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sisted of domestic products with the export of which no belligerent government had any lawful right to interfere. This was, in fact, a necessity in some cases in order to enable neutral countries adjacent to Germany to obtain from the Central powers commodities such as coal and iron which were indispensable to their economic life, since they were dependent upon Germany in particular for these commodities and she would not allow them to draw on her for them except in return for a certain portion of their surplus products. An agreement, for example, was entered into between the Dutch and German governments by which the former bound itself to allow Germany to have 75 per cent of all Dutch exports of butter, vegetables, eggs, and fruit; 50 per cent of all exports of flax, and as much of all kinds of meat as the total of such exports to all other countries.1 In return for this concession Germany agreed to allow coal and iron to be exported to the Netherlands. The necessity of such arrangements was recognized by the governments of the Entente allies, but they complained that in certain instances the quantity allowed to go to Germany was more than was necessary to preserve the balance, and they denied in toto the right of the countries in question to expose their own populations to starvation through the exportation of their domestic supplies and then to replace them by means of importations from America. In short, there was no difference in principle between furnishing Germany with supplies imported from America and furnishing her with supplies of domestic production when the deficit thus produced had to be made up by importations from America.

Under these circumstances Great Britain and France, as has been said, adopted the system of rationing, under which importations into those countries were limited to the estimated amount of their domestic requirements. Goods in excess thereof were seized under the application of the principle of ultimate destination.

§ 529. Neutral Protests. Neutrals thus affected naturally protested against the application of a measure which from the very nature of the case could not be enforced without arbitrariness and without infringements upon their right to trade with one another. They complained that in determining the extent

1 An English translation of this agreement may be found in the New York Times of September 30, 1917. It was concluded on December 1, 1916.

of their local needs the allied governments did not take into consideration the fact that their German, Austro-Hungarian, and Belgian sources of supply had been largely cut off by the war, and that consequently larger importations from America were necessary. Before the war, for example, Norway imported her flour from Germany and Russia; Holland obtained her supply of coal and iron from Germany; Switzerland drew her raw materials, metals, and iron largely from the same country, and so on. They were therefore reduced to the necessity of importing more heavily from America, and it did not follow that the excess of importations over those of peace times necessarily meant that it was being reëxported to Germany. Some of the neutral governments, indeed, complained that the allied governments in the enforcement of the rationing system limited the amount of importations to a point far below the urgent local needs of the population.

§ 530. American Policy. With the entrance of the United States into the war in 1917 the task of Great Britain and France in dealing with the shipments from America to neutral countries in Europe of goods which ultimately went to Germany was greatly simplified. Since the greater proportion of these supplies came from the United States, the American government had only to place an embargo on their exportation, after which Great Britain and France would be largely relieved from the difficult and more or less arbitrary task of sifting out goods which they suspected were intended for Germany. In pursuance of authority conferred by the Espionage Act the President in July, 1917, proclaimed an embargo on the shipment of some six hundred commodities to the neutral countries of western and northern Europe, except upon license granted by his authority. Furthermore, an order was issued requiring every steamship leaving an American port to obtain a license before it would be allowed to take on a supply of bunker coal. Statistics having been produced to show that a large proportion of exports from America to the neutral countries of Europe had been going to Germany, there was a widespread popular demand that the embargo should be rigorously applied, and that no licenses should be granted for the exportation of any goods which there was reason to believe would ultimately find their way to enemy country. The President promptly adopted this policy. Com

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missions from the various neutral countries affected soon arrived in the United States, supplied with statistics to show that the charges concerning the reëxportation of American goods to Germany had been greatly exaggerated, and that the rigid enforcement of an embargo on shipments from America to those countries would paralyze their industries and reduce their populations to the verge of destitution. While their appeals for relaxation were carefully considered, the President was firm in his determination not to grant any licenses except upon sufficient guarantees, which would insure that no supplies exported from America would find their way to Germany. For many months, in fact, no licenses were granted. In September, 1917, eighty-four Dutch vessels laden with grain and other supplies were lying in American ports and could not depart for lack of licenses. The American government declined to issue licenses so long as the Dutch agreement with Germany referred to above, under which the Dutch government was bound to allow Germany to have a large proportion of the native produce of Holland, remained in force.

As the American government had an unquestionable right to prohibit the exportation from its territory of goods which it had reason to believe would ultimately find their way to the enemy, no question of international law could arise between it and neutral countries, such as had arisen between them and Great Britain, since the United States was merely restricting its own trade, whereas Great Britain had interfered with trade between neutrals.

The assertion was made in some quarters that the American embargo policy against the neutral powers of Europe was inconsistent with its former protest, when it was a neutral, against the British claim to intercept trade with Germany through neutral ports. This charge, however, was without foundation. What the American government had complained of was the British practice of intercepting commerce between neutral countries on the ground that the ultimate destination was enemy territory. It never protested against the right of the British government to restrict its own trade with neutrals.

§ 531. Other Expedients. Another device adopted by the British government to cut off trade with Germany through neutral ports took the form of agreements with neutral shipping

lines, under which their vessels were allowed to proceed without molestation to their destinations upon their undertaking to return to England, for adjudication by the prize courts, any goods whose destination was suspected of being enemy country, or to store them until the end of the war in the neutral country to which they were consigned, and to comply with the other regulations of the British government in regard to such trade. Agreements of this kind were entered into with most of the leading steamship lines, the vessels entitled to this favored treatment being known as "white ships."

Another expedient was the policy of the British government of refusing bunker coal at British ports to neutral merchant vessels whose owners declined to comply with certain regulations intended to prevent cargoes from going to Germany. Neutrals complained of this measure, but the British government maintained that it had an undoubted right to refuse coal to any vessel which it had reason to believe was engaged in carrying supplies to the enemy.1 It was stated in the press despatches from Sweden that Great Britain was able by refusing bunker coal to control absolutely all commerce carried on in Danish and Norwegian steamers.2

Still another device was the so-called "Skinner scheme," suggested by the American consul-general at London, Mr. Skinner, under which the British embassy at Washington upon application of American exporters investigated the particulars regarding proposed consignments and cabled the facts to the contraband committee in London, which in turn notified the embassy at Washington whether the consignment would be permitted to pass the blockade. If the report was favorable, a "letter of assurance" was issued and carried by the steamer which bore the privileged cargo. No steamship sailing from an American port would accept a shipment to a neutral port in northern Europe unless it was accompanied by such a letter. Aside from the more or less humiliating position in which neutral

1 The American government was one of those which complained of this policy; but in 1917 when the United States had become a belligerent and was itself-endeavoring to cut off trade with Germany through neutral ports, it was announced from Washington that one of the weapons at the disposal of the government was its power to refuse bunker coal to neutral vessels carrying goods with a suspected ultimate enemy destination, and that it would be employed if necessary.

2 New York Times, July 24, 1916.

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shippers were thus placed in being obliged to apply to the British government for permits to trade with one another, there was much complaint that permits were frequently delayed or even refused when the goods were on the embargo lists of the countries to which they were consigned.' Through these and other measures the German over-seas supply through European neutral ports was gradually reduced to insignificant proportions. Loud complaints were made by neutrals against the alleged arbitrariness of these measures which, it was said, not only interfered with their lawful right to trade with belligerents in non-contraband goods, but also reduced their own supply for domestic consumption in many cases below their actual necessities. The British government, on the other hand, asserted that it was only exercising its lawful rights, and that most of the measures in question were adopted for the convenience of neutrals and with a view to relieving their vessels from the delays and inconveniences to which they would otherwise have been subjected.

1 A detailed description of the British procedure of dealing with vessels bound for neutral ports in Europe by Sir Frank Newnes may be found in the New York Times of July 23, 1916.

2 In September, 1916, the British government estimated that over 92 per cent of German exports to the United States had been stopped. As to goods imported into Germany, it was estimated that some of the most important commodities, such as cotton, wool, and rubber, were totally excluded. But throughout the year 1916 and a part of 1917 a considerable quantity of fats, oils, and other commodities from America "leaked" through the blockade, and it was not until the establishment of the American embargo in the autumn of 1917 that this trade was reduced to insignificant proportions.