who take and hold as purchasers directly | constituted heirs. Held, that the term "lawfrom testator. Smith v. Ellington-Guy Timber Co., 71 S. E. 445, 446, 155 N. C. 389. Under a will giving all the testator's land to his son for life with remainder to his "lawful heirs born of his wife," the son did not take a fee under the rule in Shelley's Case so as to give his widow a dower therein. The words "born of his wife," qualifying and explaining his "lawful heirs," confining the remainder to the children of his wife, and preventing the operation of the rule. The superadded words show that the devisor intended to make the words "lawful heirs" designatio personarum; that is, they show an intention on his part to limit the remainder over to a particular class of heirs. Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514. fully constituted heirs" was merely a tautological way of referring to his lawful heirs at his death; and that the grantee took a life estate, with remainder to those who should comprise the class known as the grantee's heirs at his death. Bradley v. Goff, 147 S. W. 1012, 1014, 243 Mo. 95. A testator gave his wife, for life, all of his estate, and provided that after her death it should go to his eldest daughter for life. He then declared that after the daughter's death such portion of his estate as might remain should be equally divided between his lawful heirs. Held, that the testator meant by the term "lawful heirs" those persons who at his death were entitled to inherit his intestate real estate. In re Cowley's Will, 97 N. W. 930, 931, 120 Wis. 263. LAWFUL ISSUE See Die Without Lawful Issue Surviving. Testatrix adopted defendant in 1890, but, aside from recording of the deed, no public recognition of the relationship appears, testatrix having assumed no authority over defendant who continued to reside with her The term "lawful issue" is not a techninatural parents and other relatives until her cal term, and when used in a deed does not marriage. In 1905 testatrix made a will giv- necessarily bring the deed under the rule in ing defendant, who was designated "my Shelley's Case, like the word "heirs," which young friend," $100. After various other is always a technical word, necessarily bringdispositions, the will provided that the resi-ing the deed under the rule regardless of indue of the estate should go to testatrix's tention. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 114 S. W. 673, "lawful heirs," excepting specified nephews. 676. Held, that defendant is not entitled to share under the residuary clause. Warden V. Overman, 135 N. W. 649, 652, 155 Iowa, 1. Where a testator devises a parcel of real estate to his son for life with remainder to his lawful heirs, and the son marries after the death of the testator, held, that upon the death of the son, the wife takes as heir, where there is nothing in the will tending to show that the testator used the words "law ful heirs" in a different sense from their strict technical import. Miller v. Miller, 29 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 451, 454. In a devise to the testator's grandson of a tract of land, and if he should die without "lawful heirs of his body" then to the testator's granddaughter, does not limit the estate of the grandson to a life estate where he had heirs of his body, but merely creates a conditional estate in the granddaughter by way of executory devise or shifting use. Sessoms v. Sessoms, 56 S. E. 687, 688, 144 N. C. 121 (citing Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284; Morrisett v. Stevens, 48 S. E. 661, 136 N. C. 160; Jones v. Ragsdale, 53 S. E. 842, 141 N. C. 200; Whitfield v. Garris, 42 S. E. 568, 131 N. C. 148, reaffirmed in 45 S. E. 904, 134 N. C. 24; criticising Bird v. Gilliam, 28 S. E. 489, 121 N. C. 328; Dawson v. Quinnerly, 24 S. E. 483, 118 N. C. 188; Thompson Crump, 50 S. E. 457, 138 N. C. 32, 107 Am. St. Rep. 514). V. A grantor executed a deed to his son, granting the property to him during his natural life, and at his death, then to his lawfully As children born in wedlock After death of testator and probate of his will, devising land in New York to B. for life, and on his death to his "lawful issue," Acts Mich. 1881, p. 48, No. 55, and Laws N. Y. 1895, p. 313, c. 531, declaring that the subsequent marriage of the parents shall legitimatize their children previously born, B. had a lawful wife, M., by whom he had were passed. Prior to either act, and while children, he had children by another woman, S., and, after enactment of the Michigan act, he, in an action in that state in which jurisdiction was not acquired of M., a resident of New York, and on grounds not recognized by the laws of New York for divorce, obtained a decree of divorce; and thereafter in Michigan there was a marriage ceremony between him and S. Subsequently, in an action in New York by M. against B. for separation, there was a decree establishing the fact that M. was still the wife of B., notwithstanding the Michigan decree. Held, that B.'s children by S. were not entitled to take under the will. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 83 N. E. 569, 190 N. Y. 458, 128 Am. St. Rep. 585. Under the rule that, where statutes can Civ. reasonably be construed to avoid conflict, at law, and section 1387, providing that every illegitimate child is an heir to the person who, in writing signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father of such child, and in all cases is an heir of his mother, and inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock, will be held not to be in conflict in the case, where both the mother and child are illegitimate, on the ground that section 1387 makes the child the heir of his mother, while section 1388, taken alone, excludes him, but section 1387, which has to do solely with the right of illegitimates to inherit, will be construed as applicable only to inheritance by an illegitimate from a parent who is legitimate, or, for purposes of inheritance, the illegitimate child by reason of section 1387 is to be held to be within the terms "lawful issue," as that term is used in section 1388. In re De Cigaran's Estate, 89 Pac. 833, 835, 150 Cal. 682. Where the father of defendants at the time of their birth was the lawful husband of another woman than their mother, but thereafter, in Michigan, obtained a divorce legal in that state, though not in the state of New York, and married their mother thereby establishing their legitimacy in that state, under Act Mich. March 28, 1881 (Pub. Acts 1881, p. 48, No. 55), they are entitled in New York to take under a devise to "the lawful issue" of their father. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1019, 1020, 118 App. Div. 69. A will, dated and which took effect in 1872, gave property in trust for the testator's son, with remainder to his "lawful issue." The son was then married and had children. After the death of his then wife, he married the mother of certain illegitimate children. Laws 1895, c. 531, providing that illegitimate children whose parents had theretofore intermarried or should thereafter intermarry should thereby become legitimatized. Held, that the illegitimate children were not entitled to share in the remainder, since, while all children, whether legitimate or not, are the "issue" of their parents, that word, when qualified by the adjective "lawful," which is the antithesis of unlawful or illegitimate, is ordinarily understood to mean those only begotten and born in lawful wedlock, and it cannot be assumed that the testator considered the contingencies of the birth of illegitimate children, the enactment of a statute by which they might be legitimatized, and the marriage of their parents. Central Trust Co. of New York v. Skillin, 138 N. Y. Supp. 884, 886, 154 App. Div. 227. As descendants The words "lawful issue, if any, of the body," mean lineal descendants, taking by right of representation per stirpes. Union Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dudley, 72 Atl. 166, 169, 104 Me. 297. The primary meaning of "lawful issue" is descendants, and, in the absence of the use of the words in a will in another sense, it will be so construed. Under a residuary bequest to testator's stepmother and half-sister, in equal portions, and, in the event of either dying without issue, the share of the one so dying to the survivor, the stepmother dying before testator, he does not die intestate as to the share given, but there is an implied bequest of it to her issue. In re Disney's Will, 103 N. Y. Supp. 391, 392, 118 App. Div. 378 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238; Chwatal v. Schreiner, 43 N. E. 166, 148 N. Y. 683). Under a will, establishing a trust fund for the benefit of a daughter of the testatrix during her life, and directing that on her death the principal be paid to her then "lawful living issue," the term "lawful living issue" does not include an adopted daughter. In re Hopkins, 89 N. Y. Supp. 467, 468, 43 Misc. Rep. 464 (citing New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Where testator by will devised his property in trust for his wife, on her death to be divided among his lawful issue, and gave the same to the persons entitled to the other half of his residuary estate, and by a clause disposing of such half testator provided that it should go to the lawful issue of his children or to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per limit the phrase "lawful issue" in the first capita, it was the intent of the testator to clause to the lawful issue of his children, or Atl. 630, 633, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. to his lawful issue. Inglis v. McCook, 59 "The words 'lawful issue,' when used in a domestic will, primarily and generally mean descendants. Where there is nothing to the contrary to be found in the context of the instrument, or in extraneous facts proper to be considered, that is the sense in which they are presumed to be used. The real question * is whether the testatrix used them in that sense or in some other sense. In giving construction to the words used by the testatrix in a domestic will, we cannot assume, without the clearest evidence, that she used the words 'lawful issue' in the sense they might possibly bear under the laws of a foreign country in which she died." In re Tenney, 93 N. Y. Supp. 811, 818, 104 App. Div. 290 (quoting and adopting definition in New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 55 N. E. 311, 161 N. Y. 19, 20, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238). Testator's will directed that his estate be divided into as many parts as he had children, the income of each part to go to a child for life, and upon the child's death the part to be divided among the "lawful issue" of the child. At the time the will was exe- | carrying "lawful merchandise." Dene Shipcuted several of the testator's children were ping Co. v. Tweedie Trading Co., 143 Fed. married and had children. Held, that the 854, 855, 74 C. C. A. 606. daughters of a deceased daughter and a grandchild of such daughter took equally under the clause "lawful issue"; that phrase being equivalent to "descendants." Phelps v. Cameron, 96 N. Y. Supp. 1014, 1016, 109 App. Div. 798. Testator gave one half of his residuary estate to trustees for the use of his wife for life, and on her death to divide the same among his lawful issue, or to trustees for their use as his wife should direct by will. In default of such will, he gave the same to LAWFUL MONEY See Lawful Currency. The term "lawful money," in an indictment charging "larceny" of certain money being "lawful money" of the United States, means money as commonly understood and includes bank notes. State v. Finnegean, 103 N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286, 4 Ann. Cas. 628. "Lawful money" means money which passes from hand to hand and from person to person and circulates through the community, and is synonymous with "current money." Lawful money is that which is usu persons then entitled to the other half of his residuary estate, to be distributed and held on the same trusts and in the same propor-ally used as a medium of exchange. State v. tions as were mentioned in another clause of Quackenbush, 108 N. W. 953, 955, 98 Minn. his will. Held, that the term "lawful issue" includes not only children but descendants. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. Where the phrase "lawful issue" is used in a will, if it clearly appears that it was used in a particular meaning, the phrase may be restricted to children then living, or to children then living and to the representatives of any deceased child. Inglis v. McCook, 59 Atl. 630, 635, 68 N. J. Eq. 27. Testator gave property to trustees in trust, with directions to pay the net income to his three children for life; the trust to continue as long as any of the children lived. He provided that, if any of his children should die without lawful issue, the surviving children should have his share, and if any of the children should die, leaving lawful issue, the child so surviving should take the share of the income which the deceased parent would have taken, had he survived, and on the termination of the trust the property should vest in the surviving lawful issue of testator's children. Held, that words "lawful issue" meant children, and included only the lawful children of testator's children in being at the time of their death. Brisbin v. Huntington, 103 N. W. 144, 147, 128 Iowa, 166, 5 Ann. Cas. 931. 515. LAWFUL OBSTRUCTIONS Although the grass plats and shade trees along the sidewalk may be "obstructions," yet when ample width is left to answer the demands of travel they are obstructions that serve a useful purpose and are not inconsistent with the object for which streets are made and maintained. Like a fence, a hydrant, a hitching post, telephone or telegraph poles, they are "lawful obstructions," and a wire stretched around a grass and tree plat in a street for the protection of the plat is not such an obstruction as to render the city liable for injuries received by one who tripped and fell over such wire; the wire being in plain sight of pedestrians passing along the street. Teague v. City of Bloomington, 81 N. E. 103, 104, 40 Ind. App. 68 (citing Lostutter v. City of Aurora, 26 N. E. 184, 126 Ind. 436, 12 L. R. A. 259; City of Vincennes v. Spees, 74 N. E. 277, 35 Ind. App. 389; Weinstein v. City of Terre Haute, 46 N. E. 1004, 147 Ind. 556). LAWFUL ORDER Interstate Commerce Act, 16, relating · to the authority of a commerce commission, provides with respect to proceedings at law in a Circuit Court of the United States in case of the disregard of a "lawful order" of As words of purchase The words "lawful issue" in a deed are the commission, the finding of facts of the words of purchase and not of limitation. Lacey v. Floyd, 87 S. W. 665, 667, 99 Tex. 112. Where a deed conveyed land to the grantee and his wife and to the legitimate heirs of the grantee, and in case of no "lawful issue" then over, the words "lawful issue" mean legitimate heirs and are words of purchase. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. E. 1012, 1013, 35 Ind. App. 662. LAWFUL MERCHANDISE Asphalt is "lawful merchandise" in a charter for West Indian trade, which provides that the vessel shall be employed in commission shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated. The court says that the phrase "lawful order" implies more than the exercise of mere jurisdictional power or authority. "The words lawful order' mean an order the commission has jurisdiction to make. An order may be lawful and at the same time erroneous, so that if the commission made an order in a matter over which they had judisdiction, which was merely an error of judgment as to precisely the degree of reparation, for instance, the carrier ought to make, the order would still be lawful." Western New York & P. R. Co. Under County Government Act Cal. 1897 (St. 1897, p. 458) § 25, subd. 35, authorizing a board of supervisors to grant franchises along and over the public roads and highways for all "lawful purposes," upon such terms and conditions as in their judgment may be necessary and proper, the authority of the board has relation to the purposes for which a highway is dedicated, and is limited by the uses, primary and incidental, to which under the law a highway is devoted; the "lawful purpose" must be consistent with the character and in furtherance of the design of the easement which the public has in and to the highways. The only right which the public has in and to the highways is to use it for the purpose of traveling over it without obstruction or interference; and the control which the board of supervisors can lawfully exercise must have in view the promotion of that use, and cannot extend be travel. A grant by a county board of supervisors of a franchise to erect poles and string electric wires thereon, along and over the public highway of a county for the purpose of lighting the highway, is an incident to the contemplated use of such highway, and is for a "lawful purpose," and it is immaterial that the lighting was in part used for private purposes. Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 94 Pac. 858, 860, 7 Cal App. 534. County Government Act 1897 (St. 1897, p. 466) § 25, subd. 35, authorizes county supervisors to grant franchises over the public roads and highways for all "lawful pur-yond whatever is necessary to facilitate poses" on such terms and conditions as, in their judgment, may be necessary and proper, and in such manner as to present the least possible obstruction and inconvenience to the traveling public. Held, that the words "lawful purposes," as so used, should be construed as limited to purposes in aid of the public's easement of travel, something which would promote the public comfort and convenience in the use of the highway; and hence such act did not authorize a county board of supervisors to grant a franchise to an electric power company to erect its power line along a highway, the title to the soil of which is not in the abutting property owners, for the primary purpose of furnishing light and power to private individuals, without rendering compensation to such abutting owners. Gurnsey V. Northern California Power Co., 117 Pac. 906, 909, 160 Cal. 699, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185. The payment of a debt by a county which the Legislature has authorized is a "lawful purpose," for the issuing of bonds as authorized by County Law, § 12 (Laws 1892, p. 1746, c. 686), giving to boards of supervisors the power to borrow money on the credit of the county. County of Ontario v. Shepard, 91 N. Y. Supp. 611, 614, 100 App. Div. 200. A "lawful purpose" which will excuse one for carrying a concealed weapon is "a lawful purpose that was specific, and, in a sense, temporary. For example, if a person should buy a deadly weapon at a store, and put it in his pocket for the purpose of taking it home; or if a person should find a deadly weapon, and place it in his pocket for the purpose of keeping it only till he could restore it to the owner, or make some other disposition of it-such person would not be carrying a deadly weapon concealed within the meaning of said act." State v. Iannucci (Del.) 55 Atl. 336, 337, 4 Pennewill, 193. The words "lawful purposes," in the New York statute providing that no corporation shall issue either stock or bonds except for money, labor, or property actually received for the use and lawful purposes of such corporation, are general in character, but would seem to mean such property as would be germane to, or connected with, the business purposes of the corporation, as defined in its charter or articles of incorporation. Corporate bonds cannot be issued for the consideration of a note which is never collected. In re Waterloo Organ Co., 134 Fed. 341, 343, 67 C. C. A. 255. LAWFUL REASONS See Good and Lawful Reasons Where a bank which paid money into the state treasury as taxes, supposing that it had the right to do so, in lieu of county and city taxes, delayed for more than two years to make application to the auditor to issue his warrant for the repayment of the money, relying upon a decision of the Court of Appeals to the effect that such payments by other banks similarly situated were proper, it lost the right to demand such a warrant, though that decision was overruled after the lapse of the two years, as the decision was not a "lawful restraint," within Ky. St. § 2544, providing that, in all cases where the doing of an act necessary to save any right or benefit is restrained or superseded by in- |forceable as a contract to lease; the words junction or other "lawful restraint," the "lawfully authorized" in paragraph 2696 not time covered by the injunction or restraint meaning an authorization in writing. Murshall not be estimated in the application of phey v. Brown, 100 Pac. 801, 804, 12 Ariz. any statute of limitations. Bank of Com- 268. merce of Louisville v. Stone, 56 S. W. 683, 684, 108 Ky. 427. LAWFUL RESTRICTIONS The "lawful restrictions" authorized by P. L. 1893, p. 302 (Gen. St. p. 3235), providing for the granting of a location for street railway tracks subject to restrictions, refer to restrictions that are to be made in the interest of the public and indicate a legislative act in granting a location. An ordinance granting a location may contain restrictions in the form of covenants requiring the street railway company to pave the streets in which the tracks are laid, and such restrictions are obligatory on any subsequent purchaser of the street railway tracks and franchises, even without an express assumption. Borough of Rutherford v. Hudson River Traction Co., 63 Atl. 84, 88, 73 N. J. Law, 227. LAWFUL USE An instruction, in an action for the death of an automobilist struck by a car, that the street railway company must use reasonable care to operate its cars on public streets with regard to "the lawful and customary use" of the streets by others, and that if, at the time decedent was killed, the company was not operating the car with regard to "the lawful and customary use" of the streets, but negligently operated the car, it was liable, is not erroneous as referring to the extent of travel, of which there was no evidence, but refers to the use of the street by the public; the word "lawful" meaning according to law as distinguished from an unlawful use and the word "customary" meaning according to usage and referring to the mode of using the streets. Smiley v. East St. Louis & S. Ry. Co., 100 N. E. 157, 158, 256 Ill. 482. LAWFUL WEDLOCK See Same as Lawful Wedlock. LAWFULLY AUTHORIZED Under Civ. Code 1901, pars. 721, 725, 732, 2696, providing that no estate in land for a term of more than one year shall be conveyed, except by an instrument in writing subscribed by the party, "or by his agent thereunto authorized in writing," prohibiting actions on any lease for more than one year, unless in writing and signed by the party to be charged, "or by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized," a lease for more than a year, signed by one of the parties and by a person verbally authorized by the other party, but not acknowledged by either, is not a valid lease, but is not within the prohibition in paragraph 2696, and is en 3 WDS.& P.2D SER.-4 LAWFULLY BEGOTTEN See Heirs Lawfully Begotten. LAWFULLY CLAIMING POSSESSION Civ. Code, § 1927, provides that agreements of letting upon hire bind the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring against all persons lawfully claiming the same. Defendant on August 29, 1906, leased to plaintiff for 22 months, to commence January 21, 1907, certain land. P. A. was in possession of the land under lawful lease from the owners, and it was determined in litigation to oust him that he was entitled to possession until March 6, 1907. Plaintiff had been a tenant of P. A. but his lease expired in November, 1906, but he was permitted by P. A. to occupy a house but instructed by P. A. not to farm the land. He did farm the land and gave defendant his share of the crops as rental under the lease commencing January 1, 1907. During January and February, 1907, P. A.'s cattle got upon the land and did damage to the plaintiff's crop. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to damages from defendant as for breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, as P. A.'s act was the act of one lawfully claiming possession. Agoure v. Lewis, 113 Pac. 882, 884, 15 Cal. App. 71. LAWFULLY NATURALIZED In Rev. St. § 1994, providing that any woman married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen, the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" limits the section to a woman lawfully within the country, her own capacity independent of her marital status, being essential to citizenship; so that where an alien married woman was not entitled to enter the country under the immigration regulations, because of a contagious disease, the naturalization of her husband would not make her a citizen entitled to enter, under the statute. In re Rustigian, 165 Fed. 980, 982. LAWYER As laborer, see Laborer. As learned in the law, see Learned in As member of learned profession, see A "lawyer" is one skilled in the law, while an "attorney" is an officer in a court of justice who is employed by a party in a cause to manage it for him. A law student fresh from his school and not a licensed of |