TO THE SAME.

July, 1794. (Extract.)

It has been objected by a fine writer to your prime favourite, Mr. Locke's important refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas, and to the well-known comparison of the intellect to a sheet of blank paper, that " on the paper may be written, sugar is bitter, "wormwood is sweet, gratitude is base, envy is "noble; but no force nor fraud can ever print such "impressions on the mind. The human soul,' it is added, "has predetermined sentiments and tastes "springing from a source beyond experience, custom,

Now, this objection, though it has a plausible appearance, is not an accurate statement of the fact. Authority, and even accident, do frequently inscribe false propositions on the minds both of young and old. The memory and the understanding are tabulæ" for testimony and experience to write upon;

rasæ

though testimony and experience, it is true, are controuled by the natures of physical and of moral existence, by our senses and by our feelings of pain and pleasure: that is, by the very constitution both of the universe and of ourselves. It is indis

putable that our senses do not usually write nonsense or falsehood on the memory; but it is equally true that, their evidence being mistaken, they do so occasionally, and nothing but patient, persevering analysis, can efface or correct the inscriptions. The difference between visible and tangible magnitude, and, to use more homely examples, the delusive perceptions of pain in an amputated limb, and the appearances on the banks of a river while we are sailing, "terræque urbesque recedunt" are decisive proofs of erroneous conclusions. Indeed it requires much caution to form right opinions, and, as Dr. Moore observes, "if ideas were innate, it would save "much trouble to many worthy persons"

Leibnitz, after truly representing Locke's doctrine as an exemplification of the ancient maxim, "Nihil "est in intellectu quod non priùs fuerat in sensu"

adds, "nisi intellectus ipse" and Mr. Dugald Stewart warmly praises the acuteness of this remark. But how can any man think highly of an axiom which has absurdity in its very expression? Only strike out the middle clause, and see what can be made of "Nihil est in intellectu nisi intellectus ipse" Why! the question itself in discussion is, "what are the "laws of the intellect, and how do they originate?

In replying to this inquiry we must, at present, mention instinct as well as perception, though, since the principle of association (that great sensitive and intellectual law!) has been carefully traced, the theory of instinct is daily becoming less and less necessary to account for the phenomena. Here lie (and but little below the surface) the seeds of a rich harvest for the sickle of future metaphysicians. Sensation and association will probably be found to account for nearly all the appearances. Thus, in Ethics, the existence of a moral sense cannot be doubted; but its instinctive, innate origin is, I suppose, given up by most philosophers, and habit, unavoidable habit, is admitted to be its source.

A stumble at the threshold, not unlike Leibnitz' false-step, occurs in the elementary dictum of some eminent modern materialists: "Movent sed non "promovent " Two great teachers in this school have defined an idea to be "a motion in the brain

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perceived " Now, did any man ever perceive a motion in his brain? There may be, and there probably is a motion there, and it may be followed by perception; but who has ever perceived the motion, or detected the connection? Anatomists and physiologists may do their utmost, but there will always remain an undiscovered something between the bodily organ and the percipient power.

In subjects of this kind (and indeed in all subjects) it is best to learn, as it were, the alphabet of the doctrine. Many a time something may be found in the first chapter of a book, rendering it needless to read on, and when it happens otherwise, still the benefit of examining first principles is great.

The ascent from the bottom of the hill may be fatiguing, but, when the summit is attained, what a prospect! What a distance between a minute

examination of the mere letters composing a word, and the sublime theory that may be disclosed in its import!

You must sometimes have been surprised by the length of your journeys.

TO FRANCIS HORNER, ESQ.

Fredley Farm, 18th June, 1805.

I AM not surprised that you have reflected as you say, "again and again" on the subject of our singular conversation, although you still smile at our having fallen upon such a topic, in our long walk among the woods of NORBURY. No subject can well be more important and none is more perplexing -it is a sea almost without a shore.

In Turgot's article, "Existence," he hardly exaggerates, though he says, "Les degrés de proba"bilité, dont une juste estime et une exacte mésure "seroient le comble de la sagacité et de la pru"dence."