are of opinion that the present system, under which the certificate of a master or other officer is suspended, very frequently only for an error of judgment, should be entirely discontinued, and that neither the Court of Inquiry, nor the Board of Trade, should have the power of dealing with the certificate. We think that the certificate of the officer should never be suspended, but that, in cases to be provided for by express enactment, the tribunal before which the officer is tried should have the power of cancelling either all his certificates, or, at its discretion, his higher certificates, leaving him in these cases the power of finding employment in a lower grade.

The constitution of the Court of Inquiry must rest with the Executive Government. The evidence of Mr. O'Dowd, of Mr. Hamel, and of Mr. Farrer, indicates the nature of the change required, in order to secure a tribunal commanding public confidence.

We attach great importance to these Inquiries, as affording the best means of ascertaining on whom the culpability rests for losses at sea, and we believe that such Inquiries, followed by the proceedings which we have suggested, would be more conducive to the safety of life at sea, than many of the complex and minute regulations which Parliament has heretofore enacted.

CONCLUSION.

In closing our Report at the termination of this prolonged Inquiry it may be convenient that we should recapitulate briefly the general principles on which our recommendations are founded.

We consider that an improved system of inquiry into casualties at sea, such as we have above indicated, will afford the best means of guarding against future disasters. So far as we have been able to ascertain, the losses of life and property at sea, which may be directly ascribed to negligence of the shipowner, are few in comparison with those which are caused by subsequent neglect, or by events over which the shipowner has no control. A more searching system of inquiry may elicit the truth upon this subject. The statistics which we endeavoured to obtain on this head were not prepared in time to assist our investigations.

We attach great importance to our suggestion that the Marine Department of the Board of Trade should be revised and strengthened.

Some additional nautical assistance is requisite for the due performance of the duties now entrusted to the Board.

A legal adviser exclusively belonging to the Department is also essential for the conduct of the business.

It will be the duty of the Board of Trade to check the negligent, and to punish the culpable shipowner, but it is desirable that these functions should be performed without harassing the great body of

shipowners, who, by their ability and indefatigable energy, have contributed to the prosperity of the Empire.

In accordance with these views we have been anxious throughout our Report not to transfer responsibility from the shipowner to the Executive Government. It is the duty of the shipowner to keep his ship in a seaworthy condition, and to select competent officers and crew. We believe that under the arrangements suggested in our Report, the Board of Trade will have the means of ascertaining how far this duty has been fulfilled, and will then have the power to punish those persons who have been neglectful.

Such a policy, judiciously administered by the Board of Trade, will contribute to the greater safety of life at sea, and will thus tend to produce the results which this Commission was appointed to secure.

All which we humbly submit to Your Majesty's gracious consideration.

F. NAPIER BROOME, Secretary,

July 1, 1874.

SOMERSET.

ALFRED.

ESLINGTON.

THOS. MILNER GIBSON.

J. HOPE.

ARTHUR COHEN.

THOMAS BRASSEY.

P. DENNY.

GEORGE DUNCAN.

E. D. EDGELL.

CHARLES W. MERRIFIELD.

OFFICIAL CAUTION (^).

EXPLOSIONS OF COAL GAS ON BOARD SHIP.

The results of recent inquiries indicate that the simple and efficacious measures for preventing explosions of coal gas recommended by the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the spontaneous combustion of coal in ships are either insufficiently known to, or recklessly disregarded by, the persons chiefly interested in the safe carriage of coal by sea.

The attention of shipowners, shipmasters, colliery owners, coal brokers, underwriters and others is therefore directed to the conclusions arrived at by the Royal Commissioners, especially to their fifth recommendation, which is as follows:

"5. THAT WITH A VIEW TO GUARD AGAINST EXPLOSION, FREE AND CONTINUOUS EGRESS TO THE OPEN AIR, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE HATCHWAYS, SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR THE EXPLOSIVE GASES BY MEANS OF A SYSTEM OF SURFACE VENTILATION, EFFECTIVE IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEATHER."

WHICH WOULD BE

Certificated masters and officers are especially warned that neglect on their part will, in the event of accident, be brought to the notice of the Wreck Commissioner or of the Court investigating the case.

The Board of Trade also give notice that, as vessels laden with coal, insufficiently or improperly ventilated, are dangerous to human life, it is their intention, under the Acts 17 & 18 Vict., c. 104, s. 239, and 39 & 40 Vict., c. 80, s. 4, or any other Acts enabling them so to do, to prosecute those persons who in future send or take, or attempt to send or take, or are parties to sending or taking or attempting to send or take to sea British coal-laden ships which, on account of such insufficient or improper ventila. tion, are in such unseaworthy state that the life of any person is likely to be thereby endangered; and all persons who so neglect their duty in respect of ventilation as to cause danger to life or limb.

The other conclusions of the Commissioners to which the Board of Trade think it right to call the attention of those interested in the carriage of coal by sea, although not directly relating to the question of explosions of coal gas, are as follows, viz. :—

"2. That the breakage of coal in its transport from the pit to the ship's hold, the shipment of pyritic coal in a wet condition, and especially ventilation, through the body of coal cargoes, conduce to spontaneous combustion, even though the coal may not be unfit for conveyance on long voyages.

(*) See Introduction, page 27, note ("). See also page 28, note (").

"4. That when coal is being carried on long voyages the temperature in the various portions of the cargo should be tested periodically by thermometer and registered in the log."

All persons concerned would do well to peruse carefully the following condensed reports of inquiries which have been held in cases of explosion of coal gas in ships during the last four years (").

THOMAS GRAY, Assistant-Secretary,

July, 1881.

"LEVANT," of Liverpool.

T. H. FARRER, Secretary.

Official Number, 51,378.

On April 25th, 1877, the s.s. Levant, commenced to take in a cargo of South Wales coal of the description commonly called "Davis's Merthyr Steam Coal." She sailed from Cardiff on the 26th of the same month, bound for Gibraltar, and in consequence of heavy weather the hatches were battened down and were not removed until the 28th. At 6 a.m. on that day the mate gave orders for one hatch to be taken off each hold. This was done, but about threequarters of an hour afterwards an explosion took place in the forecastle, in consequence of one of the crew igniting a match. A Formal Investigation into the circumstances attending the casualty was held at Liverpool before T. S. Raffles, Esq., Stipendiary Magistrate, Captains Grant and Wilson acting as Assessors. The Court were of opinion that the explosion was clearly due to the want of proper ventilation, which caused an accumulation of gas in the forecastle, and considered that vessels carrying cargoes similar to that of the Levant should be fitted with efficient deck ventilators. Five men were injured by the explosion.

"SARDINIAN," of Glasgow. Official Number, 71,695.

The Sardinian (an iron screw steamer of 2,577 tons register) left Liverpool on May 9th, 1878, bound for Quebec, and anchored at Moville, Lough Foyle, where the explosion occurred the following morning. The Court of Inquiry held at Liverpool before the Wreck Commissioner (Commander Foster and Captain Castle acting as Assessors), found that the casualty was due to the gas from 405 tons of Nixon's, Crawshay's, and Ebbw Vale coal, which was stowed in the lower main-hold for the ship's use, having been allowed to accumulate in the 'tween-decks, there being no ventilation whatever from either the main-hold or the 'tween-decks, and to a light having been taken into the 'tween-decks when the air was in a highly explosive state. The Court were also of opinion that ventilating shafts fitted with cowls, causing a continuous current of air over the surface of the coal, would effectually prevent such explosions. Four lives were lost by the casualty.

(*) See also Official Caution of July, 1882; cases collected under the head of "Imperfect Ventilation," pages 250, 251.

"CHRYSOLITE," of Liverpool. Official Number, 29,924.

On June 4th, 1878, the s.s. Chrysolite, was berthed in the Alexandra Dock at Newport, and on the same day took in a cargo of Abercarn coal, 300 tons being shipped in the fore-hold, and about the same quantity being put in the after-hold. The vessel then commenced to ship bunker coal, and the foreman gave orders for the hatches to be put on. The coal was then tipped on the top of the hatches and wheeled from thence to the bunkers. The chief mate of the Chrysolite had given orders to be called at 2 o'clock in the morning, in order to take off the hatches, but at that hour the explosion, by which four lives were lost, occurred. The Coroner's jury brought in a verdict to the effect that the explosion was accidental, but recommended that greater care should be used in future in shipping gaseous coal, and that bunker coal should be shipped first, in order to obviate the closing of the vessel's hatches while in dock.

"CADUCEUS," of London. Official Number, 70,687.

This screw steamship, of 1,179 tons register, arrived at Cardiff on June 24th, 1878, having previously discharged a cargo of grain at Antwerp. She commenced to ship a coal cargo on the same day, and by the morning of the 28th had taken on board 2,180 tons of coal from the Ferndale Collieries. Semi-anthracite coal is known to be of a most explosive nature, and the owners of the collieries from whence it is obtained, issue notices to captains cautioning them of this fact, and warning them to keep their hatches open for several days after the completion of loading, and stating that no flame should be permitted in the hold or any other part of the vessel where gas might collect. There is also a bye-law of the Penarth Dock Company to the same effect. The only means of ventilation adopted on board the Caduceus, was by four holes cut along the side of the lower-deck, and these apertures were clearly not intended for purposes of ventilation, but with a view to the carriage of grain cargoes-so that the grain in the 'tween-decks might find its way into the lower hold. Forward of the fore-hatch there was no possible means for the gas to escape, and the lower fore-hatch was quite filled up with coal, halfway up the coamings. The coal had been freshly worked, and was in a condition to give off large quan tities of gas. Although the hatches were not put on, it is certain that the gas had no means of escape, as when the explosion occurred the lower fore-hatch was so securely closed by the coal that the flame did not find its way out through the hatchway, but through the slits or holes much further aft. The Wreck Commissioner, before whom the Inquiry was held, was of opinion that had the vessel been fitted with two ventilators-one in the forepart of the lower hold passing through the seamen's berths and up through the deck, and another at the other end of the vessel-the casualty would not have occurred. Five men were seriously injured by the explosion.