numbers. They were assessed for duty by the collector under paragraphs 199, 420, and 452 of that act, according as these paragraphs were applicable in the view taken by the collector.

The only claim asserted by the importer, appellant, necessary of consideration in our view of the case, is that the goods are included within the terms of paragraph 633 of said act, for "needles, hand sewing and darning," and therefore dutiable as nonenumerated manufactured articles under paragraph 480 of the act.

It was admitted at the hearing that the chief value of the merchandise resided in the needles, and the appeal was expressly limited by the appellant to the cases containing only hand-sewing needles. The subject matter of decision, therefore, is an entirety, consisting of needle cases filled with hand sewing needles, the cases being made entirely of paper and the needles of steel, and. as between the two, the chief component material of value being the needles.

The Government contends, and the board held, that the merchandise is properly dutiable as manufactures in chief value of metal. The appellant contends that under the peculiar language of paragraph 164 the merchandise is not so dutiable, because the component material of chief value of the entireties is hand sewing needles, which are precisely within the provisions of paragraph 633 of the free list, and not otherwise provided for in the act.

The exact distinction contended for is that needles are a separate tariff entity from the metal of which they are made, so denominated in paragraph 633, and so expressly assigned for duty under the proviso under consideration. Paragraph 480 in terms confines "component material of chief value" to each single component material. This proviso carves out an exception to that rule and provides for the ascertainment of duty according to a component material of chief value consisting of "articles" made up of several single component materials.

The dutiable classification of needle cases filled with needles has been the subject of extended litigation and conflicting decisions. See Wanamaker v. Cooper (69 Fed. Rep., 465), United States v. Mathews (78 Fed. Rep., 345), Guthman v. United States (148 Fed. Rep., 332; T. D. 27501), Dieckerhoff v. United States (151 Fed. Rep., 957; T. D. 27949), United States v. Dieckerhoff (160 Fed. Rep., 449; T. D. 28716).

The decision in this case depends entirely upon the construction to be given the phrase "as entireties according to the component material of chief value therein." The philosophy of the board applicable to the case is expressed as follows:

That it is necessary to draw a line between component parts as distinguished from component materials appears to us to be unquestioned.

While the reasoning of the board, as applied to the general provisions of paragraph 481 of the tariff act of 1909 for the ascertainment of the component material of chief value of manufactured articles is without question, we do not consider that it is applicable to

the case at bar. The cases cited by the learned general appraisers, and the instances, subject of comment, relating to manufactured articles in exposition of the rule of ascertainment of component material of chief value and applied by the board in this case, is expressly by statute confined to articles, and not to entireties made up of articles, and relates to the component material of chief value of such articles, the same having been manufactured. Not relying upon this provision in instances of needle cases, and obviously intending a different rule, the Congress has singled out such and laid down a special rule for the determination of dutiable value to be ascertained according to the chief component article included within and going to make up the entirety.

Under the rules of grammatical and legal reference the words "component material of chief value therein," as used in the provision of paragraph 164, are referable to the word "entireties" preceding. The statute speaks in this case of the chief component material of an entirety, and not the chief component material of an article or manufacture. The courts, notably in United States v. Dieckerhoff (160 Fed. Rep., 449), had held that needle cases filled with needles could not be spoken of as articles composed wholly or in part of metal. The court said, speaking through Judge Lacombe:

The case itself is composed of paper, and the suggestion that, when needles are stored in it, it becomes an article composed in part of metal, seems about as reasonable as would be the proposition that a square pasteboard box becomes an article composed in part of rubber when it is filled with rubber bands.

The component materials which were immediately assembled in the making up of this entirety, the merchandise in its assembled and imported condition, which the statute denominates an entirety, was made of needles and books of paper. In the specific instance the statute makes an article a component material of an entirety. The component materials, therefore, of these entireties are needles and books of paper. If, therefore, the needles are the component material of chief value, the entirety is dutiable. according as the needles therein are dutiable. In this instance such needles are free eo nomine. Were the books of paper the component material of chief value in the entirety the articles would be dutiable in the manner such books of papers are made dutiable under the tariff laws.

There is, in the opinion of the court, nothing unreasonable or impossible of administration in this conclusion, and there is nothing in the instances suggested in the opinion of the board that militates against this statement or renders administration of the customs laws hereunder either impossible or unreasonable.

Congress having specifically provided in this instance that the dutiable integers should be a component material consisting of an article of manufacture, the reasoning in and conclusion of this case does not carry it beyond the language employed by the Congress.

The chief component article, hand sewing needles, which is the chief component material of the entirety in this case, being specifically

provided for in the free list, paragraph 633, the case is controlled in principle by Hartranft v. Sheppard (125 U. S., 337). The subject of that decision was quilts composed of cotton and eider down or silk and eider down, the eider down in each case being the component material of chief value. The court said:

Quilts are nonenumerated manufactured articles, composed of two or more materials. Eider down is on the free list. * * As eider down is the component

*

material of chief value in the quilts involved in this suit and that is free, it follows that they are manufactured articles not provided for, and therefore chargeable with the duty of 20 per cent ad valorem under section 2513 rather than 35 per cent as a manufacture of cotton or 50 per cent as a manufacture of which silk is the component material of chief value.

Dieckerhoff v. United States (T. D. 27949; 151 Fed. Rep., 957). The merchandise is properly dutiable, therefore, as a nonenumerated manufactured article under the provisions of said paragraph 480.

For the reasons herein stated we think the Board of General Appraisers erred, and the decision of the board should be reversed.

DOWNING & Co. v. UNITED STATES (No. 594).1

PULP IN SHEETS MADE FROM COTTON OR LINEN RAGS.

Previous to the present enactment the board had in several opinions construed "manufactures of cotton," and there is a strong presumption that that construction was adopted in the law as it is. Pulp made of cotton rags or linen rags by processes that do not destroy the integrity or strength of the fibers has undergone no such chemical change as would make these goods dutiable by similitude; the pulp was rightly held dutiable, according to the material, as a manufacture of cotton under paragraph 332, or as a manufacture of flax under paragraph 358, tariff act of 1909.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, December 6, 1911. APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7156 (T. D. 31235). [Affirmed.]

Brown & Gerry for appellants.

Wm. K. Payne, Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Martin T. Baldwin on the brief), for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, and MARTIN, Judges. MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The importation in this case consists of sheets of pulp made from cotton rags and linen rags. The process of manufacture is described as follows: The rags, after being sorted, are cleaned and cut; then they go into boilers and subsequently into beaters to be beaten up into a soft fiber; next they are bleached, and finally sent to a drying machine and put into sheets or rolls. This rag pulp as imported is intended to be made into paper of a high quality.

The Board of General Appraisers found that in paper making from pulp the object sought is to draw out of the rags the fibers in a very fine state while preserving their strength as far as possible; that it is

1 Reported in T. D. 32093 (21 Treas. Dec., 712).

the "tissue" resulting from the deposition of the fibers on wire cloth while suspended in water that we know as, and term, paper; that the strength and integrity of the fibers determine the quality of the paper; that the rags are broken and pulped, but that neither the mechanical nor the chemical treatment thereof breaks or destroys the fiber itself.

The importation in this case was assessed for duty at 30 per cent ad valorem under the provisions of paragraph 415 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, as paper not specially provided for. It was held by the Board of General Appraisers to be dutiable at 45 per cent ad valorem as manufactures of cotton or as manufactures of flax, it being immaterial as to whether the component material of chief value was flax or cotton, as if in chief value of cotton, it would be dutiable under paragraph 332, and if in chief value of flax, under paragraph 338, at the same rate, namely, 45 per cent ad valorem.

The claim made by the importer is that the importation is dutiable by similitude to wood pulp under paragraph 406 by authority of the similitude clause in paragraph 481. Paragraph 406 provides for mechanically ground wood pulp and chemical wood pulp. It is conceded that this should be given the higher rate of duty, namely, one-fourth of a cent per pound imposed on chemically ground wood pulp bleached. The question, therefore, is whether the importation is provided for in the tariff act by either paragraph 352 or paragraph 358, dependent upon which material (cotton or flax) is of chief value, or whether it is to be treated as a nonenumerated manufactured article and therefore dutiable by similitude to wood pulp.

While the dutiability of this material as cotton or flax has never been determined by the courts other than by the Board of General Appraisers, it has had consideration in three cases by the board. In the matter of the protest of J. W. Hampton, jr., & Co., G. A. 1866 (T. D. 13594), the subject of the protest was bleached cotton pulp, dried in sheets or cakes, to be used for filtering purposes. It was returned by the appraiser as a manufacture of cotton, and assessed for duty at 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 355 of the act of 1890. It was claimed to be dutiable as manufactures of wood or other pulp. It was found that the article in question was itself cotton pulp and not an article manufactured from or of cotton pulp, and being a manufacture of cotton, it was held to be properly assessed for duty by the collector.

In the matter of the protest of Hugo Reisinger, G. A. 2414 (T. D. 14692), certain pulp was assessed for duty at 40 per cent ad valorem as a manufacture of cotton under paragraph 355 of the tariff act of 1890. It was claimed to be free, as paper stock, crude; or, if dutiable, at 20 per cent under section 4 as a nonenumerated manufactured article; or at 25 per cent, as a manufacture of paper under paragraph 425; or at 35 per cent, as a manufacture wholly or chiefly of wood

under paragraph 461. The board found the merchandise to be composed of cotton, flax, and wood, cotton the component material of chief value, and that it was not crude paper stock; and found that cotton, being the component material of chief value therein, the same was dutiable as a manufacture of cotton under paragraph 355.

With this construction of the term "manufactures of cotton" before it, Congress enacted the present statute, and a strong presumption arises that the term is used in the present act in the sense in which it had been interpreted by the board.

It is claimed, however, that in principle the question had been otherwise decided by the courts, and the case of Meyer v. Arthur (91) U. S., 570) is relied upon as a leading case upon the subject. In that case the question presented was whether white lead, nitrate of lead, oxide of zinc, and dry orange mineral are manufactures of metal within the meaning of the act of August 1, 1872, levying duties upon the manufactures of metals, or of which the metals, or either of them, is the component material of chief value. In that case the products in question were the products of metals which had undergone a chemical change and which had become something else than metals. Their characteristics as metal had disappeared. The metal had completely lost its identity and become a different mineral species.

In the present case the paragraph imposing a duty upon the manufactures of flax, hemp, ramie, or other vegetable fiber clearly indicates that the preservation of the fiber is sufficient to bring the article within the general term, "flax, hemp, or ramie." We think the same thing can be said of cotton, under paragraph 332, that it is the cotton fiber which is the crude cotton meant by the paragraph. In the present case, as the finding of facts indicates, the fibers of the cotton are retained. It is true they are cut somewhat; but the strength and integrity of the fibers determine the quality of the paper. It can not be said that they have disappeared or undergone a complete chemical change, as was the case in Meyer v. Arthur.

The case T. D. 27866 is cited as sustaining the contention of the importers. In that case the question was whether sawdust was a crude article used in dyeing within the meaning of the tariff act. The assessment was for waste not specially provided for. No question appears to have been raised as to whether sawdust was a manufacture of wood, and the case therefore is not in point. On the other hand, ground particles of wood, or wood flour, produced intentionally by the grinding operation, have been held to be dutiable as a manufacture of wood. Goldman v. United States (87 Fed Rep., 193); Nairn Linoleum Co. v. United States (151 Fed. Rep., 955).

The importers also cite the case, G. A. 1128 (T. D. 12356). The question there was whether a pulp produced from straw and reduced to fibers by beating or cutting with knives was dutiable as a manufacture of straw. It was held that the. pulp, presenting none of the dis