guage is not an infringement of a copyright. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547.

If a translator of a dramatic composition obtains a copyright, he can not prevent others from acting a prior translation made with the author's consent in England. Shook v. Rankin, 6 Biss. 477.

A fair abridgment of any book is considered a new work, as to write it requires labor and the exercise of judgment. It is only new in the view that the sense of the author is given in a condensed form. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100.

Works on law, whether elementary or otherwise, are proper subjects of abridgment. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306.

There is a clear distinction between a compilation and an abridgment. To abridge requires the exercise of the mind, and that is not copying. To compile is to copy from various authors into one work. An abridgment is a condensation of the views of the author; a compilation consists of selected extracts from different authors. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306.

It may not be essential to exclude extracts entirely from an abridgment, but in making extracts merely there is no condensation of the language of the author, and consequently there is no abridgment of it. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186.

A copy of a book must be a transcript of the language in which the conceptions of the author are clothed, of something printed and embodied in a tangible shape. The same conceptions clothed in another language can not constitute the same composition, nor can it be called a transcript or copy of the same book. Stowe v. Thomas, 2 Wall. Jr. 547.

A copy is one thing, an imitation or resemblance another. What degree of imitation constitutes an infringement is a nice question in many Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768.

cases.

It is not sufficient to show that one work may have been suggested by another, or that some parts and pages of it have resemblances to the other. It must be further shown that the resemblances in those parts and pages are so close, so full, so uniform and so striking, as to fairly lead to the conclusion that one is a substantial copy of the other, or mainly borrowed from it. Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768.

In order to constitute an invasion of a copyright, it is not necessary that the whole of the work shall be copied, or even a large portion of it, in form or in substance. The entirety of the copyright is the property of the author, and it is no defence that another has appropriated a part and not the whole of any property. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186.

Whether there has been an infringement does not necessarily depend upon the quantity taken. It often depends upon other considerations, the value of the materials taken, and their importance to the sale of the original work. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100.

If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished,

or the labors of the author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated, that is sufficient to constitute a piracy pro tanto. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186.

It is not necessary that the infringing book shall be the same, word for word, but a mere alteration of a portion of the book will not deprive the author of the protection given by the law, provided there is a use of the book substantially in all respects. Boucicault v. Wood, 2 Biss. 34; s. c. 16 A. L. Reg. 539.

Copying is not confined to literal repetition, but includes the various modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated or transferred with more or less colorable alteration to disguise the piracy. Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186; Drury v. Ewing, 1 Bond 540.

If a copyright is taken of the letters of a famous person, it is a piracy to write a life of him made up mainly by copying certain letters in full. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100.

In a dramatic composition, the series of events directed in writing by the author in any particular scene is his invention, and a piracy is committed if that in which the whole merit of the scene consists is incorporated in another work without any material alteration in the constituent parts of the series of events, or in the sequence of the events in the series. Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatch. 256.

Movement, gesture and facial expression, which address the eye only, are as much a part of the dramatic composition as is the spoken language which addresses the ear only, and that part of the written composition which gives direction for the movement and gesture is as much a part of the composition, and protected by the copyright, as is the language prescribed to be uttered by the characters. Daly v. Palmer, 6 Blatch. 256, A play which is a mere spectacle, and must be seen to be appreciated, has no value except as it is appreciated by the public. If the result of the exhibition of the original and the alleged infringement is so nearly the same as to produce the impression that they are identical upon ordinary spectators, one should be held to be a mere colorable imitation of the other. Martinetti v. Maguire, 1 Deady 216; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 356.

No compiler of a book which is a mere compilation of facts from common and universal sources of information, has a monopoly of the subject of which the book treats. Any other person is permitted to enter that department of literature and make a similar book. But the subsequent investigator must investigate for himself from the original sources which are open to all. He can not use the labors of a previous compiler, animo furandi, and save his own time by copying the results of the previous compiler's study, although the same results would have been obtained by independent labor. Banks v. McDivett, 13 Blatch. 163; s. c. 8 O. G. 860; Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 O. G. 254; Gray v. Russell, 1 Story 11; Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine 393, 397; Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306; Emerson v. Davies, 3 Story 768; Greene v. Bishop, 1 Cliff. 186; Farmer v. Calvert Publishing Co., 1 Flippin 228; s. c. 5 A. L. T. 158.

If the judge prepares the head notes to the reports, the author of a

digest made up of such head notes has no ground to complain because another author in his digest uses the same.

932; s. c. 4 Cliff. 306.

Chase v. Sanborn, 6 O. G.

In case of a dictionary or other work of that kind, similarities and some use of a prior work, even to copying of small parts, is allowed, if the main design and execution are in reality novel or improved, and not a mere cover for an important piracy. Webb v. Powers, 2 W. & M. 497.

One compiler can not copy the plan or arrangement of another compilation. Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 306.

Although the plan or arrangement of a book may be secured to an author, if it is the product of his own genius, yet a mere list of debtors and creditors, with their residences, and the amount and value of their debts, does not possess any such novelty of plan or arrangement as will preclude any other person from making and publishing similar lists from independent sources of information. Lawrence v. Cupples, 9 O. G. 254.

The right secured by the act is the property in the literary composition, the product of the mind and genius of the author, and not in the name or title given to it. The title does not necessarily involve any literary composition. It may not be, and the statute does not require that it should be, the product of the author's mind. It is a mere appendage which only identifies, and frequently does not in any way describe, the literary composition itself or represent its character, and if there is no piracy of the book, there is no remedy for the use of the title. Osgood v. Allen, 1 Holmes 185; s. c. 3 O. G. 124; Jollie v. Jaques, 1 Blatch. 618; Benn v. Leclercq, 30 Leg. Int. 185.

When the title itself is original and the product of the author's own mind, and is appropriated by the infringement, as well as the whole or a part of the literary composition itself, in protecting other portions of the literary composition the courts will probably also protect the title. Osgood v. Allen, 1 Holmes 185; s. c. 3 O. G. 124.

If a party makes a survey, and deposits it in the navy department, with the understanding that he is to have the exclusive right to publish it, a copy from it will be an infringement. Blunt v. Patten, 2 Paine 393, 397.

No person has the right to publish letters merely because the government bought the manuscript after another had acquired a copyright therein. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story 100.

A copyright of a map of one city is not infringed by a map of another city, although the latter is constructed on the same plan and uses the same arbitrary signs and key. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674.

When both works are compilations, similarities may arise from the character of the works, and yet one may not be a transcript from the other. Bullinger v. Mackey, 15 Blatch. 550.

A chromo designed from a picture found in a foreign publication and circulated in the country before this copyright was obtained is not an infringement. Johnson v. Donaldson, 18 Blatch. 287; s. c. 3 Fed. Rep. 22.

SEC. 4952 A (Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18, Stat. 79). That in the construction of this act, the words "engraving," "cut" and "print" shall be applied only to pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but may be registered in the patent office. And the commissioner of patents is hereby charged with the supervision and control of the entry or registry of such prints or labels, in conformity with the regulations provided by law, as to copyright of prints, except that there shall be paid for recording the title of any print or label not a trade-mark, six dollars, which shall cover the expense of furnishing a copy of the record under the seal of the commissioner of patents, to the party entering the same.

The claim to a label is void if the label was published before its registration. Marsh v. Warren, 24 Pitts. L. J. 207; s. c. 9 C. L. N. 395; s. c. 13 0. G. 7.

The bill should allege that the title and label were deposited before the publication of the label. Marsh v. Warren, 24 Pitts. L. J. 207; s. c. 9 C. L. N. 395; s. c. 13 0. G. 7.

A label may be entered as a label, although it could also be entered as a trade-mark. U. S. v. Willcox & G. S. M. Co., 1 Mackey 284; s. c. 22 O. G. 1366.

A printed balloon intended to be cut apart and manufactured into a balloon can not be considered as a "pictorial illustration or work connected with the fine arts." Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss, 17 O. G. 1153; s. c. 2 Fed. Rep. 217.

A label does not infringe the registry of a label unless it is substantially the same. Lorillard v. Drummond Tobacco Co., 22 O. G. 1208; s. c. 14 Fed. Rep. 111; Lorillard v. McAlpin, 22 O. G. 1208; s. c. 14 Fed. Rep. 112.

When matter that is the proper subject of a trade-mark is apparently claimed by another, the applicant must establish his right to it before he can have it included in a register of a label. Jno. D. Park, 12 O. G. 2. If matter in a label is purely arbitrary and fanciful in its nature, it should be required to be stricken out before registration. W. Simpson & Sons, 10 O. G. 333.

A print made up of a combination of colors, figures and words, adapted in their use to any goods or merchandise, can be properly registered as a label. Schumacher & Ettinger, 9 O. G. 594.

If the superscription is in its main elements a label, the fact that it contains matter which, taken separately, might constitute a trade-mark, is not fatal to its registration. Orcutt & Son, 8 O. G. 277.

A label may be registered although it contains the name of the owner, if that name does not purport to be a fac-simile of his signature. Thaddeus Davids & Co., 16 O. G. 94.

A fanciful pattern to be wrought into or upon the article, forming a part of it and giving to it a certain value by way of a new appearance, can not be registered as a label. T. E. Parker, 13 O. G. 323.

The words "satin," "polish," may be registered as a label for polish for boots. Brigham, 20 O. G. 891.

The words "dirt killer" may be registered as a label. Waeferling, 16 O. G. 764.

The line of separation between labels and trade-marks can not be defined in general terms. It is a matter of judgment in each case. Brigham, 20 O. G. 891.

If a design can be registered as a trade-mark, it can not be registered as a label. Schumacher & Ettlinger, 22 O. G. 1291.

A trade-mark can not be registered as a label. Schumacher & Ettlinger, 22 O. G. 1291; Alexius Godillot, 6 O. G. 641.

If a print is of such a character that its use in connection with the article of trade or manufacture is purely arbitrary and fanciful, it can not be registered as a label. Schumacher v. Ettlinger, 19 O. G. 791.

SEC. 4953. Copyrights shall be granted for the term of twenty-eight years from the time of recording the title thereof, in the manner hereinafter directed.

Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, ? 87, 16 Stat. 212.

Prior Statutes-May 31, 1790, ch. 15, ? 1, 1 Stat. 124.-February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 1, 4 Stat. 436.

1891

SEC. 4954. The author, inventor or designer, if he be amen still living and a citizen of the United States or resident therein, or his widow or children, if he be dead, shall have the same exclusive right continued for the further term of fourteen years, upon recording the title of the work or description of the article so secured a second time, and complying with all other regulations in regard to original copyrights, within six months before the expiration of the first term. And such person shall, within two months from the date of said renewal, cause a copy of the record thereof to be published in one or more newspapers, printed in the United States, for the space of four weeks. Statute Revised-July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 88, 16 Stat. 212.

Prior Statutes-May 31, 1790, ch. 15, ? 1, 1 Stat. 124.—Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 22 2, 3, 4 Stat. 436, 437.