the vote has been announced, if made before the House has passed to other business.1

2244. The yeas and nays may be demanded while the House is dividing.

2245. An order, or refusal of yeas and nays may be reconsidered.2

2246. After the roll has commenced and a member has answered to his name, the call must progress without debate.3

2247. A member has the right to have an erroneous record of his vote corrected-after the announcement of the vote, and to change his vote before said announcement.5 See VOTE.

2248. The yeas and nays cannot be ordered on the reconsideration of a motion which cannot be decided by yeas and nays, i. e., seconding the previous question."

2249. Tellers may be ordered on seconding the previous question."

2250. The yeas and nays may be ordered on the main question.8

2251. Upon taking the yeas and nays on excusing a member from voting, see C. L. & P. 1795, 1800, 1833; 2 Hats. 177, n.; Hans. (1) 37. 1107. See VOTE.

2252. "When no provision is made, either by the Constitution, or the laws, in reference to taking questions by yeas and nays, or as to the right of one or more of the members to dissent from, and protest against the proceedings, these subjects may be, and usually are, especially the former, regulated by the rules and orders of the assembly."9

APPENDIX.

LETTER OF GOV. BAKER

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA.

[The following communication from Gov. CONRAD Baker, of Indiana, explains how it came to be written. Instead of using the materials furnished by him, I have thought it advisable to embody the entire communication in his own language.]

MAJOR O. M. WILSON.

EXECUTIVE DEpartment,

INDIANAPOLIS, November 19, 1868. }

Dear Sir:-Some time ago, in a conversation between us, in relation to the proposed publication of a new and improved edition of your valuable DIGEST OF PARLIAMENTARY LAW, I suggested that you would add to the utility and completeness of the work by appending a chapter on the peculiarities of the Constitution of this State, so far as these relate to parliamentary law and legislative practice. I, at the same time, stated some of the points which I thought deserved attention. You subsequently requested me to reduce the suggestions I had made to writing, which I promised to do. I now propose to fulfil that promise.

I propose first, to consider the provisions of the Constitution

as to Bills and Joint Resolutions.

It is a well-established principle of parliamentary law that, when the legislative body is governed by a written constitution, which prescribes the enacting words or style of the laws, nothing

can be a law which is not introduced by these very words— equivalent words will not do. The Constitution of the United States prescribes no style or enacting words for the government of the National Legislature in the passage of laws; nor does it require that laws shall be enacted by bill, by resolution, or in any other specified form, thereby leaving it discretionary with Congress in both respects. It does require, however, that not only every bill, but every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of both Houses may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the President for his approval or disapproval, thereby making the President, to a limited extent, a part of the law-making power, without regard to the form which the legislation may assume.

From this statement it is manifest, that the practice in Congress can furnish no guide in a state, the constitution of which prescribes rules for the government of the law-making power.

The first Constitution of Indiana, adopted in 1816, contained this provision, viz.: "The style of the laws of this state shall be: 'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana.""

In practice, this provision was not construed to prohibit the Legislature from enacting laws by joint resolution. By the same Constitution of 1816, the Governor's qualified veto power extended not only to every bill, but also to every resolution to which the concurrence of both Houses might be necessary, so that every law, whether enacted by bill or joint resolution, was the subject of Executive supervision.

The present Constitution, adopted in 1851, is so different from the old one on these points, that it seems to be difficult to misunderstand the significance of the change.

By the Constitution of 1851, in article 4, section 1, it is provided as follows, viz. : "The style of every law shall be: Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, and no law shall be enacted except by bill."

The 14th section of the 5th article in terms limits the qualified veto of the Governor to bills; and, as there is no authority

whatever in the Constitution for submitting any resolution, or joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses, to the Governor for his approval or disapproval, it is plain that his approval of any such resolution could give it no validity, scope, or effect, which it would not have without such approval, and his veto in such case would be simply void. If a law may be enacted by joint resolution, it follows that it may be done without submitting the resolution to the Governor: if, however, the Legislature shall elect to proceed by bill, the bill, when passed, must be submitted to Executive supervision. Such a Constitution results in the absurdity, that the Governor is or is not a part of the law-making power, as the Legislature shall in each act of legislation decide. If it determines to act by bill, he is a part of the law-making power; if it elects to proceed by joint resolution, he is not.

Other restraints thrown around the passage of bills, and omitted as to the passage of joint resolutions, also prove that these restrictions were applied in the one case and omitted in the other, for the reason that a bill can, and a joint resolution cannot, be made the vehicle of passing a law. They are as follows, viz. Article 4, section 17, requires, "that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives."

If a law may be passed by joint resolution, a revenue law may be passed in that shape, and the result would be that a tax bill must originate in the House, but a joint resolution to raise revenue may originate either in the Senate or in the House.

Again, by Article 4, section 18, every bill must be read by sections on three several days in each House, unless two-thirds of the House where the bill is depending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, dispense with this rule; but the reading of a bill by sections on its final passage, shall not be dispensed with. No such restriction is imposed on the passage of joint resolutions. Why is this, unless it be because a law cannot be passed by joint resolution, and therefore the restriction was not deemed to be necessary?

By section 19, of article 4, it is provided that, every act shall

embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. There is no such restriction as to a joint resolution; and such a resolution may embrace a variety of subjects, and may be valid for any purpose for which it is legitimate, without any title whatever. Why this restriction, unless it be that a law may be passed by bill, and may not by joint resolution?

Section 21, of article 4, prohibits any act from being revised or amended by mere reference to its title; but the act revised, or section amended, must be set forth and published at full length. There is no similar provision as to joint resolutions, simply because laws cannot be made by such resolutions.

By section 28, of article 4, it is provided that no act shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of this state by authority, except in cases of emergency, &c.

There is no like provision as to the taking effect of joint resolutions. Why this requirement of publication in the one case and its omission in the other, unless it be that acts duly passed are laws, whilst joint resolutions are not?

The Constitution would seem to be so plain on this subject, as to render what has been already said more than sufficient, were it not for the fact that the Legislature has at nearly every session since the adoption of the Constitution, attempted to pass laws through the medium of joint resolutions, and this practice received at least a partial sanction from the Supreme Court in the case of The State v. Bailey (decided in 1861), 16th Indiana Reports, page 46.

It has already been shown that, there is no warrant in the present Constitution for submitting a joint resolution to the Governor for his approval, although such submission was expressly required by the old Constitution. So inveterate, however, has become the habit of submitting such resolutions for Executive approval, that the joint rules of the two Houses in 1863 and in 1865, and perhaps at other sessions, in express terms required such submission.