In consequence of the attitude of the allied governments the German government as a measure of retaliation announced in August, 1916, that it would no longer allow the free passage of hospital supplies to enemy countries, and that the naval forces would receive instructions to confiscate such articles for their own use whenever captured. § 525. Admission of Food Supplies to the Occupied Regions of Belgium, France, and Poland. A somewhat similar question related to the admission of food supplies to the occupied territories of Belgium, France, and Poland. The allied governments insisted on a guarantee from the German government not only that it would not requisition the supplies imported by neutral agencies into those territories for the relief of the civil population, but also that it would not requisition the domestic food crops.1 The attitude of the British and French governments was the subject of strong complaint in Germany, but in view of the wholesale policy of requisition which the German authorities carried out in Belgium and Poland, both governments were quite aware that raw materials and food-stuffs imported into these territories for the use of the native population or, what amounted to the same thing, an equivalent of the domestic stocks which that unless the distribution of such articles were under the strict control of neutral agencies, they would be requisitioned by the German authorities for military purposes. Moreover, there was no evidence for believing that the domestic supply in Germany was inadequate, and high German authority was quoted in support of this view. If there was any real scarcity, it must be due to the fact that the governments of the Central powers preferred to use such materials for other than Red Cross purposes, and the admission of supplies from America would only set free larger quantities of the domestic stock for belligerent uses. See Sir Edward Grey's reply of July 12 to Secretary Lansing's communication, New York Times, July 18, 1916. 1 See the British parliamentary paper, Correspondence respecting the Relief of Allied Territories in the Occupation of the Enemy, Misc., No. 32 (1916), Cd. 8348; also ibid., No. 24 (1916), Cd. 8295. Cf. also an article by Vernon Kellogg, a member of the American relief commission, in the World's Work for August, 1917; pp. 405 ff.; also his Headquarters Nights, pp. 85 ff. Mr. Kellogg says that the Germans considered that in agreeing to refrain from requisitioning the Belgian crops they were making a great concession in view of their feeling that under international law an occupying army has a right to maintain itself on the produce of the territory occupied. He states also that the Germans seemed to have been under the impression that the Americans were deriving financial profit from the business of feeding the Belgians, so strong was their belief that money-getting was the sole object of all American enterprise. He was frankly asked by a member of von Bissing's staff, "What do you Americans get out of this business?" ADMISSION OF FOOD TO OCCUPIED TERRITORY 341 would be released by the importations from abroad, would be taken by the German military authorities for their own use. To have allowed such importations would therefore have put Great Britain in the position of aiding her own enemies. The controversy between the Entente governments and those of Germany and Austria-Hungary regarding the admission of food supplies into Poland was even more irritating. After repeated efforts to secure a pledge from the German government that it would cease its systematic policy of draining Poland of its food supplies under the guise of requisitions, the British government on May 11, 1916, responding to the appeal of the American government, proposed a scheme by which the importation of food-stuffs into Poland would be allowed, subject to reasonable guarantees to insure that the domestic stocks released by such importations would not be requisitioned by the Germans, but to this proposal the German government never made any reply. On July 29, 1916, the German foreign office issued a statement regarding the British proposal in which it asserted that the British proposal was "nothing more than an attempt to include the territories occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary into the system for the starvation of Germany which has been proclaimed by the British government contrary to all international law." It is clear that the German government feared that the effect of the British scheme would be to give the Poles a share of the produce of their crops, which the Germans claimed rightly belonged to them in consequence of their contribution to the increased output, and that it would place the Poles on a more favorable footing in respect to rations than it would the occupying forces. The German contention was quite in accordance with their theory of occupation, that the occupant has a lawful right to take the produce of the occupied territory for his own subsistence, even if it reduces the civil population to destitution, or at least he is entitled to an equal share of it with the inhabitants. On October 17, 1916, President Wilson issued a statement from Long Branch in which, adverting to his efforts to bring about an agreement among the belligerent nations under which supplies might be admitted to 1 See the British white paper, Correspondence respecting the Relief of Allied Territories in the Occupation of the Enemy, Misc., No. 32 (1916), Cd. 8348. Poland for the relief of the destitute civil population, he announced that they had resulted in failure'. § 526. The Problem of Preventing Commerce with the Enemy. The Problem of blockading effectively the ports of Germany, flanked as she was by a group of neutral countries several of which were separated from her by only a surveyor's line and others by only a few miles of sea, without at the same time blockading the ports of these countries was a difficult one indeed. Sir Robert Cecil, speaking at a meeting at the Mansion House on August 7, 1916, thus stated the problem: "We had to do something never before done in the history of the world: blockade our enemy through neutral countries which surrounded him. We had, therefore, to sift out that part of the trade which belonged to the enemy and deal with it, while leaving trade to be carried on as far as possible without interference." 2 Under the doctrine of ultimate destination Great Britain and France clearly had a right to seize contraband goods consigned to neutral ports when the evidence was conclusive that their ultimate destination was the enemy, and whether or not, under the law of nations, they had a right to prevent non-contraband goods from reaching the enemy through neutral ports, by applying the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade running, they proceeded on the theory that they did have such a right. But whatever may have been their lawful rights in this matter, they clearly had no right to intercept trade in goods, whether contraband or not, intended for use or consumption in the neutral countries to which they were consigned. The difficulty of determining in many cases whether such goods were intended for local use or consumption or for reëxportation to the enemy country naturally led to many arbitrary seizures and unjust interferences with legitimate neutral trade, against all of which neutrals vigorously protested. § 527. The Netherlands Over-seas Trust. In the beginning, the Dutch government undertook the responsibility of guaranteeing that imported goods allowed to pass the blockade would not be reëxported to Germany, but the burden becoming intolerable, it was taken over by an extraordinary association known as the Netherlands Over-seas Trust, organized on No 1 Text in New York Times of October 18, 1916. 2 Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter, Vol. 60, p. 684. NETHERLANDS OVER-SEAS TRUST 343 vember 24, 1914. The object of the association, as stated in its statutes, was "to act as an intermediary for Dutch merchants and trading companies with a view to enabling the unmolested conveyance from oversea, merchandise which has been or may be declared contraband - either absolute or conditional by belligerent States." The definition was subsequently altered to read, "the unmolested import and export of merchandise as much as possible," an alteration which was more in accord with the new conditions. Under this arrangement importers and consignees gave a pledge that goods received by them would not be reëxported to belligerent territory. For the observance of this pledge they furnished a bond to the Overseas Trust, the amount of which at first was fixed at the value of the cargo, but was subsequently raised to three times its value. Thereupon the Trust undertook to guarantee that the merchandise so imported would not be shipped to Germany or Austria-Hungary, in return for which over-seas consignments to it were allowed to pass the blockade.1 Thereafter practically all commerce between the Netherlands and countries beyond the seas was carried on through the intermediary of this association.2 The extraordinary high prices offered in Germany afforded a great temptation to neutral importers to violate their agreements, and cases were not lacking where this was done, the prices being sufficient to cover the cost of forfeiting the bond, still leaving the importer a handsome profit. The Netherlands Over-seas Trust, however, appears to have made an honest attempt to prevent reëxportations to Germany, and in some cases it took drastic action to prevent violations of its agreement with the British government. A somewhat similar organization was formed in Switzerland under the name of the Société Surveillance Suisse. In Denmark the Danish merchants' guild performed a similar function, although the Danish government appears never to have entered 1 Cf. an article on The Netherlands Overseas Trust" by Alexander NicolSpeyer in International Law Notes for August, 1916, pp. 120-122; also the London Solicitors' Journal and Weekly Reporter, February 5, 1916, p. 249; and the Grotius Annuaire International, 1915, p. 70. 'Originally estabished in offices of three rooms and with a staff of less than half a dozen men, it occupied before the end of the year 1916 eighteen buildings and employed a staff of over one thousand persons. into an agreement with the British government not to export goods to Germany. In most neutral countries adjacent to Germany and Austria-Hungary importers showed a willingness to enter into such arrangements out of sheer necessity, and their governments, while unwilling themselves to guarantee that the terms of such agreements would be observed, appear to have countenanced the organization of private associations of merchants or importers for the purpose. In the absence of such an arrangement no contraband goods were allowed to pass the blockade. Another § 528. The System of "Rationing" Neutrals. and somewhat more arbitrary expedient adopted by the Entente allies for cutting off the enemy's over-seas trade through neutral ports was a system of "rationing." It was discovered that at the outset neutral countries adjacent to Germany were importing goods, mainly from America, vastly in excess of their customary importations before the war and far beyond their normal requirements. The conclusion drawn by the British government from this fact was that the greater part of the excess was being reëxported, mainly to Germany. The statistics produced by the allied governments in proof of this were in some cases attacked by the neutrals concerned as being exaggerated, but it would be a very credulous person who should refuse to be convinced by the evidence adduced that when due allowance was made for exaggeration, a very large quantity of goods imported from America ultimately found their way to Germany.2 A large amount of the exportations to Germany, to be sure, con 1 Thus statistics were produced to show that the exports from the United States to Norway during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916, were valued at $53,675,000 as against $9,067,000 for the year ending June 30, 1914. For Sweden the figures were: 1913, $12,104,366; 1916, $48,353,387; for Switzerland: 1913, $826,549; 1916, $13,654,256; for Denmark: 1913, $18,687,791; 1916, $56,335,596. Sir Samuel Evans stated in the case of the Kim that more lard was imported into Copenhagen in three weeks in 1915 than had been imported into all Denmark during the previous eight years. 2 The New York Times of July 2, 1917, printed a Washington despatch in which it was asserted on the basis of "figures obtained by the British government after careful investigation" that fats in sufficient quantities to supply the rations of 7,700,000 soldiers, "practically the entire army of effectives in Germany," were then going to Germany from neighboring neutral countries. The chief of the Bureau of foreign commerce estimated in August, 1917, that Germany had obtained from neutrals meat enough to support all her armies for a period of 275 days. |