Opinion of the Court.

276 U.S.

Held, that the right of action for his death was controlled by the state, and not by the maritime, law, since, though the death occurred in the water, the occurrence which was the sole, immediate and proximate cause of it and gave rise to the cause of action, was on the wharf, which was to be deemed an extension of the land. P. 181.

5 La. Ct. App. 284, affirmed.

ERROR to a judgment of the Court of Appeal of Louisiana affirming a recovery under the state workmen's compensation law. The Supreme Court of the State denied a writ of certiorari.

Mr. John May, with whom Mr. Edmund L. Jones was on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Eugie V. Parham, with whom Mr. Edward Rightor was on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

March 12, 1925, plaintiff in error, a stevedoring corporation, was unloading a vessel lying in the Mississippi at a dock in New Orleans. George Taylor was in its employ as a longshoreman and came to his death while engaged in that work. Defendant in error is his widow and brought this suit in the Civil District Court of Orleans Parish under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law* to recover compensation for herself and children. The district court gave judgment for them; the Court of Appeal affirmed; and its presiding judge, after the state Supreme Court had denied a writ of certiorari, allowed the writ of error that brings the case here.

Plaintiff in error maintained below and here insists that this is a case exclusively within the admiralty and mari

* Act 20 of 1914 as amended by Act 243 of 1916, Act 38 of 1918, Acts 234, 244 and 247 of 1920, Act 43 of 1922 and Acts 21 and 216 of 1924.

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Opinion of the Court.

time jurisdiction, and that, while the state Compensation Law is broad enough to apply to longshoremen unloading vessels, its application in this case violates § 2 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" and also that clause of § 8 of Art. 1 which authorizes Congress to make laws for carrying into effect the powers granted by the Constitution.

At the time of the accident, cargo was being hoisted out of the hold to deck skids and thence swung to trucks operated upon a stage that rested solely upon the wharf and projected a few feet over the water to or near the side of the vessel. The petition of defendant in error alleged, and she introduced evidence to show, that deceased was standing on the stage when a sling, loaded with five sacks of soda weighing 200 pounds each, was being lowered over the side by means of a winch on the vessel; that the sling was swinging back and forth and, while deceased was trying to catch and steady it, the sling struck him and knocked him off the stage into the water where sometime later he was found dead. At the trial plaintiff in error maintained that deceased was not struck but accidentally fell into the river. The issues were decided in favor of defendant in error and the evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the finding.

Deceased was engaged in maritime work under a maritime contract. If the cause of action arose upon the river, the rights of the parties are controlled by maritime law, the case is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the application of the Louisiana Compensation Law violated § 2 of Art. 3. But, if the cause of action arose upon the land, the state law is applicable. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 33; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 59; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149; Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219. Plain

tiff in error concedes that the stage and wharf on which deceased was working are to be deemed an extension of the land (Cleveland Terminal R. R. v. Steamship Co., 208 U. S. 316, 321; Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U. S. 263, 275) and that the state law would apply if he had been injured or killed by falling on the landing-place. It argues that as no claim was made for injuries sustained while deceased was on land and as the suit was solely for death that occurred in the river, the case is exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction. But this is a partial view that cannot be sustained. The blow by the sling was what gave rise to the cause of action. It was given and took effect while deceased was upon the land. It was the sole, immediate and proximate cause of his death. The G. R. Booth, 171 U. S. 450, 460. The substance and consummation of the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action took place on land. The Plymouth, supra. This case cannot be distinguished from Johnson v. Chicago Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388, 397 or Martin v. West, 222 U. S. 191, 196, The contention of plaintiff in error is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY v. TOWN OF MORRISTOWN ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 147. Argued January 6, 9, 1928.-Decided February 20, 1928. The railroad company constructed a driveway over its station grounds to connect with the streets of the town. The railroad and the town agreed that the driveway should be kept open and that the town should exercise upon the station grounds, etc., all necessary police powers for the regulation of traffic and for the enforcement of the railroad's rules and regulations. The railroad granted a

182

Argument for Petitioner.

cabman exclusive right to solicit passengers and baggage in the station grounds and to park his vehicles in the driveway. The town (claiming the right so to do under the contract) declared the space so assigned by the railroad a public hackstand and prohibited parking elsewhere. Other cabmen thereupon entered the grounds and used that space. The railroad objected on the ground that its property was being taken for municipal purposes without compensation. Held:

1. The taking of private property for public use is against the common right, and authority so to do must be clearly expressed. The agreement does not empower the town to establish a public hackstand on the company's land. P. 192.

2. Assuming that the creation of a public hackstand upon the -station grounds would be a proper exertion of the police power, the due process clause safeguards to the owner of the land just compensation for the use of its property. P. 193.

3. As against those not using it for purposes of transportation, the railroad is private property in every legal sense, and if any part of its land is capable of use that does not interfere with discharge of its obligations as a carrier, the railroad has the right to use or permit others so to use it for any lawful purpose. P. 194.

4. A railroad is not bound to permit persons having no business with it to enter its trains, station or grounds to solicit trade or patronage for themselves, and the grant of such privilege to one does not give rise to any duty to others. P. 194.

5. Tó compel the use of railroad station grounds for public hackstands without compensation is to take them in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 195. 14 F. (2d) 257, reversed; District Court affirmed.

CERTIORARI, 273 U. S. 686, to a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed a decree of permanent injunction, and directed dismissal of the bill in a suit by the railroad against the town and a number of taxicab men, to prevent the use of its land for the parking of vehicles and enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance designating part of it as a public hackstand.

Mr. John W. Davis, with whom Mr: M. M. Stallman was on the brief, for petitioner.

Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the ordinance are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment because they take petitioner's

Argument for Petitioner.

276 U.S.

property without due process of law. It is not necessary, in order to render the ordinance vulnerable to constitutional attack, that it must in terms or effect authorize an absolute conversion of property, so long as it affects the free use and enjoyment of the property or the power of disposition at the will of the owner. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166; Penna. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393; Great Northern Rwy. v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340.

While the municipality has not in terms deprived petitioner of the title to its lands in establishing the hack stand thereon and in prohibiting the use of other parts of its property for parking space for private vehicles and taxicabs, it has deprived petitioner of the right to use the land according to its own plans, purposes and requirements. The property of a railroad company cannot be taken or appropriated, under the guise of regulation, except for a purpose within the statutory duties of the carrier. Great Northern Rwy. v. Minnesota, supra; Great Northern Rwy. v. Cahill, 253 U. S. 71.

Taxicab service is no part of the business of petitioner, and it cannot be compelled to furnish land for a public hack stand under the guise of an exercise of the police power. Great Northern Rwy. v. Minnesota, supra; Id. v. Cahill, supra.

As to the cab drivers, they have no right to make use of the company's premises, and such a right cannot be conferred upon them by a municipal ordinance. Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279; Thompson's Express Co. v. Mount, 91 N. J. Eq. 497. Cf. Welsh v. Morristown, 98 N. J. L. 630. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp'n, 248 U. S. 372; Producers Transportation Co. v. R. R. Comm., 251 U. S. 228; and Wolff v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, distinguished.