it was said, three ways of disposing of the surrendered German ships; sink them in the ocean, as Great Britain wished; convert them into transports, which was impracticable because of cost; distribute them between France, Italy and Japan, for neither Great Britain nor America wanted them. This last plan was objectionable because, in the face of the League of Nation's requirement for disarmament, it would be adding to the navies of three powers.

Military terms to be imposed, it was reported, would force Germany to reduce her army to one hundred thousand men, recruit this force by volunteer enlistment, and make the term of enlistment twelve years lest, by training a new body of a hundred thousand men each year, she should, in time, train a great army. The Imperial General Staff must be abolished, artillery and military equipment, over and above the needs of the new army, must be surrendered, and the forts along the Rhine destroyed. The terms of aerial disarmament forbade Germany to use airplanes, or dirigibles, for military purposes, and required her to hand over her airplanes to the Allies, and build no more until after peace was concluded.

The Supreme Council, it was further reported, indeed, it was so stated by Premier Delacroix in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, had decided that the old treaty of April 19, 1839, must be revised, and would insert in the peace treaty a requirement that Germany relinquish her leasehold on Tsingtau and all concessions on the Shantung peninsula. The Polish Commission on the Eastern Boundary of Germany now reported, and proposed to give Poland direct access to the Baltic by a corridor leading to Danzig, thus cutting off East Prussia from Germany; to allow Germany communication across this corridor; and to demilitarize East Prussia. From the subcommission of the Commission on Responsibility for the War came a report listing thirty-one classes of crimes for which Germany should be held responsible. Civilians had been massacred, tortured, starved, deported, interned under brutal conditions, forced to labor in connection with military opera

tions. Girls and women had been abducted, women violated, and hostages put to death. Towns and villages had been pillaged, property confiscated, the currency debased, penalties imposed and collected. Property, religious, charitable and educational, and historic buildings and monuments had been wantonly destroyed. Exorbitant and illegal contributions had been exacted, undefended places and hospitals had been bombarded, relief ships, hospital ships, fishing boats had been destroyed, and merchant ships sunk without warning. Asphyxiating and poisonous gases, and explosive and expanding bullets, had been used. No quarter had been given; prisoners had been illtreated; flags of truce misused; wells poisoned, and the rules relating to the Red Cross utterly disregarded. Even this list, the sub-commission stated, did not exhaust the record of enemy crimes.

From an official of the French Foreign Office came a statement of the disposition France wished to have made of the country west of the Rhine. Never again should the people and their territory be made a military menace and vantage ground for invasion of France, as in the past. France had not the least desire to make these people a part of her own; they should have an independent status. But the Rhine should be a military and political boundary. West of that river there should never again be any German troops, German fortifications, German munition works. Every railroad, every bridge across the Rhine must be in French hands, or those of the Allies, until the territory was politically independent. The whole German population must be forever rid of all military obligations to Germany, never subject to service in German armies, or allowed to volunteer, and no taxes should ever be levied on them for military purposes.

Making the Rhine a political boundary meant, that during the period of occupation, which must continue until Germany had paid her reparation bill in full, local administration of the towns and villages should remain in the hands of the native population, with no political connection with any Central Ger

man Government. Reparation made, and the period of occupation ended, this Rhine country should at once become an independent State, for the good of itself, and for the protection of France and the rest of the world against the Germany of the future.

Public opinion in Rome, it was now reported from Paris, was irritated by reports that the Italian territorial claims would not be decided together with those of France, before the treaty of peace, but afterwards with those of the new nations sprung from the ruins of Austria. If this report be true, said an Italian newspaper, we do not hesitate to assert that the Italian delegates will be in duty bound to oppose the proposition "even at the cost of packing their trunks and leaving Paris." But we refuse to believe that President Wilson, or any one else, can have thought of such a thing. It would be a grave offense to Italy. At Rome all eyes were turned towards Paris. Demonstrations were made in favor of the Irredenta, and Fiume in particular, and the question, What attitude will America take? was asked on every hand.

So high did feeling run that on March 21 the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference announced that they had unanimously agreed to withdraw from the Conference unless Fiume were assigned to Italy, before the conclusion of peace. Such, it was said, was the state of the public mind in Italy, that failure of the delegation to secure title to Fiume and the Dalmatian coastal islands would surely be attended by grave political results. Neither the Parliament, nor the people, would think of ratifying an agreement which abandoned what they considered necessary "to the completion of the mother country." President Wilson, report said, had the matter before him and would, it was hoped, find a way to overcome this obstacle in the path of peace.

All the Allied peoples by this time were crying out for less secrecy and more speed. Most of the issues, it was said, that have arisen could be settled easily in a few days by two or three determined men. There must be a truce to the constant refer

ence of these claims to committees, sub-committees and subsub-committees. It was foolish to put off the day when the Council must make up its mind, and that day must not be far away, for the audience "will soon get tired of waiting for the curtain to be drawn." The whole world is impatient for peace. Trade and industry demand it as a first step towards a return to normal conditions. The ruined countries demand it, that they may take up the work of reconstruction. Civilization demands it, that the forces of Bolshevism may not break through in the East. Even the Council of Ten seemed at last to be convinced of the need of haste, and March 24, decided, that a Super-Council of Four, composed of President Wilson and the three Allied Prime Ministers, should proceed at once to gather up the decisions already made, settle the issues on which no decision had been reached, and draw up the Treaty of Peace.

At the end of a week the Council of Four gave no more satisfaction than the Council of Ten. They, too, it was charged, were wasting time. At the moment when clear-sighted resolution was most needed, they were showing neither vision nor courage. Victory was not yet assured, and might even be lost unless the politicians, who so misrepresented their people, were driven to do their duty or replaced by others who would do it. Their secrecy was even more hateful than their sloth.

President Wilson now issued a statement denying that conferences on the League of Nations had anything whatever to do with delay in framing the treaty. Rumor then found other causes. The "Big Four" were said to be "deadlocked" on the question of reparation, and the demands of M. Clémenceau for the cession, outright to France, of the whole Saar valley; the "Big Four" were said to have indulged in some very plain talk; President Wilson was said to have threatened to go home unless greater progress was made in settling the peace of the world; to have told his associates that the world was awaiting the finishing of their task, and had a right to expect a speedy conclusion; to have said that the slowness of the negotiation

was not the fault of the representatives of any nation; that he willingly accepted his share for the delay in framing the Treaty; that the time for talk was over, and that the time for results had come.

After several days had passed and no results were announced, the editor of the Paris Matin had an interview with Lloyd George, and told him that the public was troubled not so much by the delay, as by the secrecy which surrounded the meetings of the Council of Four, and the fear that serious differences of opinion existed. To this Lloyd George replied:

I affirm absolutely that there is no divergence among the negotiators. They are often confronted with technical difficulties which can only be settled after close study. Take the question of reparation. In substance the Allies have one common principle, which I once set forth thus: "Germany must pay up to the last farthing of her power."

But is it sufficient to draw up a bill and hand it to the enemy? Must we not require guarantees, and must we not study the terms, methods, and forms of delayed payments? Must we not be able to say to our adversary when he pleads inadequacy of resources: "Yes, you can go as far as that and you must do it." In a word, shall we simply present a bill, or collect the money, all the money possible? Well, that is where the work comes in, slow and difficult work complicated by the fact that technical experts of the highest capabilities and greatest experience are not in agreement among themselves, either as to the method of liquidation, or as to the assets to be realized.

No, there is no divergence among the negotiators, but, alas, there are inevitable ones among the experts, often among those from the same country.

The editor remarked that the public could not understand why, before everything, Germany has not been handed a full bill, no matter what the amount, and forced to admit full liability.

"And who says we shall not do so?" cried Premier Lloyd George. "Who says we have not decided that?"

"No one," the interviewer interrupted, "has said that you have not decided it."