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AND RUSSIA. 1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under

stophen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent yours of “Greater Serbia” movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and

Slovenes.") 1. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.

(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high

handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Ser: bia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. De

claration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31): “Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In doferonce to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia un. dertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 4.) (b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs

into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was

imposed in 1906. (c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary

societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the “dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their Uberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains.” (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19;

Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 465.) (d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway re

quired that Serbia should be controlled by Aus

tria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.) 3. Russia's interest in Serbia-founded upon kinship in

blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Ger. many recognized that their policy toward Serbia might load to war with Russia. (See War Cyclopedia, under "Pan-Slavism.")

“During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. British Blue Book, No. 139; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 101.)

“We were perfectly aware that a possible warliko attitude of Austria-Hungary against Sorbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)

II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914). 1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Far

dinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Serrajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See War Cyclopedia,

under “ Serajevo.") 2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay

Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 152.)

M. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.) 1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the

Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 490-4; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 8, and German White Book, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.

“A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Powa, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.” (Austrian Minister at Belgrado to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In Austrian Rod Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p.

452.) 2. Conference at Potsdam (July 6, 1914), at which the

terms of the Note were practically settled. Tho hold. ing of such a conference has been denied by Germaa newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (8. War Cyclopedia, under “ Potsdam Conferenco; » New York Times, Current History, September, 1917, pp.

469-471.) 3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatun

to which un onditional acceptance must be given witho forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of ito do mands. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

“I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formid. able a character.” (Sir Edward Grey, British Socra tary for Foreign Affairs, in British Blue Book, No. 5; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 13.)

“The demands of that (the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any dvil. ized State in the history of the world, and they ar be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (Ger

man Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.) 4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those

of the Note itself. (See British Blue Book, No. 4; Oollected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 3-12.)

“2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana (the chief society for Serbian pro paganda), to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other so cieties and their branches in Serbia which engago la propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall tako the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another nam. and form."

“3. To eliminate without delay from public instruo tion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, overy. thing that serves, or might serve, to foment tho pro paganda against Austria-Hungary."

tually may be, implicated in the plot, ... and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdoms.
As regards the participation in this enquiry of Aur
tro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for
this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [Austro
Hungarian] Government, the Royal (Serbian] Gov.
ernment cannot accept such an arrangement, as #
would be a violation of the Constitution and of the
law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concreto
cases communications as to the results of the investi-
gation in question might be given to the Austro-
Hungarian agents.”
(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the

Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in cur

its reply was not considered satisfactory. 2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dis

honest and evasive. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 34; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 600514.)

In less than an hour after receiving it the Aug. trian Minister left Belgrade with all his staf. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.

The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Governmont could " no longer recede, nor enter into any discus. sion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Nota." (British Blue Book, No. 93; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 70.)

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“5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

“6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian torritory; delegates of theAustro-Hungarian Government

will take part in the investigation relating thereto." 6. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.

“We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)

This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Bal. kans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program! The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which

certainly was not consulted. 6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult:

Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate with drawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a

remote mountain resort, etc., etc. 7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening

the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and Franco
make urgent endeavors:
(a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in

meeting the demands of Austria.
(b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in or.

der (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Sorajevo; and (2) to permit them to exerciso a moderating influence on Serbia Sharp rofusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later

proposals see ch. v.) IV. SKRBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 26,

1914). (800 British Blue Book, No. 39; Collected Diplomatio

Correspondence, pp. 31-37.) 1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia,

(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.
(b) Returned a qualified refusal to the other two.

As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that thoy “ do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, ... but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international laro, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."

As to No. 6, they returned a temperato refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a doliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the domand): “It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an onquiry against all such persons as are, or oven

1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain,

Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Sorbia,

July 28, 1914. 2. Demand of Germany that the war be “ localized "-LO

that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastico

ment of Serbia. 3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.

VI. CONCLUSIONS. 1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their

chief fear was lest something might, against their will, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the hasta and secrecy which attended their measures.

“The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was 80 drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Govern. ment are fully resolved to have war with Sorbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In British Blue Book, No. 41; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 38.)

“Ho [the German Secretary of State) admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. ... Secretary of Stato confessed privately that he thought tho Noto left much to be desired as a diplomatic documents (British Chargé at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July

25, 1914. British Blue Book, No. 18; Collected July 31. “ Threatening danger of war” proclaimed in Diplomatic Documents, p. 22.)

Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to “In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen France. arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and b bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. Germany. Declaration of war by Germany against ... Only a war, for which the best minds of the Russia. Italy declared that she would remain neutral army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamen since “ the war undertaken by Austria, and the consttal ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and quences which might result, had, in the words of the of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the ac German ambassador himself, an aggressive object." ceptance of the claims put forward in the note could British Blue Book, No. 152; Collected Diplomatio have profited Vienna.

Documents, p. 107.) “The question has been asked: Where was the Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand plan of campaign elaborated-in Vienna or Berlin ? that Belgium also permit German troops to violate its And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do peo neutrality. ply tolerate the propagation of such dangerous Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it declared war on France. must be), namely, that a complete understanding in Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." war on Germany. (Maximilian Harden, in Die Zukunft for August 1, Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, Russia and the Great


1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey 8. Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vas

(July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian salage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan

ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's

and the French ambassador and Grey himself, u sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed

friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover “an issu. to satisfy Serbia's friends.

which would prevent complications." “ Austria demanded conditions which would have

“If it is borne in mind how incomparably more placed Serbia under her permanent control.” (Prof.

difficult problems had been successfully solved by the Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of

conference of ambassadors at London during the Germany, in Atlantic Monthly, for February, 1915,

Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement p. 234.)

between the Austrian demands and the Serbian conI. Germany's objects were:

cessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared (a) To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair

with the previous achievements of the London con(1911) and over the Balkan wars (1912-13).

ference." (I Accuse, p. 155.) (b) To strengthen her ally Austria, and so increase

The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and her own power.

Italy. It was declined by Germany (without con(c) To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and

sulting Austria) on the ground that she “could not to disrupt or render harmless the latter.

call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a Euro(d) To promote the Central European—" Berlin to

pean tribunal.” (German White Book; Collected Bagdad "-project, and open a trade route to Diplomatic Documents, p. 409.) Grey explained that Saloniki, the most favorably situated seaport for

it “would not be an arbitration, but a private and the commerce of Central Europe with the East. informal discussion; " nevertheless, Austria and Ger 4. To advance these ends Germany and Austria deliberately many continued to decline.

incurred the grave risk of a general European war. 2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France “exerciso • For reading references on Chapter IV, see page 39.

moderating influence at St. Petersburg." The French

Foreign Minister in reply “pointed out that Germany V. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GER

on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, MANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA

especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed

by Serbia. The (German) ambassador replied that AND FRANCE.

such a course was not possible, owing to the decision I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 to August 6, 1914. not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian disputa * July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued (Russian Orange Book, No. 28; Collected Diplomatto

in Germany. These measures, including the movement Documents, p. 276.) of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to 3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia final mobilization. (See Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1911,

and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). pp. 14-25; Nineteenth Century and After, issue for Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though June, 1917.)

proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion boJuly 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.

tween the two Governments ?) July 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Bel. 4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on grade, severing diplomatic relations.

July 26 from a yachting cruise) attemped to act we July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at Lon “ mediator” between Russia and Austria; but appar

don on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy ently he confined himself to the effort to persundo accepted; Germany refused.

Russia " to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.

war without drawing Europe into the most terrible Suly 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, ha frontier.

German White Book, exhibit 22; Collected Diplomatto July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General mobilization Documents, pp. 431-2.) in Russia begun.

“Neither over the signature of tho Kaisor nor over

British Blue Book, No. 161; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 117.)

But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.

that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace.” (J. M. Beck, The Evidence in the

Case, p. 112.) 6. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser

(July 29), “to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal.(Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from tho German White Book! “The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for

this reason it was declined.(I Accuse, p. 187, noto.) 6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express

herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.

King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: “I rely on William applying his great influence in order to in. duce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way ho will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an irternational catastrophe.” (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 539.)

Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Ger. many would press the button' in the interests of peace.(British Blue Book, No. 84; Collected

Diplomatic Documents, p. 64.) 7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): “I

Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question bas assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (Russian Orange Book, No. 60; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 288.)

Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal.” (Russian Orange Book, No. 63; Collected

Diplomatic Documents, p. 289.) 8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31):

If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (Russian Orange Book, No. 67; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 291.)

This proposal remained unanswered. .. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then “ ready

to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (Russian Orange Book, No. 73; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 293.)

Sir Edward Grey comments: “ Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (British Blue Book, No. 131; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards “the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight.” (British Ambassador at Vienna, in


AGAINST RUBBIA AND FBANCE. 1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July

29, apparently decided definitely to make War ou France and Russia.

“Our innermost conviction is that it was on the evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consant to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (Le Mensonge du d Août, 1914, p. 38.)

" People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation en bloo i

war were not resolved on.” (I Accuse, p. 189.) 2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31).

This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on “the measures for mobilization (against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (French Yellow Book, No. 118; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 223.)

The Tsar assured the Kaiser: “ It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertako no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 411.)

For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see Nineteenth Century and After, issue for June, 1917. Consult also I Accuse, pp. 194-201; War Cyclopedia, under “Mo

bilization Controversy." 3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) do

manding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1” (twelve hours).

Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) us to “What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia ?(French Yellona Book, No. 117; Collected Diplomatic Documents, P. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that “France would do that which her interests dictated.” (German White Book, exhibit 27;

Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 434.) 4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m, on Au

gust 1, following Russia's failure to demobilizo. (Russian Orange Book, No. 76; Collected Diplomatio Documents, p. 294.)

Orders for a general mobilization of the French

army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day. 5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (French

Yellow Book, No. 147; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 240.)

This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremburg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 130230; pamphlet entitled, German Truth and a Matter of Fact, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashos

through hot-headedness of her troops and underofficers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the othor hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (French Yellor Book, No. 106.)

Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, and in the German declaration of war on Russia. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the “Ems dispatch” at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, Autobiography, II, p. 101. See War Cyclopedia, under “German Government, Moral Bankruptcy,” etc.)


The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroko in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed tho war. (See War Cyclopedia, under “War, Responsi bility for.”)

“ The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by ber dilatory or negative attitude, caused the fail. ure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncom promising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula (of July 29-31), declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Rus. sia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these

and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.” (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in French Yellow Book, No. 114; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 221.)

"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater offrontery and hypocrisy.” (I Accuse, pp. 208-9.)

“ The German Government contrived the war jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and 80 burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Tsar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.).” (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See War Cyclopedia, under “Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

“ The object of this war (on the part of the opponents of Germany) is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices

and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood-not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of fourfifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals, August 27, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter V, see page 39. VI. VIOLATION OF BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY BRINGS

IN GREAT BRITAIN. 1. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT. 1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the I Ambittered state

Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the voto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes (“the wild women"), and the passago by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rule bill (May

25, 1914). 2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster)

against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organi. zation of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; "gup

running" from Germany. 3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among tho railway

workers. 4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the

province of Bengal; boycott movement; rovolutionary

violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations. 5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a “nation of

shopkeepers” supposedly unready for the sacrifices of war. Progress of pacifist opinions (“Norman-Angell

ism”). 6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of

volunteers (“ mercenaries") instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kalsor's phrase) as "contemptible.”

II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAB. 1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored

unremittingly for peace. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Grey and British Policy, 1914.”)

“Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the 'peacemaker of Europe.' ... His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history." (I Accuse, pp. 247-8.)

"No man in the history of the world has ovar labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world a general and abiding peace. . . . We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most chorishad friendships and obligations, even to the last maling effort upon effort and hoping against hopo. Tha, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay betwoon honor and dig

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