boundless as the terrestrial globe. The party would lie at the mercy of the jury-there would be the same reason for ten thousand dollars damages as ten cents. The court could not set aside the verdict in any case, either on account of extravagance or smallness of damages, for there is nothing by which to measure them; but the arbitrary discretion or the caprice of the jury must decide them, without evidence and without control. It cannot be compared to actions of slander, where the jury have a wide range, and must exercise some latitude,-it is an action on an express promise, which the law says must be to perform something either certain to a common intent, or by reference to something which can render it certain. In contracts which can be enforced specifically, or where damages are to be given for their nonperformance, there is always a measure of damages; in actions affecting the reputation, the person, or the liberty of a man, they must depend, in some measure, on the direction of the jury. If the jury go beyond the standard, the value ascertained by evidence of the thing contracted for, or under its value, the court will set aside the verdict, but in the vindictive class of actions, the damages must be outrageous to justify the interference of the court,-seldom, if ever, for smallness of damages. There is a great difference between damages which can be ascertained, as in assumpsit, trover, etc., where there is a measure, and personal torts, as false imprisonment, slander, malicious prosecution, where damages are matter of opinion. To say that nominal damages, at least, ought to be given, is taking for granted the very matter in controversy; for the legal question is, was there an actionable promise—a promise to do anything certain, or certain to a common intent, or where, by reference to anything, it would be rendered certain? The jury have negatived all this.

I am therefore of opinion that there was no error in the opinion of the court, by which the plaintiffs have been endamaged; that the law was laid down more favorably for them than the evidence warranted. Judgment affirmed.

WHERE IT IS AN OFFICER'S DUTY TO MAKE AN ARREST, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXTRA COMPENSATION HOGAN V. STOPHLET

179 Ill. 150, 53 N. B. 604 (1899)

Action by Daniel Hogan, sheriff of Pulaski county, to recover the amount of a reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of a person who had committed a felony in his own county. Judgment in circuit court for plaintiff. Reversed by appellate court. Appeal.

MAGRUDER, J. It being true that it was the official duty of the appellant, as sheriff to make the arrest of the guilty party, and that the fees, which he is entitled to charge for the performance of his official duties, are fixed by law, it follows, upon well established principles, that the appellant was not entitled to the reward sued for in this case. It is against public policy to allow a man to recover a reward for doing his duty as a public officer. It is also against public policy and illegal for a sheriff to receive for services, for which fixed compensation is perscribed by law, any other or further fees, although extraordinary diligence may have been exercised by him in the discharge of his duty. (Pool v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 219; Murfree on Sheriffs, p. 1070.) A promise to pay an officer a reward for doing what it is his duty to do under the law is a promise without any consideration to support it.

In Matter of Russell's Application, 51 Conn. 577, the facts showed, that an inhabitant of the city of Hartford, whose house was broken into in the night, offered a reward for the detection of the burglar; that certain policemen, during the hours allotted them for rest, discovered the burglar, and obtained information which led to his conviction; that policemen in that city were required by law to report all violations of law, and to arrest without warrant persons guilty of criminal offenses where the offenders were taken in the act, or on the speedy information of others; to render all possible assistance to the ministers of the law, and to exert themselves to prevent the commission of crime, etc.; and it was held by the court that to allow them to receive the reward would be both in violation of the city ordinances, and against public policy. In that case the court said: "It has been held from a very early period, that a promise to pay an officer a sum of money for doing a thing, which the law will not suffer him to take anything for, is merely void, however freely and voluntarily it may appear to have been made.

And it is now well settled that a public officer, whose compensation is fixed or whose fees are prescribed by law, cannot legally contract for or demand a larger compensation or higher fees in the form of a reward. or in any other form, for services rendered in the line or scope of his official duties."

In Pool v. City of Boston, supra, it was held, that a watchman of the city of Boston, who, while in the discharge of his duty as such, discovered a person setting fire to a building and prosecuted him to conviction, was not entitled to claim a reward offered by the city government for the detection and conviction of the incendiary.

In Davis v. Burns, 5 Allen (Mass.) 349, it was held, that an officer of the customs of the United States, who found smuggled goods, while

assisting the inspectors in charge of a vessel and examining the passen gers and their luggage, although he was not in discharge of the specific duty assigned to him, could not maintain an action to recover a reward offered by the owners of the vessel to any person giving information to their agents or officers of any goods smuggled or concealed or intended to be smuggled therefrom. In the latter case the decision of the court was put upon the broad ground of public policy which forbids an officer to receive extra compensation for doing what his official duty requires him to do.

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In Lees v. Colgan, 120 Cal. 262, where a captain of police of the city and county of San Francisco apprehended a murderer in such city and county for a murder committed in another county, it was held that the captain made the arrest of the murderer in the line of his official duty and that it was against sound public policy to receive a reward offered by the government of the state for the arrest and conviction of the murderer; and in that case the courts say; "That courts, both in this country and in England, are practically unanimous in declaring that a public officer working for a fixed compensation, or whose fees are prescribed by law, cannot demand or contract for a reward for services rendered in the line or scope of his official duty." (See also, Marking v. Needy & Hatch, 8 Busch. (Ky.) 22; Ex parte Gore, 57 Miss. 251; Monroe County v. Bell, 18 So. 121; Thornton v. Railway Co. 42 Mo. App. 58; Kick v. Merry, 23 Mo. 74; Weaver v. Whitney, I. Hopk. 13; Hatch v. Mann, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 45.)

The claim that extra services have been rendered, furnishes no warrant in such cases for the charge of extra compensation. In Hatch v. Mann, supra, it was said: "That a public officer, whose fees are prescribed by law, may maintain an action to recover an additional sum promised him by a party for doing his official duty, is a monstrous proposition, fraught with every kind of mischief. The pretense, that it is for extra services, would cover any conceivable corruption or extortion. If a constable for making extraordinary efforts to perform an ordinary official act, may not only receive, but may also collect by law a compensation beyond what the statute allows for the act, any other officer may do the same; and sheriffs, legislators and judges might, and soon would, put their 'extraordinary efforts' in the market, to be had by the highest bidder. This is a sickening and revolting view of the subject."

There are some decisions which hold to the contrary of the views herein expressed, but these decisions will be found upon examination to be cases where the officer arrested the offender beyond his territorial jurisdiction, or cases arising under particular statutes, which did not

make it the duty of the officer to make the arrest. Many of these decisions are reviewed in the very able opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the matter of Russell's Application, supra, and are there distinguished from such cases, as that which is presented by the present record.

The principles, announced by the authorities above referred to, have always been recognized as sound by this court.

Judgment of appellate court affirmed.

WHERE IT IS NOT THE DUTY OF AN OFFICER TO PERFORM AN ACT, HE IS ENTITLED TO A REWARD OFFERED GENERALLY TO ANY ONE WHO WOULD DO IT

REIF V. PAIGE

55 Wisconsin, 496 (1882)

During the afternoon of December 3, 1880, a hotel in the city of Oshkosh, known as the "Beckwith House," was destroyed by fire. The defendant and his wife lived in this hotel, occupying rooms in the fourth story. When the fire broke out Mrs. Paige was in those rooms and perished in the flames. The members of the Fire Department of Oshkosh placed a ladder at a window near where Mrs. Paige was supposed to be, and at least two firemen attempted to enter the window and rescue her, but were driven back by the smoke and flames. The ladder was then removed, but subsequently was replaced at the same window. About this time, and after the fire had been raging thirty minutes or more, the defendant, who had been absent, reached the scene of the fire, and, as it is alleged in the complaint, offered and promised to pay a reward of $5000 to any person who would rescue his wife from the burning building, dead or alive. The plaintiff claims that he has earned the reward thus offered, and has brought this action to recover the same.

The complaint alleges that the plaintiff, on being informed of such offer and promise and confiding in and relying upon the same, entered such rooms in the fourth story of the burning building, at great peril to his life and health, removed therefrom the dead body of Mrs. Paige, and delivered the same to the defendant. Also that the plaintiff has performed all of the conditions of said contract on his part to be performed; that no part of the said $5,000 has been paid to him, and that the same is now due and payable.

In his answer the defendant denies that he offered any reward for the rescue of his wife from the burning building and also denies an averment in the complaint that the Fire Department was unable to re

move her therefrom. He alleges therein that the body of his wife was recovered by members of that department; that the plaintiff was an assistant engineer and a paid officer in that department, and whatever he did in the recovery and removal of the body of Mrs. Paige was done as such officer and member of the Fire Department, and in the performance of his duties as such.

The testimony on the trial tended to prove that the defendant offered the reward, and that with knowledge of the offer and on the faith of it, and for the purpose of earning the reward, the plaintiff ascended the ladder, entered the building, and rescued the dead body of Mrs. Paige from the flames, to the knowledge of the defendant.

LYON, J. The learned circuit judge nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that it was his duty as a paid officer and member of the Fire Department of Oshkosh to rescue persons as well as property from fires and that it is against sound public policy to allow him to contract for a reward for recovering the body of Mrs. Paige. Also that in such a case there is no valid consideration for the offer, moving from one whose duty it is to do the act. Counsel for the plaintiff concedes that if it was the duty of his client as fireman to go into the burning building and remove therefrom the remains of Mrs. Paige, he cannot recover the reward, but contends that it was not his duty to do so under the circumstances of the case. Counsel for the defendant, while not contending that it was the duty of the plaintiff as a fireman to imperil his life by going into the building for Mrs. Paige, or that the act was not a very perilous one, maintains that it was in the nature of extra or extra hazardous services in the line or scope of his duty, and, being so, the law will not permit him to contract for a reward for doing the act.

There was considerable discussion by counsel as to what are the duties of firemen. We know of no guide for ascertaining those duties other than the charter of the municipality in which they are employed, and the ordinances or by-laws enacted pursuant thereto. The ordinances of the city of Oshkosh in respect to its Fire Department were read in evidence, and reference made to the city charter in that behalf. We do not care to comment upon these, for we are clear that there is nothing in them which made it the duty of the plaintiff to enter the fourth story of the burning building and rescue the body of Mrs. Paige from the flames, at the imminent hazard of losing his own life. That he incurred such hazard there can be no doubt from the testimony. He did not, as does a soldier, contract to risk his life in the service. The most that can reasonable be claimed is that, short of risking his life, he contracted to use his best judgment and efforts in extinguishing fires, and in saving persons and property from destruction or injury.