SEC. 4883. All patents shall be issued in the name of the United States of America, under the seal of the patent office, and shall be signed by the Secretary of the Interior and countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and they shall be recorded, together with the specifications, in the patent office, in books to be kept for that purpose.

Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 21, 16 Stat. 200.

Prior Statutes-April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.-Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.-July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 118.

Principles of Construction.

Patent laws should be liberally construed to meet the wise and beneficent object of the legislature. Patentees are a meritorious class, and the courts will give them all the aid and protection which the law allows. Commissioner v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 522; Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean 432; Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218; s. c. 1 Robb 604.

The right of property which a patentee has in his invention, and his right to its exclusive use, are derived altogether from the statute. An inventor has no right of property in his invention upon which he can maintain suit, unless he obtains a patent for it according to the statute, and his rights are to be regulated and measured by its provisions, and can not go beyond them. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183; s. c. 2 Curt. 371.

When Congress are legislating to protect inventors, their attention is necessarily attracted to the authority under which they are acting, and it ought not lightly to be presumed that they intended to go beyond it, and exercise another and distinct power conferred on them for a different purpose. Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183; s. c. 2 Curt. 371.

A special act extending a patent must be construed in connection with the statute. They are statutes in pari materia, and all relate to the same subject, and must be construed together. Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539; Jordan v. Dobson, 4 Fish. 232; s. c. 7 Phila. 533; s. c. 2 Abb. U. S. 398.

A special act of Congress in favor of a patentee, extending the time beyond that originally limited, must be considered as engrafted on the general law. Bloomer v. McQuewen, 14 How. 539.

An act of Congress which gives a patent for an invention will, if it is ambiguous, be construed to give damages for the construction or use of the invention only after the grant of the patent, so that it may not be deemed to create rights retrospectively, or make men liable for damages for acts lawful at the time when they were done. Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story 164; s. c. 3 Sumner 535; s. c. 1 Robb 734, 742.

The courts can never presume that Congress intended to decide that an individual is an author or inventor in a general act, the words of which

do not render such a construction unavoidable. Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454; s. c. Pet. C. C. 322; s. c. 1 Robb 68, 243.

The grant of an exclusive privilege to an invention for a limited time does not imply a binding and irrevocable contract with the people that at the expiration of the period the invention shall become their property. Congress may renew the patent right at the end of the period or decline to do so. Evans v. Eaton, 3 Wheat. 454; s. c. Pet. C. C. 322; s. c. I Robb 68, 243.

Signature.

If a patent is issued without the signature of the Secretary of the Interior it is void. Marsh v. Nichols, 15 Fed. Rep. 914; s. c. 24 O. G.901. If a patent was not signed by the Secretary of the Interior at the time of the commencement of a suit, a subsequent signing will not make it valid as of the date when it was issued. Marsh v. Nichols, 15 Fed. Rep. 914; s. c. 24 O. G. 901.

If a patent was not signed when it was issued it can not be signed by the Secretary of the Interior after his tenure of office has expired. Marsh v. Nichols, 15 Fed. Rep. 914; s. c. 24 O. G. 901.

As the Secretary of the Interior must by law sign the patent, as well as the commissioner, should the patent be altered after he signs it, he must be made aware of any such subsequent alteration and sanction it before his signature can be regarded as verifying the amended patent. The entry of his sanction upon the letters patent themselves would be a convenient mode of perpetuating the evidence of it, but in principle nothing seems to be demanded beyond his assent or ratification. Woodworth v. Hall, 1 W. & M. 389; s. c. 2 Robb 517.

SEC. 4884. Every patent shall contain a short title or description of the invention or discovery, correctly indicating its nature and design, and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery throughout the United States, and the territories thereof, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. A copy of the specification and drawings shall be annexed to the patent and be a part thereof.

Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 201.

Prior Statutes-April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109.-Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318.-July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 118.-March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 249.

Rules of Construction.

Patents for inventions under the fair application of the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat, are, if practicable, to be so interpreted as to uphold and not to destroy the right of the inventor. Turrill v. Railroad Com

pany, 1 Wall. 491; Stover v. Halstead, 13 Blatch. 95; s. c. 8 O. G. 558; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 98; Ryan v. Goodwin, 3 Sumner 514; s. c. 1 Robb 725; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433; Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean 303; Ingels v. Mast, 6 Fish. 415; Davoll v. Brown, 1 W. & M. 53; s. c. 2 Robb 303; Union Paper Bag Co. v. Nixon, 6 Fish. 402; s. c. 4 O. G. 31 ; Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788; s. c. 2 Fish. 499; s. c. 2 Cliff, 351; Goodyear v. Berry, 3 Fish. 439; s. c. 2 Bond 189; Goodyear Dental Co. v. Gardner, 4 Fish. 224; s. c. 3 Cliff. 408; Brown v. Guild, 23 Wall. 181; s. c. 6 O. G. 392; s. c. 7 0. G. 739; Adams v. Joliet Manuf. Co., 12 O. G. 93; s. c. 3 Ban & Ard. 1; Blaisdell v. Tufts, 15 O. G. 881; s. c. 3 Ban & Ard. 521.

This principle is not to be carried so far as to exclude what is in it, or to interpolate anything which it does not contain. Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788; s. c. 2 Fish. 499; s. c. 2 Cliff. 351.

The rights secured by a patent for an invention or discovery are as much property as anything else real or incorporeal. The titles by which they are held, like other titles, should not be overthrown upon doubts or objections capable of a reasonable and just solution in favor of their validity. Blandy v. Griffith, 3 Fish. 609.

Patents for inventions are treated as a just reward to ingenious men, and as highly beneficial to the public, not only by holding out suitable encouragement to genius, and talents, and enterprise, but as ultimately securing to the whole community great advantages from the free communication of secrets and processes and machinery, which may be most important to all the great interests of society, to agriculture, to commerce and to manufactures, as well as to the cause of science and art. Specifications are therefore clearly entitled to a liberal construction, since they are granted not as restrictions upon the rights of the community, but “to promote science and useful arts." Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story 164; s. c. 3 Sumner 535; s. c. 1 Robb 734, 742; Bussey v. Wager, 9 O. G. 300; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 229; Treadwell v. Parrott, 3 Fish. 124; s. c. 5 Blatch. 369; Dennis v. Cross, 6 Fish. 138; s. c. 3 Biss. 389; Potter v. Holland, 1 Fish. 382; s. c. 4 Blatch. 238; Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., 5 Fish. 90; s. c. 1 Holmes 45; s. c. 3 Cliff. 336; s. c. 1 O. G. 91; Singer v. Walmsley, 1 Fish. 558; Birdsell v. McDonald, 6 O. G. 682; s. c. 1 Ban & Ard. 165; Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252; Goodyear v. Central R. R. Co., 1 Fish. 626; s. c. 2 Wall. Jr. 356; Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330;. 4 Am. L. J. 498; Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean 303; Parker v. Stiles, 5 McLean 44; Ames v. Howard, 1 Sumner 482; s. c. 1 Robb 689; Latta v. Shawk, 1 Fish. 465; s. c. 1 Bond 259; Bloomer v. Stolley, 5 McLean 158; Parker v. Haworth, 4 McLean 370; s. c. 2 Robb 725; Waterbury Brass Co. v. N. Y. Brass Co., 3 Fish. 43; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 437; s. c. 2 Blatch. 1; s. c. 2 Robb 655; Davoll v. Brown, 1 W. & M. 53; s. c. 2 Robb 303; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516; s. c. 3 Fish. 555; Adair v. Thayer, 17 Blatch. 468; s. c. 5 Ban & Ard. 118; s. c. 4 Fed. Rep. 441.

It is the duty of the court in construing a patent to so construe it, if it

can without doing violence to the language used, as not to defeat the claim of the patentee, but to give to the patentee what he has actually invented, and all that he has actually invented-in other words, to make the claim commensurate with the invention which has been actually made by the patentee. New York v. Ransom, 1 Fish. 252; s. c. 23 How. 487; Swift v. Whisen, 3 Fish. 343; s. c. 2 Bond 115; Parker v. Stiles, 5 McLean 44; Coffin v. Ogden, 3 Fish. 640; s. c. 7 Blatch. 61; Union Sugar Refinery v. Mathiessen, 2 Fish. 600; s. c. 3 Cliff. 639; Whipple v. Middlesex Co., 4 Fish. 41; Roots v. Hyndman, 6 Fish. 439; s. c. 4 O. G. 29; Rogers v. Sargent, 7 Blatch. 507; Hovey v. Stevens, 3 W. & M. 17; s. c. 2 Robb 567; Andrews v. Carman, 13 Blatch. 307; s. c. 9 O. G. 1011; S. C. 2 Ban & Ard. 277; Estabrook v. Dunbar, 10 O. G. 909; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 427; Judson v. Moore, 1 Fish. 544; s. c. 1 Bond 285; Johnson v. Linen Co., 33 Conn. 436; Smith v. Fay, 6 Fish. 446; Clark v. Kennedy Manuf. Co., 14 Blatch. 79; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 470; s. c. 11 O. G. 68; Goodyear v. Providence Rubber Co., 2 Fish. 499; s. c. 9 Wall. 788; s. c. 2 Cliff. 35; Hamilton v. Ives, 6 Fish. 244; s. c. 3 O. G. 30; Francis v. Mellor, 5 Fish. 153; s. c. 8 Phila. 157; s. c. 5 A. L. T. (U.S.) 237; s. c. 1 O. G. 48; Union Paper Bag Co. v. Nixon, 6 Fish. 402; s. c.4 O. G. 31; Henderson v. Cleveland Stove Co., 12 O. G. 4 ; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 604; Adams v. Joliet Manuf. Co., 3 Ban & Ard. 1; s. c. 12 O. G. 91; Fuch v. Bragg, 8 Fed. Rep. 588; s. c. 20 O. G. 1589.

The general rule that a patent will be liberally construed will not be applied in a case where it is evident that the claim has been expressed in loose, ambiguous or general terms for the fraudulent purpose of apparently covering subsequent inventions, especially where the objectionable claim has been first introduced in a reissue for the purpose of covering the subsequent invention of another. Taylor v. Garretson, 5 Fish. 116; s. c. 9 Blatch. 156.

If a reissue was taken out for the purpose of securing a broad claim the patentee will be held to it, although the result may be that the reissue is void for want of novelty. Wisner v. Grant, 7 Fed. Rep. 922; s. c. 5

Ban & Ard. 217.

The word "process" in a reissue will not be construed to mean machinery, for the same liberality of construction does not prevail in the case of a reissue as in the case of an original patent. Hatch v. Moffit, 15 Fed. Rep. 252.

A patent should be construed in such a way, if possible, as to conform to the actual invention. Hale v. Stimpson, 2 Fish. 565; Stimpson v. Woodman, 3 Fish. 98; s. c. 10 Wall. 117; Taylor v. Garretson, 5 Fish. 116; s. c. 9 Blatch. 156; Bussey v. Wager, 9 O. G. 300; s. c. 2 Ban & Ard. 229; Barnes v. Straus, 5 Fish. 531; s. c. 9 Blatch. 553; s. c. 2 0. G. 62; Gallahue v. Butterfield, 6 Fish. 203; s. c. 10 Blatch. 232; 2 O. G. 645; Mahn v. Harwood, 14 O. G. 859; s. c. 3 Ban & Ard. 515.

The patentee may so restrict his claim as to cover less than what he invented, yet such an interpretation should not be put upon his claim if it can fairly be construed otherwise. Winans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330; s. c. 4 Am. L. J. 498.