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(Soo Conquest and Kultur, sec. 11; War Cyclopedia, under “ Belgium, Neutralization of.”)

Our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. ...If we could induce these States (on our northwestern frontier] to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed inva. sion. . . . If, on the contrary, their defensive organi. zation was established against us, thus giving definito advantage to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the

security of her neutrality.(Ibid., p. 133.) 6. Short-term ultimatum to be issued. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.”)

“ The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentra tion of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for

our action in international law.(Ibid., p. 133.) 6. Prizes of the war. (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 17.)

“We will ... remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy [Franche Comté, acquired by Louis XIV) and a largo part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces (of Russia] are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's for. mer possessions should be restored to her.(Ibid.,

p. 133.) II. CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE KAISER: INTERVIEW WITH

KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM (NOVEMBER, 1913). 1. Circumstances of the interview; held in the presence of

General von Moltke (chief of the German General Staff) and reported to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, “from an absolutely reliable sourco." Published in French Yellow Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 142-3. (See War

Cyclopedia, under “Albert I,“William II,” etc.) 2. War with France regarded by the Kaiser as inevitable. (Soo War Cyclopedia, under“ William II, Ambitions.")

“ This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I (Cambon] am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

“The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal irfluence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peaco, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peaco against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Gormany. William II has come to think that war with France 18 inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later...

"General von Moltke spoke exactly in tho samo strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be Docessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'for,' he said to tho King [Albert], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresisti

ble enthusiasm with which the whole German pooplo will be carried away when that day comes.'” (Ooh

lected Diplomatic Documents, p. 142.) 3. Cambon's comment on the interview.

“As William II advances in years, family tradi. tions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, und especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels som. slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its powar. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German Army (German army law of 1913, cited below; France met this by increasing her military service from two years to three years), the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

“One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress tho King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. ..."

(Ibid., p. 143.) IV. GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AS REPORTED BY FRANCE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAB AGENTS (JULY 30, 1913). (In French Yellow Book, No. 5; Collected Diplo

matic Documents, pp. 136-142.) 1. The Moroccan settlement considered a diplomatio do feat. (See Conquest and Kultur, sec. 16.)

"... Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic do feat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so oftan denounced), & proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious becauso up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlone ness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma"

(Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 136.) 2. Forces making for peace.

“ There are in the country forces making for peaca, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." Thoso favoring peace included "the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct," etc. But the classes which prefer peace to war “are only a sort of make-weight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling."

(Ibid., p. 137-138.) 3. Forces making for war. (See War Cyclopedia, under

“ Arbitration, German Attitude,” “Disarmament, German Attitude,” “German Military Autocracy, Propaganda for War,” “ Militarism or Disarmament," " PasGermans Urge War in 1913,” “War, German View, etc.)

“There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, & press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.” (Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 139.) It included the following: (a) Those who regard war as inevitable, and hence

“the sooner the better.” (b) Those influenced by economic reasons—" over• population, over-production, the need for markets

and outlets,” etc. (c) Those influenced by “Bismarckism.” “They

feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even

when they have a preponderating force." (d) Those influenced by "a mystic hatred of revolu

tionary France," and others who acted from "a

feeling of rancor.” & Bocial classes included in the war party. (See Conquest

and Kultur, sec. 16; War Cyclopedia, under “ Coal and
Iron as Cause of War," “German Diplomacy,"
“ Junker,” “Peace Terms, German Industrialists on,"
“ Peace Terms, German Opinion as to," “ Peace Terms,
German Professors on," " Treitschke," etc.)
(a) The country squires (junkers), who wish to

escape the imposition of inheritance taxes
(“ death duties ") “which are bound to come if
peace continues. ... This aristocracy is military
in character, and it is instructive to compare the
Army List with the year book of the nobility.
War alone can prolong its prestige and support
its family interest. ... This social class, which
forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as
its supreme head, realizes with dread the demo-
cratization of Germany and the increasing power
of the Socialist party, and considers its own days
numbered." (Collected Diplomatic Documents,

p. 140.) (b) The capitalist class (“higher bourgeoisie"), in

cluding the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, and all who “regard war as good business." Among these are “doctrinaire manufacturers” who “declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be

unknown.” (Ibid., p. 140.) (c) University professors, etc. “The universities,

If we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociologi. cal fanatics who go even further. ... Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her posses

sion.” (Ibid., p. 140-1.) (d) Diplomatists and others “whose support of the

war policy is inspired by rancor and recentment.

... German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter er those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and

Germany are in contact.” (Ibid., p. 141.) 5. Must war be considered inevitable ?

“The opinion is fairly widely spread even in PanGerman circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

“Must war then be considered as inevitableIt is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, it France can make it clear to the world that the En. tente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mer. diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires . wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained.” (Ibid.,

pp. 141-143.) V. EXTRAORDINARY MILITABY MEASURES OF GERMANY TAKE

BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914. (See Conquest and Kultur,
sec. 16; War Cyclopedia, under “Egypt,” “ German
Army Act, 1913," “ German Intrigue Against American
Peace," “ Kiel Canal,” “ Sinn Fein,” “ South Africa,"

etc.) 1. Laws of 1911, 1912, and especially 1913, increased the

German army in time of peace from 515,000 to 866,000 men. Great increase of machine-gun corps, aviators, etc. Enormous stocks of munitions prepared. Excep tional war tax levied of $225,000,000. Special war fund (for expense of mobilization, etc.) increased from

$30,000,000 to $90,000,000. 2. Reconstruction of Kiel canal (connecting Baltic and

North Sea) hastened so as to be ready in early summar

of 1914. Fortifications of Helgoland, etc., improved. 3. Strategic railways constructed leading to Belgian, French, and Russian frontiers.

“Germany had made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across the territories of two wo offending and pacific neighbors (Belgium and Luxomburg] in her fixed resolve to break through the north. ern defenses of France, and thus to turn the formid. able fortifications of the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to her neighbors' frontiers, and in some places across them. . . . An immons sum of money has been sunk in these railways, ... and there is not the least prospect of an adequato return on them as commercial ventures. They are purely military and strategical preparations for war with France." (See Fortnightly Review for February, 1910, and February, 1914, and New York Times Our.

rent History, I, 1000-1004.) 4. Exportation of chemicals used in making explosivos

greatly reduced in 1913-14, and importation of horson, foodstuffs, and fats (used in nitroglycerin) greatly to creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See

Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, pp. 9-10.) 6. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and

June, 1914. 6. Exceptional grand maneuvres of 1914. Ordered in May,

these massed “500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month

of August." (Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914, p. 9.) 7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire.

(a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913)

to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: “I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately.” (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, Development of the European Nations, 5th ed., II, p.

379.) (b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments

were brought in the Federal Court at San Francisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: “For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See War Cyclopedia, under

“ German Intrigue Against American Peace.”) “ Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago) is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. ... The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, Ger. man consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawall, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin.” (Christian Science Monitor, October 19,

1917.) e. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vessels (June 14, 1914).

A German cruiser, the Eber, was in dock at Capo Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter addressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town. Now York and Chicago.

“ The commander of the Eber was given the name of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal con. fidentially, the essence of the plan being that a collier would leave Table Bay [Cape Colony) ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German war. ship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far us Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have book upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, ax. plains why German cruisers have been more in evidence in North Atlantic waters than in the southon ocean." (Cape Town correspondent of London Timos,

issue of October 6, 1914.) VI. CONCLUSION. Before June 28, 1914, Germany willed, 4

not war, at least another trial of diplomatic strength in which the threat of war should enter as a decisiot factor.

“There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importance, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individ. uals) long before the menace of war was approciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those meas. ures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. Whan one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (Le Mensonge du s Août, 1914, p. 9-10.)

Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undortaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted 8. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose plou for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not plac ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our powa shall create new law in Europe. Germany strika. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priosthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. ... We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselva with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, u a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, widar room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of thom. selves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. ... Now strika the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of Die Zukunft; see New York Times Current History, III, p. 130.)

" It nouo appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been proparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thor. oughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastnoss of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation.” (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago,

September 14, 1917.)
For reading references on Chapter III, see page 39.

IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY. L LITRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA,

AND RUSSLA. 1. Provious history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under

Stophen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; indepondent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent yoars of “Greater Serbia ” movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and

Slovenes.") 1. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.

(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high

handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. De

claration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31): “Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In doferonce to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia un. dertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (British Blue Book, No. 4; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 4.) (b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs

into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was

imposed in 1906. (c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary

societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the “dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north,” who “robs millions of Serbian brothers of their Uberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains.” (Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 19;

Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 465.) (d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway re

quired that Serbia should be controlled by Aus

tria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.) 8. Russia's interest in Serbia-founded upon kinship in

blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might load to war with Russia. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Pan-Slavism.")

“During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. British Bluo Book, No. 139; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 101.)

“We were perfectly aware that a possible warlsko attitude of Austria-Hungary against Sorbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)

II. THE SEBAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914). 1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Princo Franz Far.

dinand and his wife, while on an official visit to San. jevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See War Oyclopedia,

under “ Serajevo.") 2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsey

Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 152.)

II. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.) 1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the

Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 490-4; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 8, and German White Book, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measurus against Serbia.

“A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.” (Austrian Minister at Belgrado to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In Austrian Rod Book, No. 6; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p.

452.) 2. Conference at Potsdam (July 6, 1914), at which the

terms of the Note were practically settled. Tho holding of such & conference has been denied by Gormu newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (86. War Cyclopedia, under “Potsdam Conference; " Now York Times, Current History, September, 1917, pp.

469-471.) 3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatun

to which un onditional acceptance must be given withha forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its de mands. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.”)

“I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character.” (Sir Edward Grey, British Socro tary for Foreign Affairs, in British Blue Book, Na 5; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 13.)

“The demands of that (the Austrian) Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any dvil. ized State in the history of the world, and they ar be regarded only as intended to provoke war.” (Ger

man Socialist newspaper Vorwärts, July 25, 1914.) 4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those

of the Note itself. (See British Blue Book, No. 4; Ook lected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 3-12.)

“ 2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda), to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other so cieties and their branches in Serbia which engago la propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolve from continuing their activity under another nam. and form."

“ 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruotion in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, overything that serves, or might serve, to foment tho propaganda against Austria-Hungary."

“5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

“6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian torritory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government

will take part in the investigation relating thereto." 6. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.

“We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.” (German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 406.)

This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (Seo Ramsay Muir, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Bal. kans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program! The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which

certainly was not consulted. 8. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from

ssadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate with drawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a

romote mountain resort, etc., etc. 7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening

the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and Franco
make urgent endeavors:
(a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in

meeting the demands of Austria.
(b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in or-

der (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Sorajevo; and (2) to permit them to exerciso a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp rofusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)

tually may be, implicated in the plot, ... and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdoma.
As regards the participation in this enquiry of Aus-
tro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for
this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [Austro-
Hungarian) Government, the Royal (Serbian) Gov-
ernment cannot accept such an arrangement, as
would be a violation of the Constitution and of the
lar of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concreto
cases communications as to the results of the invosti-
gation in question might be given to the Austro-
Hungarian agents.”
(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the

Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in quo

its reply was not considered satisfactory. 2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dis

honest and evasive. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 34; Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 600514.)

In less than an hour after receiving it the Aus. trian Minister left Belgrade with all his staf. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.

The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could " no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Nota." (British Blue Book, No. 93; Collected Diplomatto Documents, p. 70.)

IV. STARBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25,

1914). (800 British Blue Book, No. 39; Collected Diplomatio

Correspondence, pp. 31-37.) 1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia

(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.
(b) Returned & qualified refusal to the other two.

As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that thoy “ do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, ... but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international laro, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."

As to No. 6, they returned a temperato refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a doliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the domand): “It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an onquiry against all such persons as are, or oven

V. AUSTRIA DECLABES WAB ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914). 1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain,

Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Sorbia,

July 28, 1914. 2. Demand of Germany that the war be “ localized "- Bang

that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastico

ment of Serbia.. 3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.

VI. CONCLUSIONS. 1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their

chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the basto and secrecy which attended their measures.

“The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was 80 draron up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Govern. ment are fully resolved to have war with Sorbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country (Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with jov at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In British Blue Book, No. 41; Collected Diplomatic Documents, p. 38.)

“Ho (the German Secretary of State) admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that thoy meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. ... Secretary of Stato confessed privately that he thought tho Noto left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." (British Charge at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July

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