The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United StatesM. Walter Dunne, 1901 - 427 страница |
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Страница 9
... depend for their political constitu- tions on accident and force . If there be any truth in the remark , the crisis at which we are arrived may with pro- priety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made ; and a wrong ...
... depend for their political constitu- tions on accident and force . If there be any truth in the remark , the crisis at which we are arrived may with pro- priety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made ; and a wrong ...
Страница 81
... depend for the means of revenue chiefly on such duties . In most parts of it , excises must be confined within a narrow compass . The genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws . The pockets ...
... depend for the means of revenue chiefly on such duties . In most parts of it , excises must be confined within a narrow compass . The genius of the people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of excise laws . The pockets ...
Страница 128
... depend- ent possessions ; by the mutual aid they stand in need of , for suppressing insurrections and rebellions , an aid ex- pressly stipulated and often required and afforded ; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent pro ...
... depend- ent possessions ; by the mutual aid they stand in need of , for suppressing insurrections and rebellions , an aid ex- pressly stipulated and often required and afforded ; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent pro ...
Страница 133
... depend on the contingencies of the moment . Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assump- tions of power , called for , on pressing exigencies , by a defective constitution , than out of the full exercise of the largest ...
... depend on the contingencies of the moment . Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assump- tions of power , called for , on pressing exigencies , by a defective constitution , than out of the full exercise of the largest ...
Страница 137
... depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head . Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the peo- ple , there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional ...
... depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this head . Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of the peo- ple , there is the less pretense for the use of violent remedies in partial or occasional ...
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admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointed articles of Confederation authority body branch Britain circumstances citizens civil list commerce common confederacies Congress Connecticut consideration considered convention councils danger defense degree duties effect elections equal eral ernment established executive exercise existing experience extent faction favor February 19 federal government FEDERALIST force foreign former greater Greece HAMILTON important Independent Journal individual influence instances interest jealousy judiciary departments lative latter laws legislative legislature less liberty Lycurgus Macedon MADISON means ment military militia Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity objects particular parties passions peace persons political possess principle probable proper proportion proposed Constitution provision PUBLIUS reason regulation render representation representatives republic republican require requisite respect revenue Rhode Island Senate situation society South Carolina Sparta spirit stadtholder sufficient supposed taxation taxes tion treaties Union United usurpation York Packet
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Страница 327 - When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.
Страница 61 - The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the Government.
Страница 59 - By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
Страница 304 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Страница 329 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Страница 168 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Страница 65 - Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will* have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens...
Страница 325 - No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded; The accumulation of all powers Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or manj% and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Страница 261 - And whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present confederation, as a means to remedy which, several of the States, and particularly the State of New York, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a Convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such Convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States, a firm national government.
Страница 56 - Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound.