"The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust discrimination in the rendition of like services under similar circumstances and conditions; to prevent undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations, or localities; to prohibit greater compensation being charged for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line; and to abolish combinations for the pooling of freights. It was not designed, however, to prevent competition between different roads, or to interfere with the customary arrangements made by railway companies for reduced fares in consideration of increased mileage, where such reduction did not operate as an unjust discrimination against other persons traveling over the road. In other words, it was not intended to ignore the principle that one can sell at wholesale cheaper than at retail. It is not all discriminations or preferences that fall within the inhibition of the statute; only such as are unjust or unreasonable. For instance, it would be obviously unjust to charge A a greater sum than B for a single trip from Washington to Pittsburg; but, if A agrees not only to go, but to return by the same route, it is no injustice to B to permit him to do so for a reduced fare, since the services are not alike, nor the circumstances and conditions substantially similar. Indeed, the possibility of just discriminations and reasonable preferences is recognized by the Act, in declaring what shall be deemed unjust." In applying these principles it was held that it was not a violation of the Act for a railroad company to sell a party rate ticket covering the transportation of ten or more persons, from one place to another, at less than the regular passenger rates for such passage, because such a sale did not operate to the prejudice of a single passenger, and all railroads had the same right to issue them to compete for the same traffic.23 It has further been held by the United States Supreme Court that an allowance for cartage made by a railroad company to a shipper who had no siding connection with that line-although he had such connection with another competing line-was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act prohibiting rebates and special 23 Interstate Com. Comm. v. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, (1892). rates, when a similar allowance was not made to another person who shipped goods over the same line under the same circumstances, except that he had no siding connection with either road.24 And it was further held that the furnishing of free cartage for delivery of goods at one town but not at another, to which the same rates were charged for a shorter haul, was not an unjust discrimination in rates. § 66. Basis of Proper Discrimination. Common carriers whether engaged in interstate commerce or that wholly within a State, are performing a public service. They are usually endowed by the State with the right of eminent domain, and are so endowed to enable them more effectually to carry out the public service they undertake to render. As a consequence of this all individuals have equal rights, both in respect to service and charges. Such equality of right, however, does not prevent differences in the modes and kinds of service, and different charges based thereon. There is no cast iron rule of uniformity which prevents a charge from being above or below a particular sum, or requires that the service shall be exactly along the same lines. The principle of equality forbids any difference in charge which is not based upon difference of service. Any difference in charge must have some reasonable relation to the amount of difference in service, and can not be so great as to amount to an unjust discrimination.25 Where A and B were both dealers in coal in the same market, the giving of a reduced rate to A was held to be an unjust discrimination.26 A railroad company has no power to designate who shall deliver freight to it. It thereby places an additional burden upon the shippers. In a case where a railroad corporation owning a dock refused to receive coal on its cars at said dock from a canal boat, unless the owners of the canal boat would employ certain shovelers furnished by the railroad company at a price 24 Wight v. U. S., 167 U. S. 512, (1897). 25 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92, (1901). 26 Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 182, (1889). fixed by the company, to shovel the coal on board of the canal boat into tubs belonging to the company, which were then to be hoisted by means of a derrick on the dock and the coal dumped into the cars; it was held that such was an unreasonable requirement and could not be enforced by the railroad company,27 because it burdened shippers with a charge in addition to the freight rate. § 67. Common Law as to Discrimination. At common law a common carrier was always entitled to a reasonable compensation for his services, hence it follows that he is not required to treat all those who patronize him with absolute equality. It is his privilege to charge less than a fair compensation to one person, or to a class of persons, and others cannot justly complain as long as he carries on reasonable terms for them. Respecting preferences in rates of compensation his obligation is to charge no more than a fair return in each particular transaction, and except as thus restricted, he is free to discriminate at his pleasure. This is equal justice to all which is all that the common law expects from the common carrier in his relation to the public. § 68. Discrimination under Statutes. Railroad companies are engaged in a business in which the public are interested, and the duties and obligations growing out of it may be enforced through the courts and the legislative power. These duties are to a great extent regulated by statute in most of the States, and so far as they enter into the business of interstate commerce by an Act of Congress, railroad companies regulated by the principles of common law, were required to carry for all persons who applied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the particular station, and their charges for transportation were required to be reasonable, and by weight of authority their charges were required to be equal to all persons for similar services. To prevent discrimination and to secure uniformity of rates, and fix reasonable charges, statutes have been passed in most of the States providing means for the 27 3182 Tons of Coal, 14 Blatchford 453, 23 Fed. Cas. 1163, (1877, 1878). investigation and control of railroads, as to their various duties to the public. Permissible Discrimination. Harmless discriminations may in general be made by railroads. The carrying free of one person who is unable to pay fare, is no injustice to passengers who may be required to pay the reasonable and regular rates fixed by the company. Freight carried over long distances may be carried at a reasonably less rate per mile than the freight transported for shorter distances, because it costs proportionately less to perform the service. Passengers may be divided into different classes, and the fare regulated in accordance with the accommodations furnished to each, because it costs less to carry an emigrant with the accommodations furnished to that class, than it does to carry an occupant of a parlor car. And likewise an inferior class of freight may be carried at a less rate than first class merchandise of greater value and requiring more labor, care, and responsibility in handling. Twenty separate parcels done up in one package and consigned to the same person, may be carried at a less rate per parcel than twenty parcels of the same character consigned to as many different persons at the same destination, because it costs less to receive and deliver one package containing twenty parcels to.one individual than it does to receive and deliver twenty different parcels to as many different consignees. In a case where a railroad company made a difference between the freight rates charged to small and large shippers, in favor of the large shippers, without reference to any conditions tending to decrease the cost of transportation, it was held to be an unjust discrimination prohibited by law.28 28 Hayes v. Penn, Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 309, (1882). CHAPTER IV SPECIFIC DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF COMMON CARRIERS OF GOODS § 69. Extent of Liability. The general rule is that a carrier is liable in all cases, excepting the loss occasioned by the Act of God, or the king's enemies. But whether they are liable for the loss of particular goods intrusted to them for carriage depends upon the nature and extent of the employment, express or implied, which the carrier is engaged in. Carriers may be employed in the transportation of goods and merchandise generally, and when so engaged they are bound to the common duties, obligations, and liabilities of common carriers. The employment may be limited to the mere carriage of particular kinds of property and goods; and when this is so, and the fact is known and avowed, the carrier will not be liable as a common carrier for any other goods or property intrusted to their agents without their consent. The transportation of passengers, or of merchandise, or of both does not necessarily imply that the owners hold themselves out as common carriers of money or bank bills. The owners of stage coaches whose ordinary employment is limited to the transportation of passengers and their baggage, would not be liable for parcels of goods or merchandise intrusted to the drivers employed by them. In all cases the nature and extent of the employment or business which is authorized by the owners and which, expressly or impliedly, they hold themselves out as undertaking, furnishes the true limits of their rights, obligations, duties, and liabilities. And further, no person is a common carrier in the sense of the law who is not a carrier for hire.1 However, the contract of carriage does not imply a personal trust which can be 1 Citizens Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co., U. S. Cir. Ct., 2 Story 16, (1811). |