SINKING OF SCANDINAVIAN VESSELS 275 this measure was put into effect, and apparently only one vessel was ever taken over.1 $489. Losses of Denmark and Sweden. The merchant marines of both Denmark and Sweden were heavy sufferers from German submarine warfare. The New York Times in an editorial of March 9, 1918, stated that German submarines had sunk 216 Danish ships, in consequence of which 234 Danish sailors had lost their lives. Many of the vessels were torpedoed without warning and in waters far removed from the so-called barred zone.2 According to an official report of the Swedish government made in September, 1917, 126 steam and sailing vessels belonging to its merchant marine had been destroyed by German submarines or sunk by German mines since the beginning of the war. In addition eight others had been captured and confiscated by the German government, making a total of 134, or about 12 per cent of the entire merchant marine. Of all 1 New York Times, September 3, 1918. In August, 1918, the German government offered to deliver safe-conducts to certain Spanish ships, which would protect them against destruction by German submarines. Whereupon the French ministry of marine issued an order to the effect that “every neutral ship which should place itself under the control of the enemy by receiving an enemy safeconduct would not be recognized by the allies . . . and would be regarded as navigating in the interest of an enemy State and therefore subject to capture and confiscation." 25 Rev. Gén., Docs., p. 45. It will be recalled that the Gulflight was alleged to have been convoyed by a British war vessel at the time it was attacked by a German submarine. Certain Scandinavian vessels are said to have been convoyed in the Baltic Sea by German war ships. There is no agreement among the authorities as to the legal status of neutral vessels under belligerent convoy. Some hold that it affords no protection to the neutral vessel against capture; others hold that the acceptance of such a convoy renders the vessel liable to condemnation on the ground that it amounts to constructive resistance or a violation of neutrality; while others still take the position that while it creates suspicion, it does not necessarily justify condemnation. The views of the authorities are reviewed by Huberich in an article in International Law Notes for January, 1916, pp. 5-8. 2 A goodly number of the Danish ships sunk were torpedoed while voyaging between Iceland and Denmark, entirely outside the war zone. The United States war trade board charged that the German war upon neutral commerce was for the purpose of destroying possible neutral competitors after the war, and this charge was frequently made in neutral countries. It was also frequently asserted in the early part of the year 1918 that the German government was endeavoring by threats, intimidation, and attacks upon neutral vessels to prevent neutrals from receiving food and other supplies under relief agreements concluded with the United States. See the statement of the war trade board in United States Official Bulletin of March 15, 1918. New York Times, September 16, 1917. the neutral powers of Europe, Sweden's neutrality toward Germany was probably the most benevolent and her friendship the most cordial. Great Britain was never able to blockade the Baltic coasts of Germany, and the Swedes carried on a profitable trade with the latter country from the beginning until the end of the war. Germany was especially indebted to the Swedes for large quantities of food-stuffs and iron ores, but this did not secure immunity to Swedish vessels which claimed an equal right to trade with Russia. § 490. Destruction of Norwegian Ships. Of all the neutral merchant marines that of Norway suffered the most from German submarines. At the outbreak of the war the Norwegian merchant marine ranked third among those of Europe and fourth among those of the world, and one-fifth of the population was dependent upon the shipping industry. During the war the total number of Norwegian vessels sunk by German torpedoes or mines is said to have amounted to 929 (aggregate tonnage 1,240,000) with a loss of more than a thousand lives.1 Although less benevolent toward Germany in their neutrality, the Norwegians supplied her with large quantities of sorely needed nickel ore; but as in the case of the Swedes, the German government did not recognize their right to trade with enemy belligerents. Many charges were made by the Norwegians in respect to the barbarity of the submarine commanders who were accused of firing upon crews while leaving their ships or while in the life-boats.2 Public opinion in Norway was stirred 1 Report of the Royal Norwegian navigation bureau, quoted in the New York Nation, May 17, 1919, p. 818. Forty-seven per cent of the total tonnage of Norway was estimated to have been destroyed. 2 Among the atrocities with which German submarine commanders were charged was the shelling of the Norwegian bark Eglinton in August, 1918, with the loss of all on board except one. No warning was given, the rigging and sails were shot away, and while the crew were endeavoring to escape to the life-boats, they were fired upon by the submarine. The sea was choppy, and the submarine circled around the raft upon which six of the men had escaped and looked on without offering any assistance. After drifting at sea for some hours, the sole survivor was rescued. New York Times, August 3, 1918. Another case which fairly illustrated the barbarity of German submarine methods was the sinking in mid-ocean of the Norwegian steamer Augvoldon, June 23, 1918. Three of the crew were drowned and thirteen others were unaccounted for. The survivors, after drifting at sea in small life-boats for eleven days and subsisting most of that time on sea-weed and rain water wrung from their clothes or caught in their caps, were rescued in an exhausted condition. SINKING OF NORWEGIAN VESSELS 277 to indignation, and in November, 1917, the various shipping associations addressed a protest to the German people in which, after reciting various instances of cruelty and barbarity by German submarine commanders, they declared the conduct of the German navy to be "without parallel in the history of naval warfare and unworthy of a seafaring nation." Norway, it was charged, was filled with German spies who kept German submarine commanders, who lay in wait outside the territorial waters, informed as to the movement of Norwegian vessels, and it was asserted that secret wireless stations were erected at various places along the Norwegian coast.2 In June, 1917, a German plot to blow up Norwegian ships while lying in the home ports of Norway was discovered. More than a ton of explosives was found in the baggage of a German foreign office courier, addressed to the German legation at Christiania. The explosives, it was charged, were to have been placed upon Norwegian ships for the purpose of blowing them up when they got to sea. Other neutral States were similarly treated. In the spring of 1917 the American government obtained possession of a despatch addressed by Count Luxburg, German chargé d'affaires in Argentina, to his government advising it not to make reparation for the sinking of Argentine merchant vessels and adding: "As regards Argentine steamers I recommend either compelling them to turn back, sinking them without leaving a trace (spurlos versenkt), or letting them through." 4 § 491. Total Losses of Neutral Merchant Marines. Accurate statistics concerning the total number of neutral merchant and fishing vessels torpedoed by German submarines or sunk by German mines are not available, but the following figures are offered as representing the approximate losses: 1 Text of the protest in United States Official Bulletin, March 18, 1918. There was complaint in Norway that secret agents of the German government, who reported the sailings of Norwegian vessels, were tolerated by the Norwegian government, whereas similar agents had been expelled from Holland. New York Times despatch from Christiania (Times, October 11, 1916). New York Times, June 28, 1917. In another despatch Count Luxburg advised his government that two Argentine steamers, the Oram and the Guazo, were then nearing Bordeaux and recommended that they be spared if possible or else "sunk without a trace being left." To this should be added at least a half dozen vessels belonging to South American merchant marines (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay). The total number of sailors drowned or killed on such vessels is said to have exceeded two thousand.4 § 492. The German Defence. As has been said above, in the great majority of cases in which neutral merchantmen were destroyed by the Germans during the recent war, the offence alleged was the carrying of contraband. Is it lawful to destroy a neutral merchantman for carrying contraband, and if so, under what conditions and restrictions may the right be exercised? According to the Declaration of London, which the German government put into force at the outbreak of the war, neutral vessels which are liable to condemnation by a prize court for carrying contraband may be sunk if, for the reasons mentioned above, it is dangerous to attempt to take them in, and if at least half the cargo consists of contraband goods.5 Vessels, there 1 These are the figures of Dutch losses as given by the New York Times Current Hist. Mag. (November, 1918, p. 256). According to the information there given fifty of the Dutch ships sunk were fishing vessels. The lives of 939 Dutch seamen were lost. 2 According to an official report of the American state department in June, 1917, nearly one-fifteenth of the entire Greek tonnage had been sunk by Teutonic submarines during the preceding three months. New York Times, June 24, 1917. 3 Most of the above estimates are those published by the New York Times (of September 4, 1918). The Times of March 9, 1918, however, placed the total Danish losses at 216 instead of 172. The Swedish government is reported to have placed its losses in September, 1917, at 126 vessels. Statistics of the losses of the various neutral powers from German submarines and mines down to April 26, 1917, together with the names of the vessels destroyed and the dates of destruction, are given in a booklet entitled A List of Neutral Ships Sunk by the Germans, published by Geo. H. Doran and Company (1917). This publication placed the total number of vessels mined and torpedoed by the Germans down to that time at 849 with an aggregate tonnage of 1,653,654. According to a Washington press despatch of March 2, 1917, twenty-three American ships had been attacked by German submarines since the outbreak of the war, and twelve had been destroyed by mines and submarines. 4 New York Times, September 4, 1918. Art. 40. THE GERMAN DEFENCE 279 fore, laden with contraband in smaller proportions cannot lawfully be sunk. Moreover, the burden of proving that he acted in the face of "exceptional necessity" is placed upon the captor, and in case he fails to produce such proof, his government is bound to indemnify the owners. These rules, which are also those of the German prize code (articles 41, 113-115), were generally disregarded by German naval commanders. In the first place, as stated above, only neutral vessels which are liable to condemnation as good prize may be destroyed. Manifestly, such liability can be determined only by stopping the suspected vessel and by sending aboard a searching party to verify its nationality, to inspect its papers, to examine the cargo, and to weigh the evidence from these and other sources very much as a prize court would do if the vessel were taken in for adjudication. But this was not the procedure of the German submarine commanders. In all the hundreds of cases in which they destroyed neutral merchantmen, they rarely stopped, visited, or searched the vessels sunk by them. They contented themselves with a long-distance view of the vessel through a periscope, and if it looked suspicious, the doubt was generally resolved against the ship, and it was torpedoed. With its sinking frequently went cargo, crew, passengers, evidence, and all to the bottom of the sea. The rule which allows destruction of vessels only that are liable to condemnation by a prize court means nothing if they may be destroyed on sight without any effort to verify their nationality, ascertain the character of their cargoes, or to determine the destination of the vessel or the use for which the cargo is intended. The whole procedure is very much like ambushing an accused person and assassinating him on suspicion without a hearing or a trial. The German prize code embodies the rule of the Declaration of London that the captor's government is bound to indemnify the owner of a vessel or cargo destroyed in case the captor fails to produce proof that the vessel was liable to destruction. But how can a captor produce proof of this kind when he torpedoes a vessel without taking off and preserving the papers or other evidence of its character? In fact, save in a few instances, as in the case of the sinking of the Frye where the sinking was for 1 Art. 51. |