Supposing then that, by fair implication, there must be some limit to this offer, and there being no limit in terms, then by a general rule of law it must be limited to a reasonable time—that is, the service must be done within a reasonable time after the offer made.

What is a reasonable time, when all the facts and circumstances are proved on which it depends, is a question of law. To determine it, we are first to consider the objects and purposes for which such reward is offered. The principal object obviously must be, to awaken the attention of the public, to excite the vigilance and stimulate the exertions of police officers, watchmen and citizens generally, to the detection and punishment of offenders. Possible, too, it may operate to prevent offences, by alarming the fears of those who are under temptation to commit them, by inspiring the belief that the public are awake, that any suspicious movement is watched, and that the crime cannot be committed with impunity. To accomplish either of these objects such offer of a reward must be notorious, known and kept in mind by the public at large; and, for that purpose, the publication of the offer, if not actually continued in newspapers, and placarded at conspicuous places, must have been recent. After the lapse of years, and after the publication of the offer has been long discontinued, it must be presumed to be forgotten by the public generally, and if known at all, known only to a few individuals who may happen to meet with it in an old newspaper. The expectation of benefit, then, from such a promise of reward, must in a great measure have ceased. Indeed, every consideration arising from the nature of the case affirms the belief that such offer of reward, for a special service of this nature, is not unlimited and perpetual in its duration, but must be limited to some reasonable time. The difficulty is in fixing it. One circumstance, perhaps a slight one, is, that the act is done by a board of officers, who themselves are annual officers. But as they act for the city, which is a permanent body, and exercise its authority for the time being, and as such a reward might be offered near the end of the year, we cannot necessarily limit it to the time for which the same board of mayor and aldermen have to serve; though it tends to mark the distinction between a temporary act of one branch and a permanent act of the whole city government.

We have already alluded to the fact of the discontinuance of the advertisement, as one of some weight. It is some notice to the public that the exigency has passed, for which such offer of a reward was particularly intended. And though such discontinuance is not a revocation of the offer, it proves that those who made it no longer hold it forth conspicuously as a continuing offer; and it is not reasonable to regard it as a continuing offer for any considerable term of time afterward.

But it is not necessary, perhaps not proper, to undertake to fix a precise time, as reasonable time; it must depend on many circumstances. It is somewhat analagous to the case of notes payable on demand, where the question formerly was within what time such notes must be presented and, in case of dishonor, notice be given, in order to charge the indorser. In the earliest reported case on the subject, Field v. Nickerson, 13 Mass. 131, the Court went no farther than to decide that eight months was not a reasonable time for that purpose.

Under the circumstances of the present case, the Court are of opinion, that three years and eight months is not a reasonable time within which, or rather to the extent of which, the offer in question can be considered as a continuing offer on the part of the city. In that length of time, the exigency under which it was made having passed, it must be presumed to have been forgotten by most of the officers and citizens of the community, and cannot be presumed to have been before the public as an actuating motive to vigilance and exertion on this subject; nor could it justly and reasonably have been so understood by the plaintiffs. We are therefore of opinion, that the offer of the city had ceased before the plaintiffs accepted and acted upon it as such, and that consequently no contract existed upon which this action, founded on an alleged express promise, can be maintained.

Plaintiffs nonsuit.

AN INFANT'S CONTRACT IS VOIDABLE AND NOT VOID

PHILPOT V. BINGHAM

55 Ala. 435, (1876).

Action to recover an undivided half interest in land. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff, a minor, and his older brother, executed a power of attorney to their father, authorizing him to sell and convey the land in controversy. Under this power the land was conveyed to one Stringfellow, who conveyed to defendant. Defendant was ignorant of plaintiff's infancy. The trial court charged that the power of attorney and the deed executed under it were voidable and not void.

STONE, J. Ever since the leading case of Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr, 1794, there has been a growing disposition to treat almost all contracts made by infants as voidable rather than void. The principles of that decision have received a very steady and cheerful support on this side of the Atlantic. The declared rule is, that contracts of an infant, caused by his necessities, or manifestly for his advantage, are valid and binding, while those manifestly to his hurt are void. Contracts falling between these classes are voidable. Relaxation of ancient rigor has had the

effect of placing many transactions, formerly adjudged void, in the more conservative category of voidable. See 3 Washb. Real Prop. 559, et seq.; 2 Kent's Com. 234, in margin; 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 5th ed. 242 et seq., in margin; 2 Greenl. Ev. 365 et seq; Tyler on Infancy, 41 Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, 65; Boody v. McKenney (10 Shep.), 23 Maine, 517. This question has been several times before the court, and we have uniformly followed the modern rule above expressed. Fant v. Cathcart, 8 Ala. 725; Elliott v. Horn, 10 Ala. 348; Thomason v. Boyd, 13 Ala. 420; Manning v. Johnson, 26 Ala. 446; Freeman v. Bradford, 5 Por. 270; Slaughter v. Cunningham, 24 Ala. 260; Derrick v. Kennedy, 4 Por. 41; Clark v. Goddard, 39 Ala. 164.

It is declared in the adjudged cases, and in the elementary books, that a power of attorney to sell lands, a warrant of attorney, or any other creation of an attorney, by an infant, is absolutely void. Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio, 38, 42; Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Littell, 17, 21; Bennett v. Davis, 6 Cow. 393; Fonda v. Van Horne, 15 Wend. 636; Knox v. Flack, 22 Penn. 33; Tyler on Infancy, 46-47; 1 Amer. Leading Cases, 5th ed. 247, in margin; Saunderson v. Marr, 1 H. Bla. 76; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 58, 68; 2 Kent's Com., m. p. 235. So, in Alabama it has been said, "an infant cannot appoint an agent." Ware v. Cartledge, 24 Ala. 628. In Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 424, C. J. Chilton said, "The better opinion, as maintained by the modern decisions, is, that an infant's contracts are none of them (with perhaps, one exception) absolutely void by reason of non-age; that is to say, the infant may ratify them, after he arrives at the age of legal majority." C. J. Chilton refers to Parsons on Contracts in support of this proposition. Looking into that work, 244, it is clear that he means to except from the operation of the general rule, laid down by him, those contracts of an infant by which he attempts to create an attorney or agency.

From such an array of authorities, sanctioned as the principle has been by this court, we do not feel at liberty to depart, although the argument in favor of the exception is rather specious than solid. We therefore hold, that the power of attorney, under which the plaintiff's land was sold, made, as it appears to have been, while he was an infant, was and is what the law denominates void. If void, then no title, even inchoate, passed thereby; and the defence to the action must rest entirely on grounds other than and independent of the power of attorney and deed.

Thus circumscribed, the defendant (appellee here) has failed to show any defence to the plaintiff's claim to an undivided half interest in the land sued for. See Boody v. McKenny, 23 Maine, 517; Haney v. Hobson, 53 Maine, 451; Cresinger v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156.

Judgment reversed.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A NECESSITY WILL DEPEND UPON THE INFANT'S STATION IN LIFE

TRAINER V. TRUMBULL

141 Mass. 527 (1886)

C. ALLEN. The practical question in this case is, whether the food, clothing etc., furnished to the defendant were necessaries for which he should be held responsible. This question must be determined by the actual state of the case, and not by appearances. That is to say, an infant who is already well provided in respect to board, clothing, and other articles suitable for his condition, is not to be held responsible if any one supplies to him other board, clothing, etc., although such person did not know that the infant was already well supplied. Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28; Swift v. Bennett, 10 Cush. 436; Davis v. Caldwell, 12 Cush. 512;Barnes v. Toye, 13 Q. B. D. 410. So, on the other hand, the mere fact that an infant, as in this case, had a father, mother, and guardian, no one of whom did' anything towards his care or support, does not prevent his being bound to pay for that which was actually necessary for him when furnished. The question whether or not the infant made an express promise to pay is not important. He is held on a promise implied by law, and not, strictly speaking, on his actual promise. The law implies the promise to pay, from the necessity of his situation; just as in the case of a lunatic. 1 Chit. Con. (11th Am. ed.) 197; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones (N. C.) 111; Richardson v. Strong, 13 Lred. 106; Gay v. Ballou, 4 Wend, 403; Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45, 47. In other words, he is liable to pay only what the necessaries were reasonably worth, and not what he may improvidently have agreed to pay for them. If he has made an express promise to pay, or has given a note in payment for necessaries, the real value will be inquired into, and he will be held only for that amount. Earle v. Reed, 10 Met. 387; Locke v. Smith, 41 N. H. 346; Met. Con. 73, 75.

But it is contended that the board, clothing, etc., furnished to the defendant were not necessaries, because he, "being a pauper and an inmate of an almshouse, was supplied with necessaries suitable to his estate and condition, and, under the circumstances, it would have been the duty of the guardian to place him in the almshouse." It is true that a guardian is not obliged to provide for the support of his ward, when he has no property of the ward available for that purpose; and, if he has no other resources, no doubt he may, under such circumstances, place the ward in an almshouse. The authorities cited for the defendant go no further than this. Spring v. Woodworth, 2 Allen, 206. But this

by no means implies that a boy with an expectation of a fortune of $10,000 should be brought up in an almshouse, if any suitable person will take him and bring him up properly, on the credit of his expectations. On the other hand, it seems to us highly proper for a parent or guardian, under such circumstances, to do what the father did in this case; leaving it for the boy's guardian to see to it that an unreasonable price is not paid. Looking to the advantage of his subsequent life, as well as to his welfare for the time being, his transfer from an almshouse, to a suitable person, by whom he would be cared for and educated, would certainly be judicious; and the support and education furnished to an infant of such expectations, whose means were not presently available, fall clearly within the class of necessaries. In Met. Con. 70, the authority of Lord Mansfield is cited to the point that a sum advanced for taking an infant out of jail is for necessaries. Buckinghamshire v. Drury, 2 Eden, 60, 72. See, also, Clarke v. Leslie, 5 Esp. 28. Giving credit to the infant's expectations of property is the same as giving credit to him. There was no error in refusing to rule, as a matter of law, that, upon all the facts in evidence, the action could not be maintained. The findings of all matters of fact, of course, are not open to revision. Exceptions overruled.

DEFENSE OF INFANCY IS A PERSONAL PRIVILEGE

PATTERSON V. LIPPINCOTT

47 N. J. L. 457 (1885)

Action of debt upon the contract stated in the opinion. Judgment below for defendant.

SCUDDER, J. An action of debt was brought in the court for the trial of small causes by Jacob M. Patterson against Barclay Lippincott, to recover the balance, $75, claimed under a contract in writing for the sale of the exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell the plaintiff's patent "air-heating attachment" in Atlantic county, New Jersey. The writing was signed "Geo. P. Lippincott, per Barclay Lippincott," on the part of the purchaser. The state of demand avers that by virtue of this agreement the plaintiff did in due form convey said patent right to said George P. Lippincott, that said George and Barclay, on request have refused to pay said balance and that, since payment became due, the plaintiff has found out and charges that said George is under age of twenty-one years. He further avers that he never had any contract or negotiations with George, and that Barclay's warranty of authority to act for his minor son is broken, whereby an action has accrued to the plaintiff against the defendant.