IF OBSERVED, AMICABLE RELATIONS NOT ENDANGERED. 577 Thus the line of duty and course of conduct is plainly prescribed, so that neither the minister, magistrate, or masses can well mistake as to whither it tends, or to what it may lead. A due observance of it obviously tends to peace, a non-observance to war. By adhering, therefore, to its neutral duty, a nation will avoid all danger of war, and preserve and continue its future friendly relations with other states. If, however, a state will risk an interruption of those relations, it must also risk the consequences. Any departure from the duty of neutrality, whether that duty be enjoined by the law of nations, found in existing treaties, be prescribed by the local municipal law or contained in a proclamation of the sovereign, endangers the good understanding and future amicable relations of neutral states. Therefore, in modern times, all just sovereigns make it a point to observe, with scrupulous honor, all duties growing out of their neutral relations with belligerents, however they may be defined or created. To act in contravention or derogation of these high political duties in time of war, flagrante bello vel imminente bello, would be to practically ignore the rights of belligerents, and disavow the obligations of neutrals. If a neutral do not remain neutral optimâ fide, he thereupon becomes practically an ally or enemy. And a converted ally becomes naturally the bitterest of enemies. At the present advanced stage of civilization, the true neutral and the known ally may be regarded as opposite in character as are open and declared belligerent enemies. A like distinction may exist between the true neutral and professing or declared neutral. Indeed, a merely professing neutral, with no sincerity and 578 AVOWED ALLY LESS DANGEROUS THAN PROFESSING NI UTRAL. no fidelity, may inflict more injury upon a trusting belligerent than it might be possible for an open and declared ally to inflict. For, under the guise of friendship, the insincere neutral may reveal secrets of state fraudulently obtained; show his good offices in collecting and imparting dangerous information to the enemy, disclose military movements contemplated, which, by his ill-timed and treacherous discovery and communication, may be rendered abortive; telegraph or signalize naval expeditions so as effectually to baffle the object of their operations; negligently enforce its own municipal regulations, in total disregard of its own self-imposed neutral obligations, or culpably furnish shelter and asylum to known and declared belligerent enemies. All these contingencies may possibly happen from the loose practice of a professing neutral, who, having no sincerity in his assumed attitude of a declared neutrality, will be neither earnest nor constant in observing his neutral duty. Therefore, it is plain that a merely professing neutral may be positively more dangerous than an open and avowed ally. Against the latter, the belligerent may be put upon his guard, but against the former, he would be lulled into a fatal security. Among states, such effects and results should be studiously avoided and carefully guarded against. This will ever be the case, where an upright minister and faithful law officer may happen to be privileged advisers of an impartial and high-minded sovereign. While in 1793, England and France were at war, Washington's issued proclamation of neutrality was then faithfully adhered to, both by citizens and Secretaries, and its every instruction most strictly observed. The then Secretary of State, Mr. Jefferson, exhibited WASHINGTON'S NEUTRALITY ADHERED го. 579 his profound and precise knowledge of neutral duties, at that early period, and his administrative skill and ability in enforcing them. His letter to M. Genet of August 7, 1793, and that to Mr. Hammond of September 5, 1793, are masterly specimens of diplomatic directness and ability. The extent and limit to which reparation and redress would be made are plainly pointed out; nothing, indeed, is left vague or expressed equivocally. In his letter of August 7th, the American Secretary reminded M. Genet, that the President, by a letter of June 5th, desired that all those vessels which were armed in American ports to commit hostilities on nations at peace with the United States, should depart; and by letter of July 12th, that such vessels as remained or had left only to cruise on our coasts, should be detained. The Secretary further informed M. Genet, that he was now charged to state that "pursuant to positive assurances given in conformity to the law of nations, the President considers the United States bound to ef fectuate a restoration or make compensation." And for all subsequent captures, the French were expected to cause restitution; if not, then the United States will indemnify, and expect reimbursement of the French nation. For this reason, future fitting out will be prevented, and asylum refused in all American ports. And for the involuntary instrumentality of the United States in the fitting out and escape of these French cruisers, reparation was expected, and regret expressed that neutral injunctions had not been observed and the government consulted before the armaments were made or the cruisers dispatched from these shores. In Mr. Jefferson's letter to the English minister, Mr. 580 SECRETARY JEFFERSON'S ASSURANCES. Hammond, dated September 5, 1793, he assured the latter, First, that there would be an exclusion from all further asylum in American ports of French cruisers armed there, to depredate upon the commerce of a neutral and friendly nation, and that there would be a restitution of certain named vessels, as the Lass, Henry, and Jane of Dublin. Second, that if measures for restitution fail in their effect, then compensation for the vessels is to be made by the President. Third, that Great Britain should stand proximately on the same footing as other nations with which the United States had made special engagements by treaty. Fourth, that the governors of the several States were to be instructed to invoke the aid of the custom-house officers and employ all other means in their power for making restitution, at the same time soliciting from the English legation all information which it might impart calculated to check the illicit depredation in future; concluding thus: That the President contemplates restitution or compensation in cases before August 7, 1793; and after that date, restitution if practicable. Thus it may be perceived not only how faithfully Washington's Proclamation was, on his part, adhered to, but also how firmly and fairly the President's principal Secretary upheld and enforced the doctrines of that proclamation. Again, when M'Leod was indicted in New York for his confessed participation in the destruction of the Caroline, the British Government interposed, somewhat offensively, to shield the accused; and, on suitable rep CASES OF THE CAROLINE AND TRENT. 581 resentation that the act was adopted as the act of the government, McLeod was surrendered, or, at all events, never tried; the United States preferring, at the time, not to pursue the British subject, but hold the British Government hereafter to its precedent and practice. More recently still, when the British ministry, then declared neutrals, saw fit to make a peremptory demand for the return of some Confederate emissaries and other officers taken from the Trent upon the ground that there had been no legal adjudication of the intercepted post-office packet, the satisfaction exacted was readily accorded to them by the American Secretary. The compliance with the demand was entirely conformable to the doctrine and practice as maintained and followed by Americans. The opportunity was not, therefore, to be lost for their public official servants to inculcate, by example as well as precept, upon other states, the value of established principles and a steady adherence to them in all international intercourse with others, whether neutrals or belligerents. And although the particular infraction or delinquency, justifying the complaint, was indeed painful to all true Americans, yet the recognition by Great Britain of those settled principles so long practiced upon, and steadily adhered to, by the United States, was welcomed as a fitting and appropriate acceptance of the better interpretation of public law, and not, therefore, without some substantial compensation as a precedent. These examples well illustrate the comity and good faith observed by the United States in the past, and so likely to mark her conduct in the future, toward all nations, in her international policy and practice. A government or a people, whose example has been |