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as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." (Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 1911,
War, 1811, pp. 18, 23.)
"They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say." (Vernon Kellogg, in
Atlantic Monthly, August, 1917.) Idea of the German mission in the world, and the Gor. man demand for world influence and prestige (PanGermanism). (a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German
raco and German “ Kultur” over all other races
and civilizations. (b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization
of the world, and to oppose the absorption of
Germans by other nationalities. (0) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treit
schke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (Seo Conquest and Kultur, secs. 1, 2; War Cyclopedia, under “ Bernhardi,” “Hegemony, German Ambition," “Kultur,” “ Pan - Germanism,” “Treitschko,"
“ William II.” “I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said Civis Romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.'”
“God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress."
“The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor.” (Speeches of Emperor William II.)
“The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passivo racos in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." (Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthropologie, 1913.)
“If people should ask us whether we intend to bocome a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that the will to world power has no limit." (Adolph Grabowsky, in Das neue Deutschland, Oct. 28, 1914.)
" By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lios about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world.” (Benedikt Haag, Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 1914.)
“With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language.” (Theodor Springman, Deutschland und der Orient, 1915.)
“Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history.
World power or downfalll will be our rallying ory." (Bernhardi, Germany and the Neat War, 1911, p. 154.)
II. MILITABISM AND ARMAMENTS. 1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not the D. having of an army, no matter how large, but tho axo altation of it to the chief place in tbe state, the subordination to it of the civil authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every disputo. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Militarism,” “ Prussian
ism,” etc.) 2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.
(a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible
frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also
to topics under heading I. (b) The Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical as.
ample of military domination. (See War Cyclo
pedia, under “ Zabern," “ Luxemburg, Rosa." (c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war
and army, etc. (See Conquest and Kultur, socs.
4, 5.) “Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarismı is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high ostimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingrediont of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy." (Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden, 1915.)
“War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common.” (Jung-Deutschland, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)
“War is for us only a means, the state of preparation for war is more than a means, it is an end. If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." (Ernst Hasse, Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums, 1908.)
" It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)
Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the “ jingo” spirit. At the end of a book which he compiled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: “The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand on the wishes of the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association [Wehrverein]. . . . War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs a war; & long-continued peace seems regrettable to them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the Ger man nation would again be in danger of moral de generation. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts-not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity." (Der deutsche Chauvinismus, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in Conquest and
Kultur, 137-139.) 8. The competition in armaments. Europe an “armed
camp” following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expendi. tures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war were estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 4,100,000; Germany, 4,250,000; Austria, 3,600,000; France, 4,000,000; Great Britain (including its “Terri.
torials" or trained militia), 707,000. 4. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a
Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German naval activities.
II. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF
LONDON (1908-9). 1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia
and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Hague Conferences,” “Hague Conventions,"
“ Hague Regulations," " Hague Tribunal." 2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitra
tion defeated by Germany and Austria. 3. General policy of Germany with referenre to arbitration.
Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the
tude," “ Peace Treaties.”) 1. British vs. German views of the “ freedom of the seas,"
as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Freedom of the Seas," “ Declaration of London," etc.)
“ The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent warvessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or dostruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce-while preserving for the weaker power
every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas.” (Ramsey Muir, Mare Liberum: The Freedom
of the Seas, pp. 8-13.) ! IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLIOT. 1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Ger
many in 1871. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Alsuor
Lorraine," “ Franco-German Rivalry.") 2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its "unredeemed ” lands held
by Austria (See Ibid., “ Italia Irredenta.") 3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Pow.
ers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco espocially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See Ibid., un
der “Morocco Question,” “Franco-German Rivalry.”) 4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balka
Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions (Drang nach Osten) conflicted with Russia's desire to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediter. ranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See Ibid.,“ Balkan Prob
lem," " Drang nach Osten,” etc.) 5. Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance .
(1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being “hemmed in" (alleged policy of “encircloment”). (See Ibid., “Encirclement, Policy of,"
“ Triple Alliance,” “ Triple Entente.”) 6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, The Anglo
German Problem, 1911; Conquest and Kultur, BCC
time supremacy through Germany's rapid indus.
trial development since 1870. (b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor,
Mesopotamia, etc. (c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschke
and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit
_“a colossus with feet of clay”-and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to “the Day"-when war with Great Britain should come. (See War
Cyclopedia, under “ Der Tag,” “ Treitschke," eto.) “If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with Franco, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult." (Heinrich von Treitschke.) (d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of
conciliation. (e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agree
ment as to naval armaments and mutual relations. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to sign
the following declaration: “ The two Powers being naturally desirous of socuring peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to whilada
hands of a ministry, headed by the Imperial Chancellor. Unlike the ministers of true parliamentary governments, the German ministers aro responsible to the Emperor, and not to the legislative chamber. They do not need, therefore, to resign their offices when defeated in the Reichs
England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."
Germany refused to sign a similar declaration unless Great Britain would agree to stand aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the Continent, i. e., to abandon her new friends, Franco and Russia, and allow Germany to attack them un. hampered by fear of British interference.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. For forty years political and economic theories and gov. ernmental policies, especially in Germany, had been bring ing a great European war ever nearer. Forces making for peace were also in operation, and at times it seemed that these would continue to control the situation. But in 1914 the influences making for war definitely triumphed in Ger many and Austria, and precipitated the Great World War.
For reading references on Chapter I, see page 38.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR
(1870-1914). I. FOUNDATION AND CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT GERMAN
EMPIRE. 1. Franco-German War (1870-71), and the Treaty of
Frankfort. France to pay an indemnity of ono bil
lion dollars and to cede Alsace-Lorraine. 2. Formation of the German Empire; its undemocratic
character. (See C. D. Hazen, The Government of Ger.
five, with one imperial territory (Alsace-Lor-
that of the Empire. (b) The king of Prussia is hereditary “German Em
peror," with full direction of military and for
eign affairs. (c) The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is a council of
ambassadors appointed by the rulers of the separate States, and responsible to them. It oversees the administration and initiates most legislation, and is the most powerful body in the Empire. The States are represented unequally in it. Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the population of Germany, has 17 votes out of a total of 61. (If we include the three votes allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, which are “instructed" by the Emperor, Prussia has 20 votes in the Bundesrat.) Bavaria has six votes, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the other States
fewer. (d) The Reichstag is the representative chamber of
the legislature. It is composed of 397 members, of whom Prussia elects 236. Representative districts are very unequal in population. “A Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 votes; a deputy of East Prussia, home of the far-famed Junkers, an average of 24,000." The members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of five years; but the Emperor may (with the conBent of the Bundesrat) dissolve the Reichstag at
any time and order new elections. (e) The administration of the Empire is in the
II. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 1. The Triple Alliance formed by Germany, Austria, and
Italy (1882). Germany's main object was to safeguard herself against an attempt by France to recover Alsace-Lorraine. As France recovered strength Gor.
many plotted new aggressive designs against her. 2. Germany attempted in 1904-05 to form a secret allianco
with Russia and France against Great Britain. Failuro of the attempt owing to France's unwillingness to givo up hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The evidence of this attempt was published in 1917, in a series of letters signed “ Willy” and “Nicky” which passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and which were discove ered in the Tsar's palace after his deposition. (Soo War Cyclopedia, under “ Willy and Nicky Correspond.
ence.") 3. Formation of the Triple Entente.
(a) Dual Alliance of France and Russia formed
(1891-94) as a counterpoise to the Triplo Al
liance. (b) Settlement of England's disputes with Franco
over certain African questions, etc. (1904), and with Russia over Persia, etc. (1907), established the Triple Entente (“good understand.
ing”) between those powers. “France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe under German leadership was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They bad decided not to fight, and the face of European things was changed.” (Fullerton, Problems of Power, p. 57.)
III. THREE DIPLOMATIO CRISES: 1905, 1908, 1911. 1. First Morocco crisis, 1905-06. (See Conquest and Kultur.
120-126; War Cyclopedia, under “Morocco Question,"
his yacht in Tangier, challenged France's policy
in Morocco. (c) Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dis
missed on Germany's demand. “We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany, and you may rest assured we shall not wait for it to be realized." (German ambassador to France, in published in
terview.) (d) France brought to the bar of Europe in an intor.
national conference at Algeciras—which, in the
main, sanctioned her Moroccan policy. (e) The purpose of Germany in this crisis, as in
those which follow, was to humiliate France and wo test the strength of the Triple Entente. These
were struggles to increase German prestige. 2. Crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzo
govina in 1908. See War Cyclopedia, under “BosniaHorzegovina,” “Congress of Berlin,” “Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc.)
(a) These provinces freed from direct rule of the
Turks by Serbia and Russia, but handed over by the Congress of Berlin to Austria to administer
(1878). (b) Austria seized the occasion offered by the
“Young Turk” Revolution of 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to refer the
question to a European congress for settlement. (c) Russia (as yet unrecovered from the RussoJapanese War) was forced to acquiesce when the
ve Kaiser “ took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally.” Humiliating submission im.
posed on Serbia. (See below, ch. iv, I 2 a.) 8. Second Morocco crisis, in 1911. (See Conquest and
Kultur, 120-126; War Cyclopedia, under “Morocco
to Agadir as a protest against alleged French in.
of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag.) (b) Great Britain, in spite of political difficulties at
home, warned Germany that in case of war sho
would help France. (c) Adjustment of the Moroccan question. Germany
accepted compensation from France elsewhere in return for recognition of French protectorate over
Morocco. (Treaty of November 4, 1911.) (d) Furious resentment of the German military
party at this outcome. “The humiliation of the Empire is so much the greater, since it is the Emperor himself who had engaged the honor of the German people in Morocco.” (Rheinisch
Westfälische Zeitung.) 4. Hardening of the German resolve not to accept another
diplomatic defeat. “It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword.” (Speech
in Reichstag, applauded by the German Crown Prince.) IV. BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE “ MIDDLE EUROPE” PROJECT
CONSTITUTE OTHER GROUNDS OF CONFLICT. 1. Germany supplants England as the protector of Turkey
against Russia. Speech of the Kaiser at Damascus, 1898: “The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all
times." 1. The Bagdad Railway. Designed to connect Bagdad with
Constantinople and the Central European railways. Germany obtains concession from Turkey for its construction in 1902-03. Political as well as economic motives involved. Threat to British rule in India by proposed extension to the Persian Gulf. (See the President's Flag Day Address with Evidence of Germanv's Plans, note 15: Conquest and Kultur. sec. 8: War Cyclopedia. under “ Berlin to Bagdad.” “ Corridor.
etc.) 3. The “Middle Europe” Project. This may be defined
briefly as a plan for “a loosely federal combination for purposes of offense and defense, military and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy [Austria-Hungary), but also including the Balkan States and Turkey, together with all the neutral States—Roumania, Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland-that can be drawn within its embrace." (W. J. Ashley, in Introduction to F. Nau. mann's Central Europe, translated by Christabel M. Meridith, 1916.)
The plan includes the domination of this group State by Germany through (a) its control of the common financial and economic policy, and (b) its control of the military forces, based on universal military service. (Compare Prussia's control within the German Empire.) (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 8; War Cyclopedia, under “ Mittel-Europa," etc.;
The President's Flag Day Address, notes 15-17.) 4. Union of the Middle Europe project and the Bagdad Railway project in a Berlin-to-Bagdad plan.
“ Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by tho same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force-Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Rou. manians, Turks, Armenians—the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtile peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.” (President Wilson, Flag Day Address, June 14, 1917.)
"Across the path of this railway to Bagdad lay Serbia-an independent country whose sovereign alone among those of southeastern Europe had no marriage connection with Berlin, a Serbia that looked toward Russia. That is why Europe was nearly driven into war in 1913; that is why Germany stood 80 determinedly behind Austria's demands in 1914 and forced war. She must have her corridor' to the southeast; she must have political domination all along the route of the great economic empire sho planned. She was unwilling to await the process of . peaceful penetration.'" (The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans, note 16.)
V. TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN Wars, 1911-13. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Balkan Wars,” “Constantinople."
“Drang nach Osten,” “Young Turks.") 1. War of Italy with Turkey over Tripoli (1911-12).
Claims of Italy on Tripoli; weakness of Turkey following Young Turk revolution of 1908; unfavorable attitude of Italy's allies (Germany and Austria) to tho war as endangering their relations with Turkey. Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 15, 1912) transfers Tripoli
from Turkish to Italian rule. 2. War of Balkan Allies against Turkey (1912-13).
(a) Secret league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and
Montenegro to expel Turkey from Europe and step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade from this most perilous adventure." (Reply of Prime Minister Giolitti to above dispatch, Ibid.)
liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish
misrule. War declared Oct. 16, 1912. (b) Inability of the Great Powers, because of their
own divergent aims, to restrain the Balkan allies. (c) Success of the allies. By the Treaty of London
(May 30, 1913) Turkey was to surrender all territories in Europe except Constantinople and a small strip of adjacent territory (Enos-Midia
line). 3. War among the Balkan Allies (June 30 to July 21, 1913).
(a) Bulgaria (with Austria's support) attacked her
allies as a result of disputes over division of con
quered territory. (b) Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montene
gro in defeating Bulgaria. Turkey recovered
Adrianople. (c) Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 10, 1913). Most of
the conquered territory was given to Greece, Ser bia, and Montenegro, though Serbia was denied (through Austrian, German, and Italian pres. sure) an outlet to the Adriatic. A smaller sharo was given Bulgaria. Roumania secured a slico of Bulgarian territory. Albania was made a
principality under a German ruler. 4. Some wider features of these conflicts :
(a) A general European war was prevented (though
with difficulty) by statesmen of the different countries working through the agency of (1) diplomatic notes, and (2) diplomatic conferences held especially at London. Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief agent in maintaining peace. (See War Cyclo
pedia, under “Grey, Viscount.") (b) Austrian and German influence was seriously
impaired, for they “ had guessed badly and supported the losing side-first Turkey and then Bulgaria." Their Balkan domination and Mid. dle Europe project alike were threatened by the events of 1912-13. Corresponding increase of
Russian and Serbian power. (0) A new assertion of power on the part of Ger
many and Austria, principally against Russia and Serbia, to recover the ground lost through the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest
was made practically certain. *For reading references on Chapter II, see page 39. III. INDICATIONS THAT GERMANY AND AUSTRIA PLANNED AN AGGRESSIVE STROKE BEFORE
JUNE 28, 1914. I. AUSTRIA PROPOSED AN ATTACK ON SERBIA IN 1913. See
War Cyclopedia, under “ Austria and Serbia, 1913.") 1. Austria's Proposal to Italy (Aug. 8, 1913—the day bofore the Peace of Bucharest.)
“ Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the causus foederis of the Triple Alliance. ..." (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in dispatch of Aug. 9, 1913. Revealed by ex-Primo Minister Giolitti in speech of Dec. 5, 1914. See Collected
Diplomatic Documents, p. 401.) 2. Italy declined the proposal, as (apparently) did Ger
many also. The declination of the latter was probably due to the fact that German military preparations were not yet completed. (See below, V 1.)
“If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a causus foederis cannot be established. It is a
II. SECRET MILITARY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING THE
GERMAN ARMY (MARCH 19, 1913). This report came into the possession of the French Minister of War in some unexplained way soon after it was drawn up; it is published in French Yellow Book, No. 2; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 130-133.
The following extracts occur in the part headed “ Aim and Obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes": 1. Minds of the people must be prepared. (See Conquest
and Kultur, secs. 15-16; War Cyclopedia, under “Pan Germanism,” “Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913,” oto.)
“We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to tho armaments and policy of the French. We must nocustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provoa. tions of our adversaries. . . . We must so manago matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (of war) should be considered as a relief, because after it would como de cades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. Wo must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction."
(Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 131.) 2. “Stir up trouble in the North of Africa and in Russia. "
“We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should opan up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. ... The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consoli
dated.” (Ibid., p. 132.) 3. Small states to be coerced. (See War Cyclopedia, under
“Neutralized State,” “Netherlands, German View," etc.)
“In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland; so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could uso as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark and Scandinavia. ... In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France,
and thus protecting our flank.” (Ibid., p. 132.) 4. No guarantee to Belgium for security of her neutrality.