ART. 1981. [1976.]-If the contract be onerous, but made in fraud on the part of the debtor, but in good faith on the part of the person with whom he contracted, if the value of the property transferred by such contract exceed by one-fifth the price or consideration given for it, the creditors may annul the contract, and take back the property on paying the price or the value of the consideration with interest, but in this case they shall not receive the fruits.

C. C. 1860 (1854), 1986 (1981); 7 L. 311; 16 L. 145.

ART. 1982. [1977.]-If the party, with whom the debtor contracted, be in fraud as well as the debtor, he shall not, on the annulling the contract be entitled to a restitution of the price or consideration he may have paid, except for so much as he shall prove has inured to the benefit of the creditors by adding to the amount of property applicable to the payment of their debts; but if the only consideration be a sum due from such debtor to the party with whom he contracted, then the only restitution to be made is the placing the parties in the situation in which they were before the contract complained of was made.

6 L. 83; 11 R. 190; 2 A. 14; 13 A. 601; 14 A. 30; 24 A. 217.

ART. 1983. [1978.]-But if such fraud consist merely in the endeavor to obtain a preference over other creditors, for the securing of payment of a just debt, under circumstances in which by law the endeavor to obtain such preference is declared to be a constructive fraud, in such case the party shall only lose the advantage endeavored to be secured by such contract, and shall be reimbursed what he may have given. or paid, but without interest; and he shall restore all advantages he has received from the transaction.

3 L. 284; 4 L. 83; 6 A. 552; 21 A. 271, 273; 23 A. 800.

ART. 1984. [1979.]-Every contract shall be deemed to have been made in fraud of creditors, when the obligee knew that the obligor was in insolvent circumstances, and when such contract gives to the obligee, if he be a creditor, any advantage over other creditors of the obligor.

C. C. 1970 (1965), 1978 (1973), 1984 (1979), 2778 (2749), 3360 (3324); 4 L. 254; 6 L. 83; 10 L. 363; 2 R. 38, 99; 4 R. 438; 5 R. 288; 12 R. 141; 14 A. 516; 17 A. 75; 19 A. 289; 24 A. 217.

ART. 1985. [1980.]-By being in insolvent circumstances is meant, that the whole property and credits are not equal in amount, at a fair appraisement, to the debts due by the party. And if he, who alleges the insolvency shows the amount of debts, it is incumbent on the other party to show property to an equal or greater amount. To prove the state of his affairs at the period of the contract, the debtor may, at the option of the

plaintiff, be examined as a witness in the action for annulling the contract.

C. C. 2281 (2260), 3027 (2996), 3556 (3522); 5 N. S. 620; 4 L. 254; 3 R. 106, 407; 4 R. 38; 12 R. 141; 5 A. 400; 14 A. 364; 19 A. 183, 197, 289. D. Sec. 295. Acts 1866, p. 144.

ART. 1986. [1981.]-No sale of property, or other contract made in the usual course of the party's business, nor any payment of a just debt in money, shall be affected by virtue of any provision in this section, although the party was in insolvent circumstances, and the person with whom he contracted, or to whom he made the payment, knew of such insolvency.

C. C. 1981 (1976), 2658 (2628); 4 L. 341; 6 L. 345; 19 L. 594; 4 R. 438; 16 A. 402; 24 A. 158.

ART. 1987. [1982.]-No contract made between the debtor and one of his creditors for the purpose of securing a just debt, shall be set aside under this section, although the debtor were insolvent to the knowledge of the creditor with whom he contracted, and although the other creditors are injured thereby, if such contract were made more than one year before bringing the suit to avoid it, and if it contain no other cause of nullity than the preference given to one creditor over another.

C. C. 1993 (1988), 1994 (1989), 2446 (2421), 3534 (3499); 3 L. 26, 274; 4 L. 260; 8 L. 308; 9 L. 106; 11 L. 424, 532; 14 L. 308, 322; 16 L. 103, 375; 19 L. 600; 1 R. 435; 2 R. 277; 4 R. 408, 438; 5 R. 288; 6 R. 142; 9 R. 267; 11 R. 298; 2 A. 659; 3 A. 248; 4 A. 65; 10 A: 20; 15 A. 177; 24 A. 124.

ART. 1988. [1983.]-If a debtor, in insolvent circumstances, shall anticipate the payment of a debt not yet payable, and shall make this payment to the injury of the creditors whose debts were either then due, or would fall due before that of which he anticipated the payment, this shall be deemed to have been done in fraud of the creditors, and the creditor so preferred shall be obliged to share the loss ratably with the complaining creditors, each creditor, however, preserving the right of mortgage or privilege, if any, which his original debt gave him by law. C. C. 1984 (1979); 14 A. 475. Acts 1855, p. 437, § 28.

ART. 1989. [1984.]-Not only contracts which dispose of property, but all others which are made in fraud of creditors, and deprive them of their recourse to the property of their debtor, come within the provisions of this section. The renunciation of a succession or other right to property, the release of a debt without payment, or any other act of this kind, may be avoided by creditors, when done to their prejudice, under the rules above established.

C. C. 2585 (2563); 7 L. 569; 19 L. 431; 1 R. 26; 4 R. 438; 8 R. 13; 1 A. 265; 2 A. 363; 3, A. 338.

ART. 1990. [1985.]-In case the debtor refuse or neglect to accept an inheritance to the prejudice of his creditors, they may accept the same, and exercise all his rights in the manner pro

vided for in the title of successions, and they are authorized, by virtue of the action given by this section, to exercise all the rights existing in favor of the debtor for recovering possession of the property to which he is entitled, in order to make the same available to the payment of their debts.

C. C. 1021 (1014), 1071 (1064), 1072 (1065), 1504 (1491); C. N. 1167; 11 R. 314; 12 A. 465, 864; 16 A. 299.

ART. 1991. [1986.]-There are rights of the debtor, however, which the creditor can not exercise, even should he refuse to avail himself of them.

They can not require the separation of property between husband and wife; nor can they oblige their debtor to accept a donation inter vivos made to him, nor can they accept it in his stead. Neither can they call on a co-heir of the debtor to collate, when such debtor has not exercised that right.

C. C. 1021 (1014), 1990 (1985), 2585 (2563); C. N. 1167; C. P. 904; 2 A. 843 ; 12 A. 465.

ART. 1992. [1987.]-There are also rights which are merely personal, that can not be made liable to the payment of debts, and therefore no contract respecting them comes within the provision of this section; these are the rights of personal servitude, of use and habitation, of usufruct of the estate of a minor child, to the income of dotal property, to money due for the salary of an office, or wages, or recompense for personal services. C. C. 1021 (1014), 1990 (1985), 2183 (2179); C. N. 1167; C. P. 644, 647; 1 R. 399, 435; 4 R. 340; 2 A. 843; 4 A. 307; 10 A. 545; 12 A. 465; 16 A. 379, 399; 23 A. 498. Acts 1852, p. 222.

ART. 1993. [1988.]-No creditor can, by the action given by this section, sue individually to annul any contract made before the time his debt accrued.

C. C. 1847 (1841), 1848 (1812), 1849 (1843), 1987 (1982), 2221 (2218); 5 N. S. 96, 634; 2 L 543; 4 L. 142, 261; 5 L. 126; 6 L. 540; 12 L. 201; 17 L. 360; 1 R. 435; 1 A. 132; 6 A. 89; 12 A. 173, 207; 14 A. 475, 477; 15 A. 177, 179.

ART. 1994. [1989.]-The action given by this section, is limited to one year; if brought by a creditor individually, to be counted from the time he has obtained judgment against the debtor; if brought by syndics or other representatives of the creditors collectively, to be counted from the day of their appointment.

C. C. 226 (242), 1968 (1963), 1987 (1982), 3520 (3486), 3534 (3499); C. P. 613, 614; 8 N. S. 75; 3 L. 26, 29; 4 L. 260; 8 L. 308; 9 L. 107; 11 L. 346, 424, 532; 14 L. 322; 16 L. 106, 370; 19 L. 594; 1 R. 435; 2 R. 277, 408, 438; 4 R. 395, 436; 5 R. 288; 6 R. 142; 9 R. 518; 10 R. 74; 11 R. 314; 1 A. 132, 262, 440; 2 A. 483, 659; 3 A. 248, 627; 4 A. 36, 65, 329; 5 A. 400; 8 A. 81, 453; 10 A. 20; 14 A. 106, 364, 475, 477, 520; 20 A. 247; 24 A. 124, 522.

CHAPTER 4.

Of the Different Kinds of Obligations.

SECTION 1.

General Division of the Subject.

ART 1995. [1990.]-The preceding chapters of this title have established rules applicable to contracts in general: this contains an enumeration of such obligations as are usually inserted in different contracts, and the following chapters show how they may be formed, proved and extinguished. Subsequent titles enumerate the different kinds of contracts into which the general obligations may enter, and provide rules for their gov

ernment.

ART. 1996. [1991.]-Independent of the division of obligations contained in the first chapter of this title, those that usually enter into particular contracts, may be further distinguished by the following classification:

Those which are strictly personal, or heritable, or real;
Simple or conditional;

Limited or unlimited as to the time of performance;

Disjunctive or alternative;

In relation to the parties, joint, several, or in solido;

In their nature, divisible or indivisible;

As to their form, penal or not penal.

Each of these divisions forms the subject of a different section of this chapter.

SECTION 2.

Of strictly Personal, Heritable and Real Obligations.

ART. 1997. [1992.]-An obligation is strictly personal, when none but the obligee can enforce the performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor.

It is heritable when the heirs and assigns of the one party may enforce the performance against the heirs of the other.

It is real when it is attached to immovable property, and passes with it into whatever hands it may come, without making the third possessor personally responsible.

C. C. 2645 (2615); 9 A. 589; 12 A. 560.

ART. 1998. [1993.]-An obligation may be personal as to the obligee, and heritable as to the obligor, and it may in like manner be heritable as to the obligee, and personal as to the obligor. ART. 1999. [1994.]-Every obligation shall be deemed to be

heritable as to both parties, unless the contrary be specially expressed, or necessarily implied from the nature of the contract. 6 L. 102; 9 A. 463; 12 A. 560; 19 A. 448; 22 A. 187.

ART. 2000. [1995.]-The obligation shall be presumed to be personal on the part of the obligor, whenever, in a contract to do, he undertakes to perform any thing that requires his personal skill or attention; in this case, if that, which was to be done, was not solely and exclusively for the use or gratification of the obligee, the obligation, although personal as to the obligor, will be heritable against the heirs of the obligee for the equivalent to be paid or given for that which was to be done.

ART. 2001. [1996.]—The obligation shall be presumed to be personal as to the obligee, in a contract to do or to give, when that which was to be done or given, was exclusively for the personal gratification of the obligee, and could produce no benefit to his heirs.

ART. 2002. [1997.]-In case of obligations purely personal as to the obligor, if he have received an equivalent that can be appreciated in money as a consideration, but dies before performance of his obligation, his heirs may be obliged to restore it or its value.

ART. 2003. [1998.]—In like manner, if the obligation be purely personal as to the obligee who dies before performance, his heirs may recover from the obligor the value of any equivalent he may have received.

ART. 2004. [1999.]-An obligation to pay an annuity to a certain person during the life of the obligor, is personal as to both, and is extinguished by the death of either.

ART. 2005. [2000.]-A merely personal obligation to do, imposed by testament as the condition on which a legacy is to take effect, is void, if the legatee die before performance, or before he has been put in default; but the legacy will take effect.

C. C. 2030 (2025).

ART. 2006. [2001.]-But if what is to be. done, be a thing that can as well be done by the heirs of the legatee as by him, the obligation shall be heritable, and they must perform it before the legacy can take effect. The provisions of this and the preceding article relate only to testamentary dispositions.

ART. 2007. [2002.]-All contracts for the hire of labor, skill or industry, without any distinction, whether they can be as well performed by any other as by the obligor, unless there be some special agreement to the contrary, are considered as personal on the part of the obligor, but heritable on the part of the obligee.

Contracts of mandate and partnership are mutually personal.

23 A. 498.