citizens will be enforced in case of need, in pursuance of the policy of the administration adopted when the Third Brigade was detailed there. I have no intimation that this policy of our Government is to be reversed. Unless it is to be reversed, this policy can be enforced only by the maintenance at Tientsin of forces sufficient to cope with any peril to Americans which may be prudently and reasonably anticipated. In the present disturbed conditions, the character of the danger to be guarded against does not reasonably include any hostile action of an organized nature against foreigners. That which may be apprehended reasonably is a condition of local disturbance in which American lives and property might be endangered by unorganized soldiers or riotous mobs who are tempted to violence. The surest precaution against such a contingency is an adequate defensive force. The precautionary value of any such force is in direct relationship to the effectiveness and strength it could exercise in achieving the purpose in view. Of course, the minimum strength of the force necessary from time to time for this precautionary purpose depends upon the political situation and upon the temper of the Chinese people. It was because of an improvement in the latter respect that, somewhat doubtfully, I assented last July to the reduction at Tientsin of the marine forces. The Legation has not observed that the situation since that time has stabilized sufficiently as to justify, in my opinion, any additional reduction of those forces. As for my part, I could not acquiesce in a further reduction at present without feeling that I was gambling with the responsibilities which rest upon me in regard to the protection in North China of American citizens. Moreover, until we have observed the developments between the present time and next spring, it is my opinion that we cannot be in a position to decide whether there has been a sufficient stabilization in the political conditions in China to justify our withdrawal of the marines from Tientsin. The situation at Shanghai, meanwhile, appears to me to be such as to justify a further reduction of the Fourth Regiment, as recommended in my telegram of October 5, 3 p. m.' 893.0146/89: Telegram MACMURRAY The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State [Paraphrase] PEKING, November 5, 1928-9 p. m. [Received November 5-6:15 p. m.] 810. Legation's 805, November 1, 11 a. m. 1. The telegram quoted below has been received from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet: "0007. The day after I sent to you my 0025-2300, the following cable was received from the Navy Department: 'Your recommendations are requested by the Department in regard to the reduction by one thousand men, more or less, of the forces on shore in China, the U. S. S. Chaumont to transport the troops on her return trip late in November.' The following reply was sent by me: 'Your 1325-1446 was received by me the day after I had communicated to the American Minister by telegraph a request for his views concerning a comprehensive plan for withdrawing the troops on shore in China. In general it is contemplated by the plan that the artillery and aviation detachment and engineers will be sent home on the U. S. S. Chaumont. The brigade headquarters and the Sixth Regiment would be left to return home on the U. S. S. Henderson in January. I will submit to the Department my recommendations as soon as I receive a reply from the Minister.' I agree with you that in the matter of maintaining at Tientsin our marine forces there is a frank disagreement between us, and following the conversations which we had last May and September there is no need for us to discuss it further. As you are aware, it is required that I keep the Navy Department constantly and fully informed as to the use of naval forces under my command for ensuring that the lives and property of American citizens will be protected. It is necessary that this be done so that our Government may be assured that its policy is being carried out by me. It is my intention, therefore, to repeat to the Navy Department the messages on the subject which we have exchanged, together with the recommendations following: 'After a final review of the entire question I recommend: (1) That the marines on shore in China be gradually withdrawn; (2) That, considering the tactical and strategic location of Shanghai as well as the section still recognized as the International Settlement, it is the best location for any forces which remain on shore in China, and that the Fourth Regiment be maintained in that city at capacity of strength of two battalions and that they be the last troops to be withdrawn; (3) That the Legation guard be maintained for the present at a strength of 500; (4) That the first withdrawal be made from Tientsin this month on the U. S. S. Chaumont, the remainder of the troops in Tientsin to be withdrawn in January on the U. S. S. Henderson. (5) As to the Minister's fears in regard to mobs of an unorganized soldierly and riotous nature, it may be conceded that throughout China the temptation to violence is latent. Protection of the lives and property of American citizens in China will be extended to all places accessible to landing parties of vessels of the fleet, and, if necessary, such protection will be made effective by landing parties from the Fourth Regiment.' I will [await] your reply before transmitting my message to the Navy Department. 1700." 2. I have sent him today the following reply: "November 5, 9 p. m. Your 0003[0007]-1700 has been received. It is quite agreeable to me that each of us proceed to communicate to our respective departments the correspondence with our several recommendations. Considering the fifth point of your recommendations, interpreted by me in the light of statements which you made to me during our conversations that marine forces would not have been sent by you to Tientsin and that you would not do so in the future, the following comment is being submitted by me to the Department of State: Except for Chefoo and Tsingtao, which would have a limited local utility as havens of refuge for Americans in eastern Shantung, there is not in North China any port accessible to vessels of the fleet which would be physically adequate or would be recommended as a refuge or place of concentration for Americans forced to leave the interior. Thus, in practice, a determination not to give protection by maintaining marine forces at Tientsin would nullify, so far as the Asiatic Fleet is concerned, the aim of our Government to maintain such a place of refuge north of the Yangtze River for Americans who again might be compelled to seek protection in the event, altogether possible, of a recurrence of communistic or other antiforeign influences aggravating that inclination toward violence which is latent throughout China. It is recommended by me, therefore, that until the political situation reaches a measure of stabilization which warrants a reconsideration, the marine forces in Tientsin be retained at substantially their present strength." 893.0146/89 MACMURRAY Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Johnson) 91 [WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1928. 1. There is an issue here not with regard to the question of withdrawing another contingent of our armed forces from China, but with regard to the place from which the next withdrawal shall be made. 2. Both our Minister at Peking and the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet agree that reduction of the marine forces on land in China is at the present moment feasible. The Minister and the Commander-in-Chief differ in their views in that the Minister believes that the force located at present at Tientsin should be retained for the present, and the reduction should be made from the force at Shanghai. The Commander-in-Chief wishes to withdraw the force from Tientsin and leave a force at Shanghai. 3. The Commander-in-Chief is apparently considering his problem as a naval problem, and regards Shanghai as a better base than Tientsin. The Minister is looking at the problem from the point of view of the protection of the Legation and American citizens at Peking, the force at Tientsin being there in part for that purpose. 4. Inasmuch as the Minister has the greater responsibility, and as the problem of insuring the safety of the Legation and American citizens at Peking is necessarily, among problems of protection, of relatively greater concern to him than to the Commander-in-Chief, it is the feeling of the officers of the Department who are concerned primarily with Far Eastern affairs that, in an issue of this sort, the views of the Minister should prevail. 5. It should be especially noted that whichever way the matter is decided, an equal number of marines can be withdrawn, and from the point of view of American policy, the credit which accrues will "This paper bears the notation: "Memorandum for Cabinet." 237577-43-28 be the same and the number of men made available for use elsewhere will be the same. NELSON] T. JOHNSON] 893.0146/89: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (MacMurray) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, November 9, 1928-1 p. m. 374. Your telegram No. 810, November 5, 9 p. m. It is understood by the Department that the reduction of the number of marines is to be gradual; that at the present time it is proposed to withdraw from Tientsin 300 men; and that before any further reduction is made the entire matter in regard to the place from which additional men will be taken, will be reconsidered. KELLOGG SATISFACTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH THE SERVICES OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AND AGENCIES IN CHINA 124.9318/128: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (Perkins) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, September 13, 1928-noon. 311. It is the desire of the War Department to have a report as to whether, from the point of view of the Minister, the troops and agencies of the United States Army in China have fulfilled the expectations of, and been satisfactory to, the Department of State. It is requested that the Minister prepare and transmit such a report, as soon as he returns from leave. KELLOGG 124.9318/129 The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State No. 1679 PEKING, September 27, 1928. SIR: Replying to the Department's confidential telegram No. 311, of September 13th, I have the honor to report that in my opinion the services of the United States Army Forces in China have been altogether satisfactory from the viewpoint of the Department of State. Throughout the considerable period during which the 15th Infan try has been on duty in North China, its discipline has been admirably maintained, and the conduct of the command has been exemplary; the Regiment has not only avoided making its presence conspicuous in a way that would be undesirable in view of the circumstances, but it has kept up very friendly relations with the Chinese officials and people, and (largely through the care devoted to having the men learn to understand and speak some elementary colloquial Chinese) it has been notably successful in minimizing encounters and misunderstandings with the people of the country. During the past year or so, the fine spirit of the Regiment has been manifested by the way in which they have behaved with regard to the coming to Tientsin of the 3rd Brigade of the United States Marine Corps. While theoretically there is no occasion for jealousy or friction between two of the forces of the United States Government, it is of course a fact of human nature that antagonisms between different military organizations are likely to occur, and indeed difficult to prevent; and in this case it would not have been hard to understand if the Infantry, which had long been the sole American force in Tientsin, had felt an aggrieved sense of being relegated to a position of inferiority by the coming of a very much larger force of Marines. I consider that great credit is reflected upon the spirit and discipline of the Army force-as also upon that of the Marine Brigade-by the almost complete absence of any friction or ill-feeling between them: both forces have done their duty, and worked heartily in cooperation, in a way in which I feel we can justifiably take great pride. As regards the cooperation of the United States Army Forces with the Legation, I am happy to record my appreciation of the way in which both of the Generals commanding these forces during my term as Minister have lived fully and loyally up to the spirit of the War Department's communication of November 21, 1922 to the Department of State 92 (see Department's instruction No. 268, December 1, 1922, 93 file No. 124.9318/95). To an extent greater than was foreseen by the correspondence cited, recent events in China have involved political or diplomatic issues with the military problems confronting our armed forces in this country: and there have been repeated occasions in which urgent considerations of policy have had to override what would have been the natural and spontaneous judgment of a commander governed solely by the desire to meet most effectively and with a minimum of risk a purely military situation; and on such occasions the Legation might have been embarrassed, if Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, p. 873. Not printed. |