Some

Despite the changed character of modern warfare, geographical factors play a part in military operations as important now as in the past. The initial determination of the Germans to invade France by way of Belgium, the Battle of the Marne, the operations about Verdun, the Russian invasions of East Prussia and Galicia, the successive German incursions into Russian Poland, the operations on the Balkan, Italian, and Mesopotamian fronts, in all these the influence of terrain upon military operations is easily discernible. How this is so may be seen by referring to Professor D. W. Johnson's highly suggestive book entitled "Topography and Strategy in the War," reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

If we take a wider view, it is evident also that at bottom it is geography which has enabled Great Britain to maintain her supremacy over the surface of the seas; it is geography that has forced Germany to attempt her challenge of that control by means of submarines and air-craft; and it is geography, in the main, which is so seriously hampering the efforts of the United States to bring to bear in the war its great potential resources. Indeed, we may consider that it is geography-in the form of colonies, spheres of trade and influence, control of lines of transportation, and considerations affecting the present and future sufficiency of the sources of food-supply, together with those of iron and coal so vitally important to an industrial nation-that makes up the essence of the German demand for a larger "place in the sun" which caused the present war. And we may be perfectly sure that in the successive "peace drives" of the German Government, it is the extending and securing of German "loot" in the form of agricultural and mineral lands, of harbors and shipping facilities, of industrial establishments and subject labor populations-all matters of economic geography-which occupy the official German mind. far more than defense against other peoples' aggressions, or even the triumph of the abstract German idea in the world."

In this supplement nothing further is attempted than to present maps and charts showing (1) the respective resources of the two warring groups, (2) the development of Prussia, (3) the subject nationalities of Middle-Europe, and the Berlin-Bagdad railway project as realized in January, 1918, (4) the countries at war, (5) the various battle-fronts of the war as they stood in the spring of 1918, and (6) the territories lost by Russia in the peace settlement of March, 1918.

The maps and atlases listed below are of varying value, but all will be found useful. In The Geographical Review (New York) for July, 1917, will be found a fuller list; also in a pamphlet published by Edward Stanford entitled "A Selection of the Best War Maps" (London, 1917). The Division of Maps of the Library of Congress has prepared a typewritten catalogue of several hundred pages entitled "A List of Atlases and Maps Applicable to the Present War," but at present is without funds for its publication.

CRAM, G. F., & Co. United States at War. American War Atlas. Eight colored maps. New York, 1917. CRAM, G. F., & Co. Historical War Atlas of Europe, Past and Present. 18 pp.; 10 colored maps. Chicago, 1917. GROSS, A. The Daily Telegraph Pocket Atlas of the War. 56 pp.; 39 maps. London, 1917.

HAMMOND, C. S., & Co. War Atlas, the European Situation at a Glance. 8 pp.; 8 colored maps. New York, 1914. LAROUSSE. Atlas de poche du theatre de la guerre. 59 pp.; 56 maps. Paris, 1916.

TIMES, THE (LONDON). Supplement to the Times War Atlas. 19 maps. London, 1915.

TIMES, NEW YORK. The New York Times War Map (of Western Front). In five sections, making map 50x58 in. when mounted. Issued with the Sunday Times of December 30, 1917; January 6, January 13, January 20, and January 27, 1918.

WAR COLLEGE, U. S. A. Strategic map of Central Europe, showing the international frontiers. Prepared in the War College Division, General Staff, War Department. 61x731⁄2 in. Washington, 1915.

WILLSDEN, S. B. The World's Greatest War. colored maps. Chicago, 1917.

31 pp.; 13

It has been said that the present generation has learned more geography in the last three years and a half than in all the decades before. In connection with the war, the world has been studying not only political and historical geography, but economic and physical geography as never before. The location of the world's coal and iron supply, its oil and wheat fields, its trade routes, its racial units, as well as political and military boundaries have become objects of serious consideration and study by persons who had never given any thought to these questions.

During the last six months, the newspapers have been eagerly studying and mapping the resources of Russia, in the desperate effort to forecast, if possible, the effect upon the great economic issues of the war of the temporary disintegration of the once formidable empire of the Tsars. A year ago Romania was the subject of particular interest, while the topography of northeastern France, and the rôle of the coal and iron deposits in Western Europe have been of paramount importance from the beginning of the war. Even the layman has become familiar with the expression an ironless France" and with the half-truths, that the sanguinary campaigns about Verdun were a fight for iron, as that of Lens is a struggle for coal. (Cp. map p. 11.)1 In the early days of the war, when the freedom of the seas was still a subject of discussion, men were examining the maps to determine the remarkable geographical basis of England's unique commercial empire. Germany's claim to direct access to the trade of the world by the shortest routes raised innumerable questions as to the geography and history of Antwerp, Trieste, Salonica and Constantinople. With each larger change in the military situation, the topography of that section of Europe directly involved has attracted particular attention.

To the majority of readers, the facts concerning the surface conditions of the European continent have not been readily accessible and it is therefore a matter of especial satisfaction that we now have a book on this subject, which is not only thoroughly scientific, but also popular in style and presentation, in Professor Johnson's "Topography and Strategy in the War." The title sounds a little technical, but the author interprets strategy in a broad sense. includes not merely the strategy of the military campaigns, but to some extent also the larger problems of this world conflict.

It

The western theatre of the war is introduced by 1 Map references are made to the maps in this number of the Reprints.

a remarkably lucid description of "The Paris Basin," with its geological strata uniformly and gradually rising toward the east, each ending in a more or less steep escarpment, thus forming a succession of impregnable barriers against invasion from the Rhine. (Cp. map p. 7.) To this is due the fact that the Germans unhesitatingly invaded France along the coastal plain, even though it was the longer route by eighty miles; though it necessitated the violation of treaty pledges, and the rape of Belgium; forced England into the war, and invited the moral condemnation of the neutral world. Following the chapter on the terrain are three chapters on the campaigns of the western area bringing out in detail the relation of land formation to military operations.

On the east front, the topographical factor is less dominant, though to most readers the description of the altogether exceptional topography of the moraine area in East Prussia, and the account of the skilful use made of the Mazurian Lakes by Von Hindenburg in his attack on the invading Russians in 1914 will help to explain the terrible punishment of the Russian forces in this region. (Cp. map p. 8.) Equally new to many will be the author's explanation of the strong natural defenses of the Polish salient, against which the German frontal attacks were again and again broken. In the meantime, the exposed area of Galicia was overrun by the Russians. They seized the Carpathians and straightened out their line in that sec

Then the unexpected happened. In the early summer of 1915, Von Mackensen drove a wedge right through the Russian line eastward from Cracow to Lemberg. Then swinging northward, he threatened the Warsaw railways from Odessa and Kiev, while Von Hindenburg attacked in the direction of the Petrograd-Warsaw line. This did what all the frontal attacks had failed to accomplish. It forced the Grand Duke to give up his battle-line, the longest in history, and retreat. In the retreat admirable use was made of the defensive possibilities of the rivers and marshes, a strategy to which the ultimate escape of the Grand Duke's colossal army into the interior of Russia is in a last analysis to be attributed.

But even though the Russian army extricated itself, the retreat and the surrender of a territory larger than Germany itself to the invader was a stupendous defeat. Its effect soon appeared not only in Russia, but in the Balkans. "For back of the Russian lines lay the Balkan States, politically, if not geographically." The reaction upon Bulgaria of the colossal victory was clearly foreseen by the German strate

Early in October Bulgar armies were combining in

This at once called into play, as Professor Johnson points out, a very powerful topographical factor in the Balkans. Up to the entrance of Bulgaria into the war, Serbia had held an impregnable position in her guardianship of the great Morava-Vardar trench with its secondary trench from Nish eastward into the Bulgarian plateau. (Cp. map p. 9.) Austria's frontal attacks on the north end of the trench had all been hurled back. Now the entire main valley was at one blow, open to a flank attack by the Bulgarian army. This, together with the powerful Austrian-German forces attacking at the northern entrance to the trench, crushed Serbian resistance. The extreme importance of the results of this successful articulation of strategy and topography appears in several ways. The Central Powers gained complete control, not only of the Morava-Vardar trench to Salonica, but also of the "Morava-Maritza trench carrying the Orient railway, that vital artery which alone assured continued life to the Turkish Empire." The water route by the Danube was also opened to the enemy by the expulsion of Serbia from the Iron Gates.

The tremendous import of this can only be appreciated when considered in its relation to the situation at Constantinople. The memorable attack of the Allied fleet on the Dardanelles was undertaken, it will be recalled, before the opening of communication through Serbia from the Central Powers to Turkey. The Turks were desperately short in ammunition for their coast defense guns, and it was the knowledge of this condition that led to the attempt to force the Strait, and the loss of the Buvette and Queen Elizabeth.

The abandonment of further efforts at that time was dictated by the deadly work of the Turkish batteries and by the rumors that supplies had reached Constantinople through Romania. These were groundless, and another day's fighting we now know would have exhausted the Turkish ammunition.

rumors

With the defeat of Serbia, however, and the opening of the vital artery" between the Central Powers and Turkey, the opportunity to take Constantinople by assault was lost. Nor was this the only result. The extension of the battle line of the Central Powers tended naturally to endanger the position of Romania long since restive and impatient to seize the opportunity of the war to free the Romanians of Transylvania from Magyar domination.

Romania's position was formidable both for defensive and offensive operations. As Professor Johnson points out the Transylvanian Alps on the north and west, and the broad Danube on the south, formed a strong frontier. The only undefended section was the southern boundary of the Dobrudja, a stretch of 100 miles. Here lay the vulnerable spot to be guarded against all attack, or better still to be utilized as a gateway for offensive operations. Co-operating with the allied force at Salonica and the Russian from the Black Sea, the objective of such an offensive would have been the Orient railway, the possible elimination

of Turkey from the war, and the capture of Varna and of Constantinople. Some of the highest stakes of the war lay within reach. If ever there was an invitation to enlighten allied strategy, it was here. But it was not accepted. Local and political ambitions determined Romania's action rather than topography, or a military policy developed on the basis of topography and allied strategy in general.

Romania decided to invade Transylvania. This gave the Central Powers their opportunity. Transylvania could be left to the Romanians till Von Mackensen gathered his forces in Bulgaria opposite the defenseless Dobrudja line for a series of crushing blows, while Von Falkenhayn waited the opportune moment to crush the heads of the Romanian invading columns or cut their line of communication. "For her part," says Professor Johnson, "Germany, the controlling genius of the Central Powers, permitted no political considerations to warp the plans for dealing with the Romanian menace. She prescribed a plan of campaign which involved deliberate sacrifice of large areas in Transylvania to the impatient grasp of Romania, and gathered strength for an assault on the Dobrudja gateway which should effectually close the way to any future menace to Bulgaria from that quarter." Romania was herself invaded and occupied, and her armies pushed north and east to the line of the Sereth near the Russian border.

Thus by a misdirected and purely local strategy Romania and the allies invited a defeat which, like the Serbian disaster, brought enormous advantages to the enemy. His battle line was shortened by 500 miles, the oil and wheat fields fell into his hands, while the Orient railway freed from all danger on the north "continued to carry munitions to the Turk."

For

In the Italian theatre of the war the problems of strategy arising from topographical conditions, while much more localized, are nevertheless equally significant. (Cp. map p. 10.) When Italy entered the war that she would quickly occupy the Trentino, and that in May, 1915, there were many persons who expected her armies would sweep around the head of the Adriatic and occupy Trieste. Months passed and only a small portion of Italia Irredenta was redeemed. In the meantime the rapid advance of Cadorna's troops across the boundary and parts of the Isonzo to the edge of the Carso plain also came to a halt. more than a year little or no apparent progress was made. Criticism and malicious rumors of Italian policy and Italian good faith were frequently heard. But to anyone familiar with the terrain it was clear that the almost impregnable positions in the mountains about Goriza and along the edge of the Carso must be at least partially reduced before either of the rocky gateways to the city of Trieste could be attempted. Nor is it only the mountain wall that checked the Italians; the Isonzo itself presented formidable obstacles. The work of Cadorna seemed impossible of achievement.

Nevertheless by tunneling and driving trenches to