ΤΟ

THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE,

AND TO

THE FRENCH ARMIES.

WHEN an extraordinary measure, not warranted by established constitutional rules, and justifiable only on the supreme law of absolute necessity, bursts suddenly upon us, we must, in order to form a true judgment thereon, carry our researches back to the times that preceded and occasioned it. Taking then the subject up, with respect to the event of the eighteenth of Fructidor on this ground, I go to examine the state of things prior to that period. I begin with the establishment of the constitution of the year 3 of the French Republic.

A better organized constitution has never yet been devised by human wisdom. It is, in its organization, free from all the vices and defects to which other forms of government are more or less subject. I will speak first of the legislative body, because the legislature is, in the natural order of things, the first power; the executive is the first magistrate.

By arranging the legislative body into two divisions, as is done in the French constitution, the one, (the council of five hundred,) whose part it is to conceive and propose laws; the other, council of ancients, to review, approve, or reject the laws proposed; all the security is given that can arise from coolness of

reflection acting upon, or correcting the precipitancy or enthu siasm of conception and imagination. It is seldom that our first thought, even upon any subject, is sufficiently just.

The policy of renewing the legislature by a third part each year, though not entirely new, either in theory or in practice, is, nevertheless, one of the modern improvements in the science of government. It prevents, on the one hand, that convulsion and precipitate change of measures, into which a nation might be surprised by the going out of the whole legislature at the same time, and the instantaneous election of a new one. On the other hand, it excludes that common interest from taking place, that might tempt a whole legislature, whose term of duration expired at once, to usurp the right of continuance. I go now to speak of the executive.

It is a principle uncontrovertible by reason, that each of the parts by which government is composed, should be so constructed as to be in perpetual maturity. We should laugh at the idea of a council of five hundred, or a council of ancients, or a parliament, or any national assembly, who should be all children in leading strings and in the cradle, or be all sick, insane, deaf, dumb, lame or blind at the same time; or be all upon crutches, tottering with age or infirmities, Any form of government that was so constructed, as to admit the possibility of such cases happening to a whole legislature, would justly be the ridicule of the world; and on a parity of reasoning, it is equally as ridiculous that the same cases should happen in that part of government which is called the executive; yet this is the contemptible condition to which an executive is always subject, and which is often happening, when it is placed in an hereditary individual called a king. When that individual is in either of the cases before mentioned, the whole executive is in the same case; for himself is the whole. He is then, (as an executive,) the ridiculous picture of what a legislature would be, if all its members were in the same case. The one is a whole made up of parts, the other, a whole without parts; and any thing happening to the one, (as a part or section of the government,) is parallel to the same thing happening to the other.

As, therefore, an hereditary executive called a king is a perfect absurdity in itself, any attachment to it is equally as absurd. It is neither instinct or reason; and if this attachment is what is

called royalism in France, then is a royalist inferior in character to every species of the animal world; for what can that being be, who acts neither by instinct nor by reason? Such a being merits rather our derision than our pity; and it is only when it assumes to act its folly, that it becomes capable of provoking republican indignation. In every other case it is too contemptible to excite anger. For my own part, when I contemplate the self-evident absurdity of the thing, I can scarcely permit myself to believe that there exists in the high-minded nation of France, such a mean and silly animal as a royalist.

As it required but a single glance of thought to see, (as is before said,) that all the parts of which government is composed, must be at all times in a state of full maturity, it was not possible that men acting under the influence of reason, could, in forming a constitution, admit an hereditary executive, any more than an hereditary legislature. I go, therefore, to examine the other

cases.

In the first place, (rejecting the hereditary system,) shall the executive by election, be an individual, or a plurality.

An individual by election is almost as bad as the hereditary system, except that there is always a better chance of not having an idiot. But he will never be any thing more than a chief of a party, and none but those of that party will have access to him. He will have no person to consult with of a standing equal with himself, and consequently be deprived of the advantages arising from equal discussion. Those whom he admits in consultation, will be ministers of his own appointment, who, if they displease by their advice, must expect to be dismissed. The authority, also, is too great, and the business too complicated, to be intrusted to the ambition or the judgment of an individual; and, besides these cases, the sudden change of measures that might follow by the going out of an individual executive, and the election of a new one, would hold the affairs of a nation in a state of perpetual uncertainty. We come then to the case of a plural executive.

It must be sufficiently plural, to give opportunity to discuss all the various subjects that in the course of national business may come before it; and yet not so numerous as to endanger the necessary secrecy that certain cases, such as those of war, require.

Establishing, then, plurality as a principle, the only question is, What shall be the number of that plurality?

Three are too few either for the variety or the quantity of business. The constitution has adopted five; and experience has shown, from the commencement of the constitution to the time of the election of the new legislative third, that this number of directors, when well chosen, is sufficient for all national executive purposes; and, therefore, a greater number would be only an unnecessary expense. That the measures of the directory, during that period, were well concerted, is proved by their success; and their being well concerted, shows they were well discussed; and, therefore, that five is a sufficient number with respect to discussion; and, on the other hand, the secret, whenever there was one, (as in the case of the expedition to Ireland,) was well kept, and, therefore, the number is not too great to endanger the necessary secrecy.

The reason why the two councils are numerous is not from the necessity of their being so, on account of business, but because that every part of the republic shall find and feel itself in the national representation.

Next to the general principle of government by representation, the excellence of the French constitution consists in providing means to prevent that abuse of power that might arise by letting it remain too long in the same hands. This wise precaution pervades every part of the constitution. Not only the legislature is renewable by a third every year, but the president of each of the councils is renewable every month; and of the directory, one member each year, and its president every three months. Those who formed the constitution cannot be accused of having contrived for themselves. The constitution, in this respect, is as impartially constructed as if those who framed it were to die as soon as they had finished their work.

The only defect in the constitution is that of having narrowed the right of election; and it is, in a great measure, to this narrowing the right, that the last elections have not generally been good. My ancient colleagues will, I presume, pardon my saying this to day, when they recollect my arguments against this defect, at the time the constitution was discussed in the Convention.

I will close this part of the subject by remarking on one of the most vulgar and absurd sayings or dogmas that ever yet imposed

itself upon the world, which is," that a republic is fit only for a small country, and a monarchy for a large one." Ask those who say this, their reasons why it is so, and they can give none.

Let us then examine the case.-If the quantity of knowledge in a government ought to be proportioned to the extent of a country, and the magnitude and variety of its affairs, it follows, 'as an undeniable result, that this absurd dogma is false, and that the reverse of it is true. As to what is called monarchy, if it be 'adaptable to any country, it can only be so to a small one, whose concerns are few, little complicated, and all within the comprehension of an individual. But when we come to a country of large extent, vast population, and whose affairs are great, numerous, and various, it is the representative republican system only, that can collect into the government the quantity of knowledge, necessary to govern to the best national advantage. Montesquieu, who was strongly inclined to republican government, sheltered 'himself under this absurd dogma; for he had always the Bastile before his eyes when he was speaking of republics, and therefore pretended not to write for France. Condorcet governed himself by the same caution, but it was caution only, for no sooner had 'he the opportunity of speaking fully out than he did it. When I say this of Condorcet, I know it as a fact. In a paper published in Paris, July 1792, entitled, "The Republican, or the Defender of representative Government," is a piece signed Thomas Paine. That piece was concerted between Condorcet and myself. I wrote the original in English, and Condorcet translated it. The object of it was to expose the absurdity and falsehood of the above mentioned dogma.

Having thus concisely glanced at the excellencies of the constitution, and the superiority of the representative system of gov ernment, over every other system, (if any other can be called a system,) I come to speak of the circumstances that have intervened between the time the constitution was established, and the event that took place on the 18th of Fructidor of the present year.

Almost as suddenly as the morning light dissipates darkness, did the establishment of the constitution change the face of affairs in France. Security succeeded to terror, prosperity to distress, plenty to famine, and confidence increased as the days multiplied, until the coming of the new third. A series of victories,