Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. sion furnished the President-a case to which this Court gave the fullest consideration nearly forty years ago. In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 680, the third section of the Act of October 1, 1890, contained this provision: "That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries producing the following articles, and for this purpose, on and after the first day of January, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, whenever, and so often as the President shall be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, raw and uncured, or any of such articles, imposes duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides into the United States he may deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of such sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the production of such country, for such time as he shall deem just, and in such case and during such suspension duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon sugar, molasses, coffee, tea and hides, the product of or exported from such designated country as follows, namely: " Then followed certain rates of duty to be imposed. It was contended that this section delegated to the President both legislative and treaty-making powers and was unconstitutional. After an examination of all the authorities, the Court said that while Congress could not delegate legislative power to the President, this Act did not in any real sense invest the President with the power of legislation, because nothing involving the expediency or just operation of such legislation was left to the determination of the President; that the legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What 394 Opinion of the Court. the President was required to do was merely in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. Second. The second objection to § 315 is that the declared plan of Congress, either expressly or by clear implication, formulates its rule to guide the President and his advisory Tariff Commission as one directed to a tariff system of protection that will avoid damaging competition to the country's industries by the importation of goods from other countries at too low a rate to equalize foreign and domestic competition in the markets of the United States. It is contended that the only power of Congress in the levying of customs duties is to create revenue, and that it is unconstitutional to frame the customs duties with any other view than that of revenue raising. It undoubtedly is true that during the political life of this country there has been much discussion between parties as to the wisdom of the policy of protection, and we may go further and say as to its constitutionality, but no historian, whatever his view of the wisdom of the policy of protection, would contend that Congress, since the first revenue Act, in 1789, has not assumed that it was within its power in making provision for the collection of revenue, to put taxes upon importations and to vary the subjects of such taxes or rates in an effort to encourage the growth of the industries of the Nation by protecting home production against foreign competition. It is enough to point out that the second act adopted by the Congress of the United States, July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24, contained the following recital. "SEC. 1. Whereas it is necessary for the support of government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement and protection of manu Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. factures, that duties be laid on goods, wares and merchandises imported: Be it enacted, etc." In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 175, and cases cited. The enactment and enforcement of a number of customs revenue laws drawn with a motive of maintaining a system of protection, since the revenue law of 1789, are matters of history. More than a hundred years later, the titles of the Tariff Acts of 1897 and 1909 declared the purpose of those acts, among other things, to be that of encouraging the industries of the United States. The title of the Tariff Act of 1922, of which § 315 is a part, is "An Act to provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the industries of the United States and for other purposes." Whatever we may think of the wisdom of a protection policy, we can not hold it unconstitutional. So long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in the selection of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate Congressional action. As we said in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38: "Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them, and with the incidental motive of discouraging them by making their continuance onerous. They do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental motive." 394 Statement of the Case. And so here, the fact that Congress declares that one of its motives in fixing the rates of duty is so to fix them that they shall encourage the industries of this country in the competition with producers in other countries in the sale of goods in this country, can not invalidate a revenue act so framed. Section 315 and its provisions are within the power of Congress. The judgment of the Court of Customs Appeals is affirmed. CASEY v. UNITED STATES. Affirmed. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 500. Argued January 11, 1928. Decided April 9, 1928. 1. Where evidence in a criminal trial tends to prove inferentially that the offence was within the venue, and supplementary evidence on that point might be produced if attention were called to it, objection that the venue has not been established should be made specifically and not rested upon a general request to direct a verdict for want of sufficient evidence. P. 417. 2. Section 1 of the Anti-Narcotic Act in providing that absence of the required stamps from any of the drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of the section by the person in whose possession such drugs are found, is merely a regulation of the burden of proof. P. 418. 3. This provision is constitutional as applied to a person charged with unlawful purchase of morphine who possessed the drug under circumstances warranting suspicion. P. 418. 4. Upon the evidence in this case, the court, acting on its own motion, would not be justified in deciding that the Government induced the crime. P. 418. 5. The amended Anti-Narcotic Act, as applied to this case, is within the power of Congress. P. 420. 20 F. (2d) 752, affirmed in part. CERTIORARI, 275 U. S. 517, to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming a conviction under the Anti Argument for Petitioner. 276 U.S. Narcotic Act. The affirmance here is on the first count of the indictment, charging unlawful purchase. The second count, charging sales, was also upheld below, but in this Court was conceded to be bad by the Government. Mr. John T. Casey for petitioner. Count 1 does not state facts sufficient to show a violation. There is no allegation that petitioner failed to purchase the 3.4 grains of morphine " from a registered dealer in pursuance of a prescription." Interstate and interdistrict travel and communication are so constant and universal, that to presume that morphine was purchased in the district where it is found in one's possession would be irrational. The conclusion reached by the Circuit Court of Appeals on this point in opposition to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits should be reversed. Mere possession of 3.4 grains of morphine, even if admitted, would not constitute a violation of the Art, whether the venue is included or not. The presumption is made only against dealers who are required to register and pay the special tax. It being now conceded that defendant is not such a person, an unlawful purchase cannot be presumed against him even if he possessed the small amount of morphine charged in Count 1. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 864; Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5; Johnson v. United States, 294 Fed. 753; Lewis v. United States, 295 Fed. 678; Hampton v. Wong Ging, 299 Fed. 289; Lamento v. United States, 4 F. (2d) 901. There is no legitimate or believable evidence of possession, upon which to presume a purchase, either lawful or unlawful. It is the truth that defendant never possessed a single grain of morphine in his life. The Harrison Act is unconstitutional. Linder case, 268 U. S. 5. It was conceded by the government in the Jin Fuey Moy case, 241 U. S. 394, that it was passed for the purpose of carrying out the recommendations of the |