functions which may be sometimes performed

by him in order to be a "livery stable keep-| Barker v. Koenig, 119 N. Y. Supp. 777, 778, er," within the meaning of the lien law, but 135 App. Div. 16.

LOAD

See Car Load.
LOADER

See Ground Loader.

LOADING

See Time Saved in Loading.
Ready for loading, see Ready.

his business must be substantially that indicated thereby. Under Civ. Code 1895, 2810, his lien includes, not only the actual feeding of a horse placed with him, but also such charges as are directly connected with his keeping as were naturally in the line of a livery stable keeper's business, but expenses of transporting a horse by railroad to races in or out of the state, and of entering him therein, do not furnish the basis of a lien; and where a horse is left with a stableman to be boarded or kept at an agreed price, and the stableman had two or more stables in this state for the accommodation of stock, and by agreement with the owner kept the horse at one of the stables, the fact that he was not kept at one of the stables rather than at another would not defeat his lien, al-ed at the time, and to have such facilities though, where a horse is delivered to a livery stable keeper and, under contract with the owner, is sent to races at distant points and kept in the stable of another person who is paid by the liveryman, the liveryman thereby acquires no statutory lien. Elliott v. Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. E. 405, 407, 133 Ga. 209, 134 Am. St. Rep. 206.

Under a charter party for a vessel to carry a cargo of coal, which provided that she should "have turn in loading" and "be loaded promptly," she was entitled to be loaded promptly in view of the facilities of the port and the climatic conditions which exist

used to their normal capacity, not only in her own loading, but also in the loading of other vessels after her arrival while she was waiting her turn. Harding v. Cargo of 4,698 Tons of New Rivers Steam Coal, 147 Fed. 971, 973 (citing Abb. Shipp. [13th Ed.] 297).

Charter parties required the vessel in each case to load a cargo of phosphate at An owner and keeper of a livery stable, should proceed to the Port Inglis anchorage, Port Inglis, Fla., and provided that the vessel who boarded horses by the month at so much"or as near thereunto as she may safely get, per stall, but did not feed or care for them,

is entitled to a lien as a "livery stable keeper," within Lien Law (Laws 1897, p. 533, c. 418, § 74, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 942, c. 465), giving a person keeping a livery stable or a boarding stable, or boarding animals, a lien for the care, keeping, or boarding of such animals; and the relation between the

parties was not that of landlord and tenant. Selner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1049, 1050.

and there load. *

*The cargo to be

brought alongside and taken from alongside
free of risk and expense to the vessel, any
custom of the port to the contrary notwith-
standing.
Steamer or vessel to pro-
ceed to safe anchorage at port of loading and
there load." Also: "The cargo to be sup-

*

plied at the average rate of not less than 400 tons per weather working day, commencing 24 hours after vessel is in load"Livery stable keepers" are those whose ing berth and is ready to receive cargo and business it is to care for the horses and car- written notice given to that effect." Vessels riages of others and to let their own horses were obliged to load at such port some miles and carriage either with or without drivers, from shore, and the government had estabbut they are not common carriers of passen-lished there two loading buoys. Three vesgers, within the legal meaning of that term, sels were ordered to proceed to the port at and the rule of law which requires the high- the same time, and they reached there and anest degree of diligence of a carrier of passen-chored, and gave notice that they were ready gers is not applicable to them. Stanley v. Steele, 60 Atl. 640, 642, 77 Conn. 688, 69 L. R. A. 561, 2 Ann. Cas. 342.

LLOYDS

The word "Lloyds" has, by use, come to be understood by the general public as synonymous with "insurance." Under General Corporation Law (Laws 1909, p. 15, c. 28 [Consol. Laws, c. 23]) § 6, providing that no corporation shall be organized with the name of "insurance" in it, except a corporation formed under the banking or the insurance law, a corporation cannot be formed under the business corporations law with the name "Lloyds" in its name, as that word has by use become synonymous with "insurance."

to load. Held, that the "loading berth" referred to in the charter was the "safe anchorage" spoken of in the prior clause; that, having reached such anchorage and given the required notice, the lay days commenced, and the charterer could not require the vessels to await their turn at the loading buoys before the time commenced, even though that may have been the custom of the port, nor avoid liability for demurrage because of their detention for two or three weeks beyond the time, either because they could not get to the buoys or because they could not, perhaps have been fully loaded where they lay-its duty being to load them there, so far as could be safely done, and then permit them to move further out for its completion. Constantine & Pickering S. S. Co. v. Auchincloss, 161 Fed. 843, 846, 88 C. C. A. 661.

The sum added to the net life insurance | pretended lender, or when any reservation premium to meet expenses and contingencies or limitation shall be pretended to have been

is called "loading" the premium. United States Life Ins. Co. v. Spinks (Ky.) 96 S. W. 889, 893, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1053.

Where insurance premiums and renewal premiums were greater than the amount necessary to pay for the insurance, the excess is called "loading." Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 107 S. W. 802, 806, 128 Ky. 174.

LOAF

See Loiter, Loaf, and Idle.

LOAN

See Money Loaned and Invested; Sell,
Barter, or Loan; Stock Loan; Tem-
porary Loan.

Passing a loan, see Pass.
See, also, Lend; Money Lent.

made of a use of property, by way of condition, etc., the transfer shall be held fraudulent, unless the loan is declared by a written instrument duly acknowledged or proved and recorded. Held, that such section had no application to a chattel placed in the hands of bailees to be stored without charge for a reasonable time without any agreement that such bailees should have the right to use the same. Woodward v. San Antonio Traction Co. (Tex.) 95 S. W. 76, 78 (citing Templeman v. Gibbs, 24 S. W. 792, 86 Tex. 359; Hunstock v. Roberts (Tex.] 65 S. W. 676).

Evidence, in an action by an ex-county treasurer against the county for commission, on the theory that a transaction by which, during his term, a judgment creditor of the county transferred the judgment to a bank, it paying him therefor, was a loan by the bank to the county and a payment of the judgment creditor by the county, so that such treasurer was entitled to commissions for receiving and disbursing the money, held sufficient to support a finding that the transaction was not a "loan," but a purchase by pre-ion County, 95 S. W. 713, 43 Tex. Civ. App. the bank of the judgment. Benefield v. Mar

From the use of the word "loan," in its ordinary signification, the law implies a promise to repay. Herlihy v. Coney, 59 Atl. 952, 953, 99 Me. 469.

Rev. St. c. 48, § 64, providing that miums for building association loans shall consist of a percentage charged on the amount lent in addition to interest, and section 65, providing that the monthly interest shall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent. per annum, mean by the words "loan" and "lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the sum actually advanced. Tibbetts v. Deering Loan & Building Ass'n, 72 Atl. 162, 165, 104 Me. 404.

A party advancing money to another to enable the latter to manufacture lumber on an understanding that the lumber shall be sold by the former on commission, so that the former may get back the advances, does not make a "loan," within the strict definition of the term. Murphy v. Dalton, 102 N. W. 277, 139 Mich. 79.

Where the note of a borrowing member of a building and loan association contained the words "monthly installments .on said share," but no reference indicated an agreement to apply such installments on the member's loan, and the deed to secure the loan was conditioned on the payment of the "loan" and of "installments on certain shares," referring to the principal debt covered by the note both as a "loan upon 18 membership shares," the terms "loan" and "installments" were not used synonymously. Cooper v. Newton, 160 Fed. 190, 193.

Rev. St. 1895, art. 2547, provides that where any loan of goods or chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained for the space of two years without demand made and pursued by due process of law on the part of the

245.

The word "loan" is defined to mean "to

deliver to another for temporary use, on condition that the thing be returned, or to dedeliver for temporary use, on condition that an equivalent in kind shall be returned with a compensation for its use." State v. Brown, 102 S. W. 394, 395, 83 Ark. 44, 119 Am. St. Rep. 109 (quoting and adopting definition in Webst. Dict.).

Where a bond guaranteed that the principal would return certain securities on a specified day, and contained no provision either permitting or requiring the principal to discharge his obligation by payment of money on or before the day named, which he was authorized to do by a collateral agreement, the bond was not given for the "loan or forbearance of money" within the New York usury

law (1 Rev. St. [1st Ed.] pt. 2, c. 4, tit. 3, § 5),

making all bonds, whereon is reserved any greater sum than 6 per cent. for the loan or forbearance of any money, void. Klein v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 166 Fed. 365,

368.

Though payment of money be called a "loan," it is not a loan where the money was not to be paid back at all events but the agreement was that on a certain condition it should be paid back. Teed v. Parsons, 66 N. E. 1014, 1046, 202 Ill. 455.

A corporate officer having misappropriated funds, acceptance by the directors of his notes in satisfaction of the misappropriations did not constitute a "loan," within a charter provision prohibiting "loans" of corporate funds to corporate officers or employés. Mur

phy v. Penniman, 66 Atl. 282, 287, 105 Md. create a preferential claim. State ex rel. 452, 121 Am. St. Rep. 583. Carroll v. Corning State Sav. Bank, 115 N. W. 937, 940, 139 Iowa, 338.

Bailment distinguished
See Bailment.

Deposit

A deposit of moneys belonging to an insurance corporation in a bank, returnable on demand in accordance with certificates of de

posit issued at the time, is not a "loan," withInsurance Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 28) 36. People v. Thomas, 130 N. Y. Supp. 246, 249, 71 Misc. Rep. 339.

The deposit of a national bank constitutes "loans" to it and confers on the deposit-in tor a mere chose in action. State v. Clement Nat. Bank, 78 Atl. 944, 950, 84 Vt. 167, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 22.

The transaction between a depositor and the bank is really a "loan" of money and not a deposit, in the strict legal sense of the term. Schippers v. Kempkes (N. J.) 67 Atl. 1042, 1043.

An ordinary deposit of money in a bank is not a "loan" of the money to the bank. Elliott v. Capital City State Bank, 103 N. W. 777, 778, 128 Iowa, 275, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1130, 111 Am. St. Rep. 198.

A "deposit" in a bank is a "loan" payable on demand, and the depositor may not, as a general rule, maintain an action for his deposit until he has first made a demand for its payment. Pratt v. Union Nat. Bank, 75 Atl. 313, 314, 79 N. J. Law, 117.

A national bank had through an employé deposited money with a savings bank, and subsequently, upon a request for more money, the national bank wrote, offering to deposit more money, but refusing to make a loan. In response, it received a certificate of deposit with a letter, asking that it be placed to the credit of the savings bank. The certificate was issued to L., the president, of the savings bank, and was by him indorsed to A., an employé of the national bank, who, in turn, indorsed it to the bank, which gave credit on its books to the savings bank for the amount of the certificate. The certicate was marked "Paid," taken up, and renewal certificates issued from time to time in the same way. After failure of the savings bank, recovery was sought on the last certificate, which was issued directly to A., and signed by the cashier of the savings bank. Held, that the transaction was a "loan" and not a "deposit," and hence did not create a preferential claim. State v. Corning State Sav. Bank, 113 N. W. 500, 503, 136 Iowa, 79.

As purchase money
See Purchase Money.
As sale

See Sale.

LOAN ASSOCIATION

See Homestead Loan Association.
LOAN FOR CONSUMPTION

"A loan for consumption' is a transfer of personal property, such as corn or money, to be consumed by the borrower and to be returned to the lender in kind and quality." State v. Brown, 102 S. W. 394, 395, 83 Ark. 44, 119 Am. St. Rep. 109 (quoting and adopting definition in Kinne v. Kinne [N. Y.] 45 How. Prac. 61).

LOBBY

"Lobbying," which has a well-defined meaning, and signifies to address or solicit members of a legislative body for the purpose of influencing their votes, is contrary to public policy, whether or not it is carried on in such manner as to constitute a crime under the statute; and a note given for money advanced for the expenses of a person to enable him to engage in the business of lobbying will not be enforced. Le Tourneux v. Gilliss, 82 Pac. 627, 628, 1 Cal. App. 546.

A lobbyist is one who solicits members of a legislative body, in the lobby or elsewhere, with the purpose of influencing their votes, and a contract to render such services, or services which consist in part of lobbying, is void as against public policy, and an action cannot be maintained thereon. Burke v. Wood, 162 Fed. 533, 537.

LOCAL

A "local," in railroad parlance, is a train which stops at all stations and does not run with great rapidity when in motion. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 107 N. W. 798, 800,

76 Neb. 496.

Hicks

A bank wrote to its correspondent that $30,000 worth of bonds had been allotted to it, and that it would have to take up and carry about $15,000 of old bonds, stating that it would have to finance the deal, and asked if the correspondent could help out on $10,000 for 30 or 40 days; that, if so, it would send up some paper maturing the next month; and that it did not object to any fair rate. Seven days later two certificates of $5,000 each bearing 7 per cent. interest payable in 40 and 45 days were mailed to the correspondent. Credit for the full amount was given. Held, that the transaction was The word "local," which is the restric a “loan," and not a deposit, and hence did | tive word used in the phrase "local improve

The words "local and special" are fre quently used interchangeably, though they do not have the same meaning; "local" signifying a belonging or confinement to a particular place and being a counter term to "general." People v. Wilcox, 86 N. E. 672, 673, 237 Ill. 421.

« ПретходнаНастави »