66 67 otherwise, the libellant cannot recover; but both parties may be adjudged blamable, and several cases of this description will be cited from the latest reports. The contest in collision cases, ordinarily, turns upon the proofs; the rules of law applicable being generally few, but clear, and well understood. Lord Stowell has stated these rules, generally as coming under four heads in the case of The Woodrop Sims, 2 Dods. 83. From the brevity and accuracy of his statement of the rules, the case itself has been as much cited in collision cases as perhaps any other known adjudication. He says: "There are four possibilities under which an accident of this sort may occur. In the first place, it may happen without blame being imputable to either party; as where the loss is occasioned by a storm, or any other vis major. In that case, the misfortune must be borne by the party on whom it happens to light; the other not being responsible to him in any degree. Secondly, a misfortune of this kind may arise when both parties are to blame; as where there has been a want of due diligence or of skill on both sides. In such a case the rule of law is, that the loss must be apportioned between them; as having been occasioned by the fault of both of them. Thirdly, it may happen by the misconduct of the suffering party only; and then the rule is, that the sufferer must bear his own burden. Lastly, it may have been the fault of the ship which ran the other down; and in this case, the injured party would be entitled to an entire compensation from the other, but not exceeding the value of the offending ship and cargo." The Trinity Masters considered the Woodrop Sims to blame, in running down the brig Industry, because the Sims had the wind free and ought to have got out of the way; and so it was decreed. Besides, the Masters of Trinity House in England and experts in the United States, when called upon to aid the Admiralty Court, have also their established rules. Those of the Trinity Masters, adopted in 1840, are recognized and substantially adopted in the United States. 1. That those ships having the wind fair shall "give way" to those on the wind. 2. That when both are going by the wind, the vessel on the starboard tack shall keep her wind; and the one on the larboard tack bear up; thereby passing each other on the larboard hand. 3. That when both vessels have the wind free, large, or a-beam, and meet, they shall pass each other in the same way, on the larboard hand, by putting the helm to port. Steam vessels are considered in the light of sailing vessels navigating with a fair wind, and should give way to sailing vessels on a wind on either tack. RULE FOR STEAM VESSELS. When steamers meet on different tacks or course, and there is danger, if their course is continued, of colision, each vessel shall put her helm to port. ADDITIONAL PROPOSED RULE. A vessel coming up with another should pass her to leeward. After the proofs are all exhibited, then the District Court, in the first instance, proceeds to pass upon the law and facts and give judgment. If the evidence be in writing, and the parties feel aggrieved, either or both may claim an appeal to the Circuit Court; if one OTHER RULES OF NAVIGATION. 69 party appeals, both ought to claim an appeal, as the better practice; and from the decision of the circuit judge, the case, by writ of error or appeal, may be carried to the Supreme Court at Washington, and there definitively determined. In addition to the Trinity rules, heretofore inserted in the text of this treatise, the increased application of the agency of steam in propelling vessels, has caused other and more stringent rules to be adopted, and the numerous cases in England and this country authorize the statement of them to be substantially as follows: Steam vessels must take all possible care to run clear of sailing vessels. A steamer passing, in a narrow channel, either a steam or sailing vessel, must so pass, as to leave the one to be passed on the larboard hand; whether she is meeting, or overtaking and passing, the other. Two steam vessels being so near as to risk collision, both must port the helm, so as to pass each other on the larboard side. "Port the helm " means larboard in contradistinction to starboard; and is so used to avoid confusion in giving orders. With these rules and such others as the growth of commerce may gradually render necessary to protect navigation and prevent marine torts and losses by collision, the practitioner has but the twofold duty to perform, of stating the law clearly; arranging his proofs lucidly; and then submit for decision the cause and his client's interest. In The Clement, 2 Curt. 368, there is a clear statement given of the rules of navigation by the learned jurist then presiding in the first circuit. Collision may properly be defined to be either one vessel running foul of another, or two vessels running foul of each other. Though losses by collision have recently produced much discussion, and many decisions, still, in reality, but little conflict is discoverable in those decisions or among the numerous writers on maritime law, who have incidentally discussed this species of marine loss and damage. Emerigon, Valin, Pardessus, and Boulay Paty, in marine affairs, are much referred to as well as the other writers noticed in the first chapter. The Roman law has become antiquated in its rule as to apportionment; differing entirely from that adopted in more modern times by other nations of Europe and particularly by Holland and England; which, in this respect, are in harmony with the United States. Indeed the most important rules are now well understood and correctly practiced upon in modern courts of admiralty; and the chief difficulty lies in reaching by the means of evidence the real source, origin, and cause of collision. If it happen at sea, on a dark night, or in a severe storm, much agitation, excitement, and consequent confusion would necessarily attend it; and so the evidence, derived from opposite sources, would naturally partake of the character of the scene; and thus the real cause would be inscrutable and might remain undiscoverable. If, on the other hand, the collision should happen in clear weather, in the day-time, in harbor, or in rivers navigable from the sea, or on any of the big lakes or other inland waters of the United States, then the evidence would be plain and the facts so clear that they would unerringly point to the blamable source and responsible cause of the disaster. If the party sued be in fault, or if it should appear that the collision was in consequence of his want of skill, care, knowledge, or prudence, then would he be deemed liable for damages. What is reasonable care depends very much upon the surrounding circumstances and the precise situation of the navigators. But there should always exist a common obligation between the parties to make every reasonable effort to avoid danger and a common responsibility in case of neglect. 6 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 401, Livingston v. Steam Towboat Express. If the libellant is so in fault that he or his agent substantially contributed to the injury, he cannot recover; nevertheless he may be only so in fault to a certain limited extent; but yet not to such extent as would prevent his recovering. 9 Car. & P. 613, Raisin v. Mitchel; 3 Mees. & Wels. 244, Bridge v. Grand Junction Railway Co.; 11 East, 60, Butterfield v. Forrester; 38 E. C. L. Rep. 254, note; 9 Car. & P. 601, Sills v. Brown. By whose fault the collision was occasioned is a question of fact for a jury. 1 How. 28, Smith v. Condry. Where the collision arose vi majore, without the fault or negligence of any one, open or concealed, the owners of the ship and cargo must bear their own loss; and it is not, in any form, a subject of apportionment, contribution, or general average. Where it resulted from error, inattention, want of sufficient precaution and proper care, and the blame is inscrutable, undiscoverable, or equally imputable to both parties, then is presented a question which to courts is most embarrassing; and the marine law, then, appor |